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Abstract
Integration, implementation and coherence are major concerns in international
debates on environmental and sustainable development governance. It is a
common argument that governance within and across jurisdictional levels is
fragmented. Mainstream debates have nonetheless overlooked the emergence of
regime complexes or loosely coupled systems of institutions in areas of
environmental and sustainable development governance. Scholars have recently
observed that regime complexes co-evolve with governmental policy-making such
that changes in one of them can stimulate adjustments in the other. An open
question, however, is whether that co-evolution extends to the ambit of national
implementation. This needs to be examined to determine whether, and to what
extent, coherence or synergy between institutional and implementation
arrangements arises spontaneously in conditions of regime complexity, and
whether it can be improved within existing governance structures rather than
through institutional change. This research develops an approach to examine the
co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation systems. Using an
abductive research strategy, it analyses the observed (but not yet researched) gap
between global integration in the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral
environmental agreements and national co-ordination of implementation activities.
National implementation is explored in countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Empirical evidence is collected from interviews with public officials and
practitioners, and from documentary sources. Materials are examined through
thematic analysis approaches. Results reveal that institutional and implementation
arrangements display similar evolution patterns, notwithstanding of which an
implementation gap is evident. Cross-level interactions have been unidirectional
(from the global to the national levels) with no clear evidence of positive feedback
loops. Structure constrains, but does not impede, more cohesive evolutions. The
analysis provides evidence for the co-evolution of regime complexes and national
implementation systems, but concludes that co-evolution needs to be steered if
coherent governance is to be achieved at the pace and degree required to address
pressing problems. The thesis challenges proposals for institutional reform,
supporting instead policy interventions within existing structures.
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1 Introduction
Rockström et al.’s (2009) influential work on planetary boundaries outlined the safe
operating levels of nine biophysical subsystems essential for human survival.
According to their paper, the boundaries of three Earth-system processes (climate
change, rate of biodiversity loss and nitrogen cycle) have already been
overstepped, with other boundaries being at risk due to the inter-linked nature of
life support systems. The current system of international environmental governance
(IEG) has failed to counteract these trends. Scholars have observed that the
incremental approach through which IEG has evolved since the 1972 UN
Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 5-16 June) is inadequate to
bring about the transformative structural change that is needed (Biermann et al.,
2012). Recently, on occasion of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable
Development (Rio+20) (20-22 June 2012), a group of academic experts and policy
practitioners called for a fundamental restructuring of the institutional framework for
sustainable development (IFSD), including its environmental pillar, seeing 2012 as
a “charter moment” comparable to 1945 when UN institutions were established to
deal with issues of peace and security (Kanie et al., 2012). Indeed, the post-war
institutional order faces new governance challenges which it was not prepared to
address (Held and Young, 2013).
Proposals for empowering the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
and clustering compatible multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) were
common in early IEG debates (e.g. von Moltke 2001a, 2001b; Biermann, 2000) and
resurfaced on the eve of the Rio+20 Conference (see Biermann et al., 2012;
Ivanova, 2012, 2011; Wehrli, 2012). While these proposals have been criticised on
both substantive and procedural grounds (e.g. Oberthür and Gehring, 2004), they
have informed recent changes in the IEG system. On 21 December 2012, at its 67th
session, the UN General Assembly decided to strengthen and upgrade UNEP in a
number of areas, including membership, funding, administrative operation, co-
ordination mandate, the science-policy interface, information dissemination and
awareness raising, capacity building, and stakeholder participation (UN General
Assembly Res. 67/213). In this context, the UNEP’s governing body was
transformed from a 58-member body (known as the UNEP’s Governing Council) to
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an entity with universal membership (the UNEP’s United Nations Environment
Assembly) (UN General Assembly Res. 67/251). In parallel, from 28 February to 10
May 2013, the governing bodies of the conventions dealing with chemicals and
hazardous waste safety held back-to-back meetings culminating in a joint session
and a ministerial segment where commitments were made to deepen co-operation
and collaboration (Secretariat of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions,
2013). The events marked a new turning point in the clustering process initiated in
2006 with UNEP’s proposal to streamline the secretariats of the three conventions
(see Perry, 2012; Selin, 2010). The UNEP’s Executive Director, Achim Steiner,
described the 2013 meetings as “a unique historic event coming at a time of
unprecedented change and progress in the arena of global environmental
governance. The strengthening of UNEP and the synergies process of chemicals
and waste multilateral environmental agreements are complementary parts of the
on-going reform to fortify the environmental dimension of sustainable development”
(Secretariat of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions, 2013, no
pagination). It nonetheless remains uncertain whether these developments will
generate the swift transformative changes required, and, in the case of clustering,
whether experiences in the chemicals and hazardous waste sector could be more
widely replicated.
In some strands of the literature (but not yet in policy debates), regime complexes
have emerged as a pragmatic option to address contemporary governance
challenges. Regime complexes are loosely coupled systems of institutions dealing
with a common subject matter (Orsini et al., 2013; Keohane and Victor, 2011).
Unlike single-issue regimes, they are rarely the result of political negotiation, but
arise spontaneously through institutional interaction (Gehring and Faude, 2010).
They have advantages over comprehensive institutions such as flexibility across
issues and adaptability over time (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Regime complexes
may not necessarily be better than integrated institutions (ibid.). Some would even
claim that regime complexes should ideally evolve towards more comprehensive
governance systems (Morin and Orsini, 2013a; Young, 2012), with the trade regime
formed around the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and, more recently, the
cluster of chemicals and hazardous waste conventions, providing examples of such
transitions. Nevertheless, in such cases where political realities make
comprehensive institutional systems impossible, regime complexes offer viable
solutions to governance dilemmas (Keohane and Victor, 2011).
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Political debates on environmental and sustainable development governance have
focussed narrowly on institutional reform (Nilsson and Persson, 2012). Global
institutional architectures are important to manage inter-dependencies between
planetary boundaries. However, emphasis on institutional reform diverts attention
away from the core functions that governance needs to fulfil, including reducing
risks and vulnerabilities, triggering transformation of economic development, and
developing a diversity of options (ibid.). Furthermore, overarching approaches often
neglect the fact that biophysical subsystems exhibit different problem structures
which demand different governance responses (Schmidt, 2013). Earth-system
processes like climate change create globally systemic changes, whereas others
like biodiversity loss cause global environmental change due to their cumulative
effects (Turner II et al., 1990). Regime complexes seem to assuage these
concerns due to their flexibility and adaptability. Complexes certainly need to be
managed to be functional (Keohane and Victor, 2011), but management within
existing governance structures is a more practical and workable option than a
hypothetical overhaul of international governance arrangements.
Action at lower levels of social organisation also needs to be considered because
planetary boundaries demand a multi-level governance (MLG) perspective (Nilsson
and Persson, 2012). It is here where the appeal of regime complexes is less
obvious, with some scholars observing that regime complexity can trigger
implementation politics, allowing states to decide how overlapping commitments
are interpreted and applied in practice (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Raustiala and
Victor, 2004). Morin and Orsini (2013a) point out that regime complexity poses a
problem of policy coherence at the national level, but they also suggest that regime
complexity and policy coherency co-evolve such that changes at one level prompt
adjustments at the other. However, they approach the problem of policy coherence
from the perspective of foreign policy and it is thus unclear whether the co-
evolution argument can be extended to the ambit of public policy where national
implementation occurs. Examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy
coherence from a public policy angle is important to assess whether the problem-
solving properties ascribed to regime complexes are justified (Stoddard (2012) has
recently criticised this approach). Such a focus is not at odds with an MLG
perspective: as studies on national implementation have noticed (e.g. Chasek,
2010; Gray, 2003), the co-evolution of global and national policies can be facilitated
and/or hampered by developments at regional and sub-national levels of
governance.
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This research aimed to understand the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence from a public policy perspective, with an empirical focus on
biodiversity governance as an IEG arena where collective action is urgently needed
to reverse negative trends. Three research questions are addressed as follows:
1. Do regime complexes and national implementation systems display similar
evolution patterns?
2. How do regime complexes and national implementation systems influence
each other?
3. What factors affect the co-evolution of regime complexes and national
implementation systems?
The analysis explores developments at two main levels of governance: international
and national. There has been limited theorising (if at all) of the regional and local
dimensions of international regime complexity to pursue an MLG approach to the
co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence. Developing such an
approach was beyond the scope of this research (when the study started, the co-
evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence had not even been
problematized in the literature). However, by deepening knowledge of the global
and national dimensions of co-evolution, this research constitutes a building block
towards a more comprehensive MLG approach to examining the inter-
connectedness of regime complexes and policy coherence.
Findings of this study are policy-relevant. Integration, coherence and
implementation are central concerns in IEG policy debates. These three themes
underlie the system-wide responses to IEG challenges identified by a consultative
group of ministers established by the UNEP’s Governing Council to consider the
reform of IEG (Bernstein and Brunée, 2011). The group, which met twice in Nairobi
(7-9 July) and Helsinki (21-23 September) in 2010, proposed five institutional
reform options to implement the system-wide responses (see Table 1.1). Emphasis
on institutional form is strongly driven by the perceived fragmentation of
governance within and across jurisdictional levels (see UNEP, 2009; Najam et al.,
2007; Knigge et al., 2005). Loose coupling within regime complexes (Keohane and
Victor, 2011) and between regime complexes and governmental policy-making
(Morin and Orsini, 2013a, 2013b) suggest, however, that fragmentation is less
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serious than is implied. By deepening understanding of horizontal and vertical inter-
connections in IEG, this study raises the question of whether policy interventions
within existing governance structures, as opposed to changes in institutional form,
can enhance integration, coherence and implementation in IEG. This thesis is thus
of particular interest to policy-makers, international officials, and practitioners
involved in IEG reform processes.
Table 1.1 The Nairobi-Helsinki outcome of the UNEP’s Consultative Group of
Ministers or High-Level Representatives on International Environmental
Governance
Potential system-wide responses to
IEG challenges
Institutional reform options to
implement system-wide responses
Strengthening the science-policy
interface
Developing a system-wide strategy for
the environment in the UN system
Encouraging synergies between
compatible MEAs
Enhancing linkages between policy-
making and financing
Developing a system-wide capacity-
building framework for the environment
to meet country needs
Strengthening regional presence to
increase country responsiveness and
implementation
Enhancing UNEP
Establishing a new umbrella
organisation for sustainable
development;
Establishing a specialised agency such
as a world environment organisation
Reforming the United Nations Economic
and Social Council and the United
Nations Commission on Sustainable
Development
Enhancing institutional reforms and
streamlining existing structures
Source: UNEP Doc UNEP/GC.26/18
1.1 An overview of the research
The study builds on Nilsson et al.’s (2012) framework for the study of policy
coherence to advance a public policy approach to co-evolution. The argument is
made that, in conditions of international regime complexity, policy integration
processes in regime complexes are dynamically inter-linked to policy coherence
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outputs at the level of national implementation. Interaction between processes and
outputs determines the coherency of governance as a whole. Conventional policy-
analytical approaches assume that policy coherence outputs should be in line with
policy integration processes to ensure coherent governance. But such a linear
perspective is difficult to apply in a regime complexity context, where policy
integration processes emerge within a loosely coupled system of institutions rather
than within a unified regime (see Keohane and Victor, 2011), reducing the sense of
obligation at the national level. The implementation politics activated by
international regime complexity suggest instead that policy integration processes
and policy coherence outputs are mutually constitutive.
Co-evolution means that two or more elements are interdependent, each adapting
to changes in the other. Applied to the present case, it implies that enhanced
integration (coherence) in regime complexes (national implementation) stimulates
increased coherence (integration) in national implementation (regime complexes).
These types of interactions should ideally result in positive system change (see
Young, 2006), here associated with coherent governance. Co-evolution in a
governance context does not stem from hierarchical or negotiated arrangements,
but emerges from patterns of differentiation and loose coupling (see Young, 2006;
Benz and Eberlein, 1999). It requires the creation of linkages within and across
levels of governance. When horizontal and/or vertical linkages are dysfunctional,
co-evolution is compromised, with a negative impact on the coherency of
governance as a whole.
Based on the above assumptions, and guided by the research questions, this study
develops a framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and
(public) policy coherence. The framework relies on concepts and approaches from
studies on international regimes, regime interplay, international law, global
governance, national implementation, and environmental policy integration to
examine the horizontal and vertical dimensions of co-evolution as well as
intervening factors. The framework evolves in three steps as per the three research
questions. It first provides elements to compare policy integration processes in
regime complexes and policy coherence outputs at the level of national
implementation (horizontal linkages). It then discusses approaches to examine how
influence travels from the global to the national level and vice versa (vertical
linkages). Finally, the framework looks into determinants of horizontal change and
vertical coupling (intervening factors). The framework provides a heuristic aid to
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disentangle the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence and
visualise opportunities for focalised and system-wide management interventions.
The framework is used to analyse the co-evolution of the cluster of biodiversity-
related conventions and national implementation systems in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) countries. Institutional interactions in international biodiversity
governance are under-researched (Oberthür and Gehring, 2011). There is also
limited understanding of the impact of conservation policies and projects on the
ground (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006). Further, biodiversity policy research has a
strong focus on the incorporation of biodiversity concerns into other policy sectors
(see Chandra and Idrisova, 2011; TEEB, 2011; CBD Secretariat, 2010; Rands et
al., 2010; UNEP, 2010). The insufficient consideration of biodiversity issues in
broader policies, strategies and programmes lies at the root of the biodiversity
crisis (CBD Secretariat, 2010), but an over-emphasis on inter-sectoral policy
integration overshadows the importance of intrasectoral policy integration for
effective biodiversity mainstreaming (see Ugland and Veggeland (2006) in the
context of food safety policy). Synergies in the biodiversity cluster have been the
subject of recent attention in the literature (e.g. UNEP-WCMC, 2012; Baakman,
2011; Caddell, 2011; Simon, 2011; Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010; Jardin, 2010;
Andresen and Rosendal, 2009; Urho, 2009), but synergies in the implementation of
its constituent regimes have mostly been examined in the context of
implementation of the Rio Conventions and other MEAs (e.g. Chasek, 2010;
Masundire, 2006; Van Toen, 2001).
The biodiversity cluster comprises the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) as
a framework convention and five specialist regimes: 1) the Convention on Wetlands
of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (the Ramsar
Convention); 2) the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage (WHC); 3) the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); 4) the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS); and 5) the International
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Inter-
treaty co-operation has developed through the secretariats and scientific advisory
bodies of the conventions at the request of their governing bodies (Caddell, 2011).
Synergies at the national level are created by lead agencies and government
officials with political and/or technical responsibilities in the implementation of the
conventions (hereinafter referred to as MEA lead agencies and national focal
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points/MEA officials, respectively). The biodiversity cluster has achieved partial
integration in a number of areas, with examples including the joint preparation
and/or endorsement of technical guidance, standardisation of taxonomy and
nomenclature, joint field missions and projects, and joint capacity-building activities
(see Jardin, 2010). While areas of substantive overlap remain under-exploited (see
Ministry of the Environment of Finland, 2010), it is at the national level where co-
ordination seems especially weak (see Jardin, 2010; Masundire, 2006).
Problems of coherence in biodiversity governance became salient in the context of
efforts to achieve the global target of significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity
loss by 2010 (the so-called 2010 Biodiversity Target), adopted at the sixth meeting
of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the CBD (The Hague, Netherlands, 7-19
April 2002) and endorsed by world leaders at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002). The
Target provided a common focus of co-operation in the biodiversity cluster, but the
constituencies of the non-CBD conventions failed to take ownership of it (CBD Doc
BLG-5/2). The CBD’s Global Biodiversity Outlook concluded that the 2010 Target
was not achieved and noted that a key lesson from that failure “is that the urgency
of a change of direction must be conveyed to decision-makers beyond the
constituency so far involved in the biodiversity convention” (CBD Secretariat, 2010,
p.83). Understanding problems of coherent governance is of utmost importance as
the international community makes renewed efforts to address the biodiversity
crisis through the Aichi Biodiversity Targets established at CBD CoP10 (Nagoya,
Japan, 18-29 October 2010).
LAC was selected as the focal region to examine national implementation of the
biodiversity-related conventions because it is one of the most biologically diverse
regions in the world (see Bovarnick and Alpizar, 2010) and 9 LAC countries are
members of the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries, a mechanism for
consultation and co-operation that brings together 19 countries rich in biological
diversity and associated traditional knowledge (CBD Doc
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/INF/33). Countries of the region are thus major players in
international biodiversity governance. Moreover, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, no studies have previously examined MEA implementation in LAC
countries. In this research, national experiences are explored in 15 countries that
are members of at least four of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster (as of
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April 2011) and which display high levels of biological diversity as measured by the
Global Environment Facility’s Benefits Index for Biodiversity.
Empirical data was obtained from interviews and documentary material. 43
interviews were conducted between September 2011 and April 2012 with CBD
national focal points (18), treaty secretariat officials (8), representatives of
international organisations (15) and other international experts (2). Documents
examined included national biodiversity strategies and action plans (NBSAPs),
national reports, decisions and resolutions adopted by the governing bodies of the
conventions of the biodiversity cluster, official documents on inter-treaty co-
operation, UNEP reports on synergies among biodiversity-related agreements, and
proceedings of relevant meetings and workshops (e.g. meetings of the Liaison
Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions). Empirical evidence was also retrieved
from journal articles examining co-operation in the biodiversity cluster.
Interview transcripts were examined using a combination of template and matrix
styles of thematic analysis (see King and Horrocks, 2010). A matrix was created
out of the co-evolution framework and applied to the transcripts. The matrix
featured three general categories associated with the three elements of the
framework (and, by implication, with the three research questions). Transcripts
were coded and classified into different categories and sub-categories as
appropriate. The matrix was revised and re-applied to the materials throughout the
process. Qualitative data analysis software (NVivo) assisted the coding process.
More general theorisation techniques were employed to approach documents (see
McCulloch, 2004). Specific procedures applied to the analysis of NBSAPs, national
reports, and MEA decisions and resolutions.
1.2 The novelty of the study
As a novel area in regime complexity studies, the co-evolution of regime complexes
and policy coherence remains under-researched. This research makes a topical
contribution by examining co-evolution from a public policy perspective. Morin and
Orsini (2013a, 2013b), pioneers of the co-evolution thesis, focus on the inter-
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connections between the institutional density of regime complexes and the
coherency of governmental policy-making (foreign policy). In contrast, this study
examines the interdependence of policy integration processes in regime complexes
and policy coherence outputs at the level of national implementation (public policy).
In doing so, it aims to assess whether regime complexes can be considered
pragmatic alternatives to comprehensive regimes (as, for example, Keohane and
Victor (2011) suggest), rather than to examine whether regime complexes can
evolve into comprehensive regimes as patterns of interests become more
concordant through processes of social interaction (as is implicit in Morin and
Orsini’s (2013) model).
This research also advances a more sophisticated understanding of coherence in
conditions of international regime complexity. Keohane and Victor (2011) suggest
that coherence is one of the minimum standards that regime complexes need to
meet to be functional entities. They conceive of coherence as a situation where the
elemental regimes of the complex are mutually reinforcing (in European Union (EU)
studies (see Portela and Raube, 2008) this is described as horizontal coherence).
However, coherence requires a broader perspective where horizontal interactions
in national implementation and cross-level linkages are also considered. This paper
claims that situations of regime complexity demand not only horizontal coherence,
but coherent governance, which comes about when policy integration processes in
regime complexes and policy coherence outputs at the national level complement
each other.
In examining how regime interplay is managed at the national level, this study
addresses another area where little research has been done (Ochieng et al., 2012).
Regime complexity studies have examined the implementation politics and cross-
institutional political strategies triggered by institutional proliferation (see Alter and
Meunier, 2009; Raustiala and Victor, 2004), but have paid less attention to other,
more positive, efforts to enhance regime interplay with a view to achieving cross-
cutting goals. These aspects have been addressed, for example, in studies on
national implementation, mostly within the so-called grey literature, i.e., publications
not published commercially (e.g. Chasek, 2010, 2006; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et
al., 2006; Boyer et al., 2002; Van Toen, 2001). But these studies have made no
inroads in regime complexity studies (again, because the relationship between
regime complexes and policy coherence is a new issue in the literature).
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The previous point leads to another contribution of this research. Recent studies
have established linkages between regime interplay and public management
studies (e.g. Nilsson et al., 2012; Nilsson et al., 2009; Oberthür, 2009). Following
this approach, the proposed framework for examining the co-evolution of regime
complexes and (public) policy coherence attempts to bring together regime
complexity studies and other literatures, including policy-oriented research
addressing the more practical aspects of governance. The framework provides a
heuristic instrument for understanding problems of coherent governance in areas of
regime overlap and assisting the design of policy responses. Its application to
areas of biodiversity governance is both timely and important: implementation and
synergies between biodiversity-related agreements have gained increased
attention in the context of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 (the Liaison
Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (BLG) recently prepared a compilation of
pertinent decisions and associated tools under the respective conventions to
support the incorporation of the objectives of these treaties into revised NBSAPs).
The co-evolution framework helps to understand how synergies are created at
global and national levels, how global (national) developments influence national
(global) governance, and what the main determinants of institutional
complementarity within and across governance levels are. Amid a renewed interest
in clustering proposals that have long been discarded as a realistic governance
option in the biodiversity sector (see Boisson de Chazournes, 2009; McGraw,
2002), the co-evolution framework departs from the assumption that policy
integration and coherence are possible in the absence of institutional and/or
organisational streamlining.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is structured in six main chapters and one concluding chapter. The next
chapter proposes an approach and framework for examining the co-evolution of
regime complexes and policy coherence from a public policy perspective. It opens
with basic conceptual definitions, making a distinction between institutions, regimes
and organisations, terms which are close in meaning but which describe different
phenomena. The problem of international regime complexity is discussed, and
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Morin and Orsini’s (2013a, 2013b) work on the co-evolution of regime complexes
and policy coherence is introduced. The co-evolution of regime density and
governmental policy coherence, as per Morin and Orsini’s model, is reframed as
the co-evolution of policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs. The
chapter then advances a framework for the study of co-evolution as explained
earlier, providing an analytical tool for exploring similarities and differences
between policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs; the vertical
transfer of influence from one level of governance to another; and the factors
impinging upon horizontal and vertical linkages.
Chapter 3 discusses methodology. It states the philosophical assumptions guiding
this research. The biodiversity cluster is described and examined under the lens of
regime complexity. Procedures for data collection and analysis are explained in
detail. Ethical issues and general limitations are discussed.
Horizontal linkages in the biodiversity cluster and at the level of national
implementation are the focus of Chapter 4. The chapter first examines the policy
goals and institutional arrangements framing policy integration processes in the
biodiversity cluster. A similar analysis is made of the policy objectives and
implementation arrangements that explain policy coherence outputs in national
arenas. A comparison between policy integration processes and policy coherence
outputs is made. The analysis shows that co-evolution is happening, but integration
in the biodiversity cluster has advanced more rapidly than coherence in national
implementation. The implementation gap suggests that cross-level communication
and learning has been weak.
In Chapter 5, vertical linkages between the biodiversity cluster and national
biodiversity governance are addressed. The chapter examines how global influence
has travelled from global to national arenas through norms, discourses and
capacity-building. It further discusses whether and how state actors have
influenced international policy as they prepare for and participate in biodiversity-
related meetings. It is noted that global efforts to shape domestic policy have been
stronger and more systematic than national efforts in the opposite direction,
reflecting the different evolution stages of global and national governance systems.
Such asymmetrical linkages prevent cross-level complementarity: global attempts
to bridge the implementation gap cannot achieve their intended effects in the
absence of feedback and strategic direction from lower levels of governance.
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Factors influencing the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national
implementation systems, discussed in chapter 6, are disaggregated in two main
categories according to whether they impinge upon horizontal or vertical linkages. If
greater integration (coherence) in regime complexes (national implementation)
triggers enhanced coherence (integration) in national implementation (regime
complexes), identifying the factors that enable and/or hinder horizontal change is
important to improve co-evolution. Equally relevant is to consider the specific
factors affecting the vertical transfer of influence. At a substantive level, integration
in the biodiversity cluster is driven, and at the same time constrained, by a process
of convergence and alignment under the CBD’s framework where costs of
adjustment are disproportionally borne by the specialist regimes. Conversely,
coherence in national implementation, whether or not under the CBD’s framework,
depends to a great extent on political context and individual commitment. Cross-
level linkages are, in turn, mostly determined by institutional capacity and the
political will of national governments. Assisting countries in meeting their multiple
commitments in a balanced manner while addressing national concerns is
considered a key aspect of more cohesive evolutions.
Chapter 7 discusses the main contributions and findings of this research. The
originality and relevance of the study in the light of scholarly and policy debates on
IEG and the IFSD are re-stated. The chapter explains how lessons arising from the
biodiversity case advance understanding of the co-evolution of regime complexes
and policy coherence. The concepts of differentiation, loose coupling and system
change are recalled to refine and elaborate the co-evolution argument. The chapter
highlights academic and policy implications, and finalises with three central
messages emanating from the research.
This thesis concludes that regime complexes and (public) policy coherence co-
evolve, but co-evolution can be weak in the absence of deliberate cross-level
management. Co-evolution needs to be steered so that regime complexes and
policy coherence move forward in complementary ways. The management of co-
evolution still appears a more realistic and feasible option for achieving coherent
governance than the creation of overarching, integrated, regimes.
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2 Regime complexes and policy coherence: Examining co-
evolution from a public policy perspective
This chapter develops an approach to examining the co-evolution of regime
complexes and policy coherence from a public policy perspective. The approach
conceives policy integration and policy coherence as two separate, but inter-
dependent, activities unfolding in the ambit of global and national governance,
respectively. It claims that when policy integration and policy coherence are
mutually reinforcing, coherent governance is achieved. The discussion is set in the
context of international environmental governance. Basic definitions of key
concepts are first given. The co-evolutionary nature of the relationship between
regime complexes and policy coherence is next explained. The chapter then
proposes a framework for examining co-evolution that evolves in three steps: 1)
policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs are compared; 2) the
strength and symmetry of vertical inter-connections are assessed; and 3) the
challenges emerging at the stages of differentiation (horizontal linkages) and loose
coupling (vertical linkages) are identified. Concluding remarks summarise the co-
evolution approach and framework and place them within the broader context of
this research.
2.1 Basic definitions
This section defines five concepts which lay the foundations for analysis:
international governance, institutions, regimes, organisations, and institutional
interaction.
International governance can be described as the panoply of inter-governmental
institutions and organisations governing world affairs (see also Maltais, 2008). It is
one of the three main forms of governance beyond the nation-state alongside
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transnational (networks of state and non-state actors) and private governance
(networks of non-state actors) (Take, 2013).
The concepts of institutions, regimes and organisations are sometimes used
indistinctively in the literature, but they portray different meanings. Young (2002,
p.5) defines institutions as “sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and
programs that define social practices, assign roles to the participants in these
practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of different roles”.
International regimes are a distinct type of international institutions, formally defined
as “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner, 1982, p.1). Regimes are
usually based on one or more international treaty (Oberthür and Gehring, 2006a).
As defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969, no pagination),
a treaty means “an international agreement concluded between States in written
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or
in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”. As
Gehring and Faude (2010) notice, regimes have traditionally been considered
normative structures that cannot act. However, modern international regimes
incorporate decision-making structures by virtue of which their members can adopt
collective decisions, adapt the original agreements to changing circumstances,
assess implementation, and address non-compliance (ibid.).
Organisations are “actors that have physical qualities, such as staff, headquarters,
resources, and formalized leadership, and that effectively pursue a policy”
(Biermann et al., 2009a, p.354). At times, they may fulfil functions within regimes
and become part of them, while in other cases international regimes (normative
structures) are embedded in international organisations (Oberthür and Gehring,
2006a). Treaty bodies and international organisations have similar structure and
functions (see Goodwin, 2013; Ulfstein, 2012).
Institutional interaction “arises in situations in which one institution affects the
development or performance of another institution” (Stokke and Oberthür, 2011,
p.4). Institutions interact with other institutions at the same level (horizontal
interplay), but also with institutions at other levels (vertical interplay) (King, 1997).
The term regime interplay refers, in particular, to situations in which one regime
affects another (see Stokke, 2001).
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2.2 Regime complexes, policy coherence and coherent governance
In their seminal work, Raustiala and Victor (2004, p.279) described a regime
complex as “an array of partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions
governing a particular issue-area”. Regime complexes are different from their
elemental regimes. As deliberately established institutions, the latter display high
levels of internal cohesiveness. In contrast, regime complexes “are marked by
connections between the specific and relatively narrow regimes but the absence of
an overall architecture or hierarchy that structures the whole set” (Keohane and
Victor, 2011, p.8).
Raustiala and Victor (2004) did not propose specific criteria for delimiting the
boundaries of a regime complex, and subsequent definitions failed to address the
issue (see Keohane and Victor, 2011; Gehring and Faude, 2010; Powers et al.,
2007). In their analysis of the regime complex for plant genetic resources,
Raustiala and Victor (2004) focus on five major multilateral institutions. Conversely,
Keohane and Victor’s (2011) study on the regime complex for climate change
discusses not only multilateral institutions, but also bilateral and unilateral
initiatives.
Orsini et al. (2013) have introduced a more elaborate definition of regime
complexes that seeks to assist in their identification. In their view, a regime
complex is “a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a
common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate
substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially
problematic whether or not they are managed effectively” (p.29). According to the
authors, regime complexes possess six characteristics:
1) The principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures of the
elemental regimes display some degree of divergence.
2) The complex is formed by at least three elemental regimes, the minimum
number necessary to examine social network properties such as density
and centralisation.
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3) Regime complexes address a specific subject matter which is often
narrower in scope than the issue-areas overseen by the elemental regimes.
4) The memberships of the elemental regimes partially overlap.
5) Elemental regimes need to interact with at least one of the regimes of the
complex.
6) The simultaneous existence of elemental regimes should be perceived as
posing an actual or potential problem.
The emergence of regime complexes is a contested issue. Keohane and Victor
(2011) see regime complexes as a pragmatic governance solution where problem
diversity, divergent patterns of interests, and path dependence prevent the
formation of a comprehensive, integrated regime. Stoddard (2012) rejects such a
problem-solving approach, arguing that regime complexes are the result of lack of
shared preferences and/or the absence of actors capable of co-opting or coercing
others into their preferred governance structure.
The effects of international regime complexity are themselves contradictory. Alter
and Meunier (2009) claim that international regime complexity affects the strategies
and interactions of actors through five different pathways:
1) Implementation politics: As the number of overlapping rules increases,
implementation at the national level determines which institutions prevail.
2) Cross-institutional political strategies: Actors may engage in “chessboard
politics” to adapt institutional landscapes to their needs. These strategies
include: 1) forum-shopping or the selection of an amicable venue to elicit a
desired outcome; 2) regime-shifting or the relocation of agendas to
alternative fora to alter the global system of rules; 3) strategic inconsistency
resulting from decisions intended to contradict pre-existing rules; and 4)
strategic ambiguity emanating from an unclear delimitation of regulatory
authority.
3) Bounded rationality or decision-making in conditions of relative uncertainty:
Keeping track of international developments requires information
processing and problem framing.
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4) Small group environments: Iterative interactions among actors convening in
overlapping fora can create relationships of trust and mutual understanding
that favour co-operation.
5) Competition and reverberation: Competition in dense institutional
environments may encourage efficiency, risk sharing and innovation; but
may also result in conflict and lack of co-ordination. Reverberation means
that developments in one forum have feedback effects on other venues.
In a pioneering work, Morin and Orsini (2013a) have recently claimed that the
problem of regime complexity at the national level is expressed in terms of policy
coherence, and that regime complexes and policy coherence co-evolve. They
identify four stages in the life cycle of regime complexes: 1) atomisation, the
embryonic stage of a regime complex where elemental institutions have a largely
independent existence; 2) competition, characterised by frictions among elemental
regimes; 3) specialisation, achieved when mutual recognition enables a division of
governance tasks; and 4) integration, a stage of unification in which inter-regime
links become intra-regime links. Formally speaking, the transition from atomisation
to competition marks the emergence of a regime complex, whereas the final stage
of integration signals the dissolution of the complex and the advent of a new, more
comprehensive, governance formation. The four stages in the life cycle of regime
complexes are inter-linked with four ideal types of governmental policy coherence:
1) erratic policy, resulting from minimal co-ordination among bureaucratic units on
the assumption that elemental regimes have no strong connections with each
other; 2) strategic policy, which involves the adoption of rules that support the goals
of one regime but are incompatible with the goals of another; 3) functionalistic
policy or the creation of boundaries between issue areas under the purview of
different bureaucratic units; and 4) systematic policy, emerging when the regime
complex is perceived as a single regime and co-ordination mechanisms among
bureaucratic units are institutionalised.
The co-evolution thesis proposed by Morin and Orsini (2013a, p.47) is premised
upon the idea that “the life cycle of regime complexes and the coherence of
governmental policy-making are mutually-linked phenomena”. As governments
work internally towards greater coherence, their negotiating mandates will support
increased integration of overlapping regimes. Thus, as the number of states
moving towards greater coherence increases, the complex will display improved
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levels of integration. In a similar fashion, states will tend to become more coherent
as the regime complex displays more cohesion. This reflects a desire of avoiding
reputational costs, but also a sense of loyalty because inconsistencies not only
affect the reputation of a single regime but that of the regime complex as a whole.
Morin and Orsini (2013b) point out that policy preferences and inter-agency co-
ordination at the national level are as diverse as institutional interplay within regime
complexes, with some governments improving their policy coherence before others
and some regimes becoming institutionally connected more rapidly than others.
The authors go on to suggest that “regimes with normative affinities are linked
before regimes competing for centrality, despite similar membership”, whereas
“states with more opportunities to perceive the complex in creation become
coherent earlier than those that are isolated, despite similar material interests”
(Morin and Orsini, 2013b, p.21).
The co-evolution of regime complexes and governmental policy-making seems to
be occurring in the IEG system. Najam (2005) observed that the embedment of the
global environmental discourse within the broader institutional framework for
sustainable development, and the increasing participation of developing countries
in IEG, are mutually reinforcing trends. He claimed that “the South has become
engaged because the discourse has changed and, equally, the discourse has
changed at least partly because of Southern involvement in this discourse” (Najam,
2005, p.317, emphasis in original). Co-evolution may also be extending to the ambit
of national implementation. Already in the late 1990s, Raustiala and Victor (1998,
p.690) noticed, based on the analysis of 14 case studies on the implementation of
international environmental regimes, that “domestic policy is critically shaped by
international decisions. The opposite is also true: the implementation of
international environmental commitments relies heavily on, and is implemented
through, existing national regulatory structures.”
The co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence in national
implementation has yet to be examined. Morin and Orsini portray policy coherence
as a problem of foreign, rather than public, policy, and their approach can thus not
be automatically employed to analyse how regime complexes and domestic policy-
making co-evolve. Hanf and Underdal (1998) notice that the boundaries between
foreign and domestic policy are sometimes blurred: some of the “new” issues of the
international agenda, e.g. the environment, demand substantive competence that
ministries of foreign affairs lack, and affect societies (i.e. different countries) as well
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as segments of societies (specific groups within countries). Following Putnam’s
(1988) classical work on diplomacy and domestic politics, Hanf and Underdal
observe that the “new” problems involve governments in a two-level game: they
need to articulate and defend the interests of domestic constituencies vis-à-vis
other governments, and, at the same time, ensure domestic support for the
agreements reached in international venues. They claim, however, that the
implementation game should be seen as a third level or arena of action. As they
explain, “[a]lthough the interactions between Level II negotiators and Level I actors
are likely to include estimations of the feasibility and implementability of any
eventual agreement, the implementation process has its own political logic and
dynamic” (p.159). Therefore, the inter-connection between regime complexes and
national implementation systems cannot be approached under the same lens as
the inter-connection between regime complexes and governmental policy-making.
Building on Nilsson et al.’s (2012) framework for the study of policy coherence, an
approach to examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence
from a public policy perspective is proposed here. Nilsson et al. (2012, p.396)
define policy coherence as “an attribute of policy that systematically reduces
conflicts and promotes synergies between and within different policy areas to
achieve the outcomes associated with jointly agreed policy objectives”. The
framework differentiates between policy integration processes, policy coherence
outputs, and policy outcomes and impacts. Applying this framework to the analysis
of regime interplay, Nilsson et al. associate policy integration processes and policy
coherence outputs with the management of regime interplay and the way in which
regimes interact in practice. They further assume that interplay management and
regime interplay are essentially global phenomena. This approach, however, needs
to be modified when regime interplay is examined under the lens of international
regime complexity. Interplay management in a regime complex reduces conflict
and turf battles, thereby limiting the scope for strategic action through
implementation politics (see Gehring and Faude, 2013). Interplay management has
an immediate effect on global-level institutional interactions, but it ultimately affects
how state actors think of and act upon regime inter-connections in national
implementation. At the same time, the management of regime interplay at the
national level, as distinguished from strategic linkages created to achieve
competitive ends (see Jinnah, 2011a; Stokke and Oberthür, 2011; Young, 2002),
influences the cohesiveness of regime complexes through the same causal
pathway through which implementation politics operate (see Alter and Meunier,
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2009). Thus, in a regime complexity context, the study of policy coherence should
not be framed in terms of the relationship between interplay management (policy
integration processes) and regime interplay (policy coherence outputs), but in
terms of the relationship between inter-treaty co-ordination (policy integration
processes) and co-ordination in national implementation (policy coherence outputs)
(see Figure 2.1)
Figure 2.1 A public policy perspective of the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence
From the perspective of environmental governance, interactions between regime
complexes and national implementation systems can be portrayed as cross-level
interplay between resource regimes. Such interplay can take five different forms
(see Young, 2006): 1) de jure/de facto dominance, which means that one of the
interacting systems dominates the other when frictions or conflicts among them
emerge; 2) separation, which requires the demarcation of jurisdictional boundaries
and scope of authority; 3) merger, whereby separate governance arrangements are
brought together under joint management; 4) negotiated agreements or hybrid
regimes with recognised roles for actors at different levels of governance and
mutually agreeable rules and procedures; and 5) system change or cases where
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separate governance systems interact in mutually determining ways triggering
structural transformation.
The five ideal types above can be seen as different ways of dealing with multi-level
politics. The literature on inter-organisational and international negotiations
distinguishes three such strategies (see Benz and Eberlein, 1999): 1) hierarchical
ordering of arenas of policy-making, where decisions are centralised and lower-
level action should be aligned with upper-level processes; 2) differentiation or
decoupling of decision-making arenas; and 3) loose coupling of negotiation arenas
through information exchange, communication and persuasion. The first two
strategies overlap with the ideal forms of dominance and separation in Young’s
(2006) typology above. The strategies can be used in tandem. For example, Benz
and Eberlein (1999) observed that the Europeanization of sub-national policies
entails a three-fold process of structuration that creates independent arenas of
negotiation, intensifies communication, and stimulates learning. The initial
decoupling of arenas of policy-making occurs in the form of differentiation related to
functions (general policy goals are agreed at the EU level, whereas specific
programmes for individual regions are jointly executed by EU, national and sub-
national institutions) and territorial differentiation in inter-governmental relations
(bilateral or trilateral negotiations are held that allow multi-level co-ordination to be
adjusted to the institutional arrangements established at lower levels of
governance). Negotiation arenas become loosely coupled through co-operative
networks and mediation.
The co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence is based on
differentiation (separation), loose coupling and system change. Co-evolution
implies that changes at one level (emerging from differentiation) stimulate
adjustments in the other (through loose coupling), leading to system change. In
other words, policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs influence
each other, and their interaction determines the coherency of governance as a
whole.
Some would associate the co-evolution of regime complexes and national
implementation systems with a broader phenomenon in international affairs which
the Brookings Project on Integrating National Economies referred to as the deep
integration of national economies (see Lawrence et al., 1996). Scholars have
observed that, “as economic liberalization expands, a wide range of policies are
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becoming deeply integrated across countries and thus increasingly interdependent”
(Raustiala and Victor, 1998, p.689). Deep or behind-the-border integration has
been differentiated from shallow or at-the-border integration (see Lawrence et al.,
1996). As Raustiala and Victor (1998, p.691) note, the Brookings Project on
Integrating National Economies suggest that “an essential part of ‘deep integration’
is the progressive synthesis and coevolution of domestic and international affairs”.
Deep integration, Raustiala and Victor claimed, occurs primarily among the liberal
states of the West.
Referring to the work of Downs and Rocke (1995), Raustiala and Victor (1998)
point out that, as co-operation deepens, states develop different forms of
institutionalised flexibility that allow some deviation from general norms. This helps
reduce backlash and political dissent at the national level. Such flexibility may
diminish compliance with international commitments, but can lead to the
progressive resolution of the problem at hand provided appropriate systems for
implementation review are in place. In the view of Raustiala and Victor (1998,
p.694), “flexible modes of cooperation allow cooperative states to take two steps
forward and one step back, to move at different speeds and at different times, but
in broadly the same direction”. Deep integration, according to Raustiala and Victor,
is opposed by developing countries and non-liberal states which tend to be wary of
co-operative efforts demanding greater attention to domestic activities, establishing
new substantive commitments, and imposing limitations on state activities. This
was noticed within the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, where non-liberal states were blocking the strengthening of non-
compliance procedures and were also the most recalcitrant to comply with data-
reporting obligations.
Regime complexes are a modern expression of flexible modes of co-operation (see
Keohane and Victor, 2011). Their nature as loosely coupled systems of institutions
brings to the fore an apparent contradiction of deep integration, namely, that it
occurs within what most observers describe as fragmented governance
architectures. Institutional fragmentation is nonetheless central in the Western
model of deep integration. Drezner (2010, p.4) claims that institutional proliferation
“enhances the ability of powerful states to engage in forum-shopping relative to
other actors”, enabling them to advance their preferred policy positions. Benvenisti
and Downs (2007) go on to suggest that fragmentation is a calculated strategy by
the world powers to create a world order that only they are capable to transform.
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If deep integration in conditions of international regime complexity is a Western
enterprise, the co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation
systems will be resisted by developing countries. This argument is nonetheless
contested when applied to areas of environmental and sustainable development
governance. As mentioned earlier, the embedment of IEG discourses within the
IFSD and the increasing participation of developing countries in IEG processes are
mutually reinforcing trends with direct effects on national implementation (Najam
2005). In other words, in areas of environmental and sustainable development
governance, the co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation
systems in developing countries unfolds naturally.
Some would still expect to see stronger levels of co-evolution in the developed
world on account of its superior material capabilities. Nevertheless, co-evolution
problems are more generic than agent-specific. Hanf and Underdal (1998), for
instance, observe that problems that are politically “malign” due to their uneven
effects on different segments of society can result in what they refer to as vertical
disintegration of policy, i.e., “a state of affairs where the aggregate thrust of ‘micro-
decisions’ deviates more or less substantially from what higher-order policy goals
and ‘doctrines’ would seem to require” (p.157). Vertical disintegration of policy (also
described as the implementation gap) has been observed in international
biodiversity governance. The early years of implementation of the CBD in EU
member states were fraught with difficulties in the areas of legislation, funding and
monitoring (see Baker, 2003). A recent study on the implementation of the Man and
the Biosphere programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland found that
local biosphere reserves were “predominantly isolated entities, inadequately linked
to the various spatial (regional to national to international) and temporal (short to
long-term) policies, socio-economic processes, and cultural traditions” (Schliep and
Stoll-Kleemann, 2010, p.926). Notably, these implementation gaps occurred in
countries which, according to the International Monetary Fund’s country
classification (see IMF, 2013), are either emerging market economies (Hungary
and Poland) or advanced economies (at the time of Baker’s (2003) study, the EU
had not yet enlarged to incorporate the former socialist states of Central and
Eastern Europe). Indeed, vertical disintegration of policy is an outstanding
challenge across the IEG system (see Kim, 2013; Esty and Ivanova, 2002).
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Vertical disintegration of policy affects, in particular, second-generation regulations
or those formulated at a time when processes of international co-operation are
gaining momentum and before implementation failures inhibit the drive for new
projects (Underdal, 2000b). Because regime complexes are spontaneous
institutions, their emergence cannot be associated with specific peaks in
international co-operation; instead, they can be conceived of as the upshot of
second-generation regulations emanating from the original regimes. A regime
complex is thus more prone to vertical disintegration of policy or implementation
gaps than its constituent regimes (at least when the diffuse norms emanating from
regime complexity, e.g. in terms of co-ordination and synergies, are compared with
the more specific commitments expressed in the foundational treaties of elemental
regimes).
Understanding the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence is
necessary to prevent and address implementation gaps impinging upon coherent
governance. The next section proposes a framework for examining the co-evolution
of policy integration processes in a regime complex and policy coherence outputs
at the level of national implementation.
2.3 Regime complexes and policy coherence: A framework for
analysis
This section presents a framework for examining whether, to what extent, and
under what conditions regime complexes and policy coherence co-evolve. The
framework relies on contributions from studies on international regimes, regime
interplay, international law, national implementation, environmental policy
integration, and multi-level governance. The framework departs from the premise
that co-evolution requires political linkages within and across levels of governance.
Political linkages result from “deliberate attempts to link institutions at the stages of
design and management”, and are independent of the functional interdependencies
between the substantive problems addressed by the institutions concerned (Young,
2002, p.25). The concept of linkage denotes an intention to improve mutual
complementarity rather than minimise conflict (Perez, 2006).
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The framework evolves in three steps. First, it examines whether policy integration
processes in a regime complex and policy coherence outputs at the level of
national implementation exhibit similar characteristics. General elements of
comparison are outlined that help determine if co-evolution is taking place. Second,
the framework explores whether integration processes and coherence outputs
influence each other. This is to determine the extent to which processes and
outputs are dynamically inter-linked as per the co-evolution thesis. Third, the
framework analyses horizontal and vertical factors affecting co-evolution. Assuming
that management problems at one level of governance have implications for
cohesive evolutions (lack of inter-treaty co-operation, for instance, will cancel joint
venture opportunities to influence national governance), identifying limitative factors
at both levels is key to improve governance. Equally important is to examine the
more specific factors affecting cross-level interplay of actors and institutions. The
three elements of the framework are unpacked below.
2.3.1 Horizontal linkages: Comparing processes and outputs
Nilsson et al.’s (2012) framework for the study of policy coherence (see section 2.2)
serves as the basis for comparing integration processes and coherence outputs in
a regime complexity context. According to this framework, policy integration
comprises three elements: 1) policy inputs, including knowledge, resources and
actors; 2) policy goals or strategic targets; and 3) policy procedures and
institutional arrangements that shape policy-making. Policy coherence involves two
main aspects: 1) policy objectives and instruments intended to achieve policy
goals; and 2) policy implementation or arrangements for making policy instruments
operational. Two general points of comparison are here proposed: 1) between
policy goals and policy objectives; and 2) between institutional and implementation
arrangements (see Figure 2.2).
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Figure 2.2 A framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence. Step 1: Comparing horizontal linkages
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The ensuing discussion builds upon the idea that policy integration and policy
coherence in conditions of international regime complexity can be associated with
the management of institutional and implementation overlap at global and national
levels, respectively (see section 2.2). Oberthür (2009) has proposed a framework
for the systematic analysis and assessment of interplay management which
distinguishes different goals, levels of co-ordination and modes of management.
This framework provides a basis for comparing policy integration processes in
regime complexes and policy coherence outputs at the level of national
implementation. Since this framework is in principle intended to examine how
international organisations manage regime interplay, some might question whether
it can also be used to analyse how national implementation activities under different
regimes are managed. Oberthür’s (2009) framework, however, draws inspiration
from public management studies, which makes it applicable to a national context.
Other studies have similarly established parallels between regime interplay and
public management literatures (e.g. Nilsson et al., 2012; Nilsson et al., 2009a),
justifying the validity of the approach taken here.
2.3.1.1 Policy goals and policy objectives
Oberthür (2009) observes that the management of regime interplay may be geared
towards different goals, including avoiding conflict; enhancing synergy; achieving
efficiency; promoting justice and equity; or, in the context of environmental
governance, realising environmental policy integration (EPI). The goals of synergy
and EPI are strongly interrelated. As defined by Rosendal (2001a, p.97), synergy
“is characteristic of a situation where the two institutions are largely pulling in the
same direction, where they are mutually reinforcing, and where wasteful duplication
may be avoided through coordination”. From an IEG perspective, synergy should
be conducive to EPI. EPI has an external, inter-policy dimension concerned with
the inclusion of environmental considerations in decision-making processes in
environmentally relevant policy domains; and an internal, intra-policy dimension
related to balancing the objectives of different environmental policies and
institutions (Oberthür, 2009). In its external dimension, EPI is otherwise known as
environmental mainstreaming (Yasuda, 2011). The distinction between external
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and internal EPI is analogous to the distinction between external and internal
coherence in downstream policy-making (see Nilsson et al., 2012).
Stokke (2009) notices that interplay management may be a pro-active exercise or a
reaction to specific cases of institutional interaction. He shows that participants in
the international regime for managing Northeast Arctic cod have been keen to
ensure that trade-restrictive measures aimed at halting illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing do not conflict with trade regimes. This has been
achieved by introducing clauses that establish a normative hierarchy (asserting, for
example, that more recent and specialised rules prevail over earlier and more
general ones); or by making IUU measures compatible with the “environmental
window” of the global trade regime. This pro-active case of interplay management
contrasts with other situations in which, only after institutional interaction creates
disruption or leaves potential for synergy, management interventions are deployed
(see Gehring and Oberthür, 2006b).
As relevant to the present study, pro-active efforts to enhance synergy are of
particular importance. The pursuit of synergy can have different logics. Surveying
the literature on inter-organisational relationships, Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos
(2011) identify two pure forms of co-operation: co-exploration and co-exploitation.
They define co-exploration as a “cooperative relationship to create new knowledge,
tasks, functions, or activities” (p.1122). As they explain, the main activity of co-
exploration is learning and innovation. Interdependence between partners is
reciprocal, leading to joint decision-making and close communication. Co-ordination
is based on inter-personal contact. Appropriation (of value) is considered a major
hazard in co-explorative relationships on account of the emphasis on innovation
and the degree of uncertainty involved. Co-exploitation, in contrast, is a
“cooperative relationship to execute existing knowledge, tasks, functions, or
activities” (p.1123). Co-exploitation, according to Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos,
focusses on expansion. Functional tasks are distributed between partners, creating
loose, but not strong, interdependence. Separate decision-making and thin
communication are typical, with co-ordination involving standard operating
procedures. Because co-exploitation relies on efficient resource usage, slacking is
a main hazard. Arguably, co-operative relationships emphasising co-exploration
can achieve greater complementarity than those favouring co-exploitation. Two of
the most notable examples of synergies in IEG, namely, the Global Environment
Facility (GEF), a global fund serving various MEAs; and the clustering process of
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chemicals and hazardous waste conventions, emerged from co-explorative
undertakings (see Simon, 2012).
2.3.1.2 Institutional and implementation arrangements
Oberthür (2009) has distinguished four levels of co-ordination and two principal
modes of interplay management which provide basic standards to compare
institutional and implementation arrangements in areas of regime overlap. As this
section shows, levels of co-ordination highlight the polity and political aspects of
governance; whereas modes of management bring to the fore its policy dimensions
(see Wiener and Diez (2009) and Treib et al. (2007) on the triad of polity, policy
and politics).
According to Oberthür (2009), the management of regime interplay involves four
different levels of co-ordination: overarching institutional frameworks, joint interplay
management, unilateral adaptations, and autonomous management. As he
explains, overarching institutional frameworks entail decision-making beyond the
interacting institutions; joint interplay management requires co-ordination of
activities; unilateral adaptations entail independent action in the framework of one
or more of the interacting institutions without explicit co-ordination between them;
and autonomous management occurs outside of formal decision-making
structures. The first two levels are considered two distinct expressions of inter-
institutional co-ordination. Overarching institutional frameworks, joint interplay
management and unilateral adaptations have been associated with governance
through hierarchy, networks, and markets, respectively (see Simon, 2012), which
unfold in the realm of polity (see Treib et al., 2007).
Experiences of interplay management at the international level suggest that actors
rely more on unilateral adaptations (governance through markets) and autonomous
management than on inter-institutional co-ordination as means for enhancing
institutional interaction (see Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; Oberthür, 2009). Oberthür
and Stokke (2011) claim that overarching institutional frameworks (governance
through hierarchies) and joint interplay management (governance through
networks) provide a basis and framing for decentralised co-ordination, but have not
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proved to influence regime interplay in significant ways. Studies exploring synergies
in the national implementation of international environmental regimes (e.g. Chasek,
2010; Masundire, 2006; Van Toen, 2001) have focussed on joint management
(intra- and inter-agency co-ordination) of overlapping activities, neglecting lower
levels of co-ordination.
The case for unilateral interplay management is consistent with findings from
studies examining institutional interaction under the lens of social network analysis,
a methodology that examines social relationships based on nodes and ties. Social
network analysis has been used to examine network governance forms (e.g.
Grasenick et al., 2008), but can be applicable to any interaction setting, regardless
of the mode of governance involved. Kim (2013) recently examined the MEA
system using a network approach, finding that it has evolved towards increased
density since 1992. He observed an interlocking structure of governance which has
emerged spontaneously without explicit co-ordination among the interacting
institutions. Using a similar approach to analysis, Böhmelt and Spilker (2013)
noticed that soft-law institutions which are well connected with each other (through
overlapping memberships rather than through inter-institutional co-ordination)
display similarities in their design (coherence). These two studies reinforce the
argument that decentralised co-ordination has been a main avenue to manage
regime interplay at the global level.
Autonomous management highlights the role of agency in enhancing regime
interplay (Stokke and Oberthür, 2011; Oberthür, 2009) and is connected with the
politics of institutional design and management (see Young, 2002). Following Selin
and VanDeveer (2003), actors involved in interplay management can be classified
in two major groups: 1) organisational actors such as states, inter-governmental
organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), research
organisations and business groups; and 2) individual actors such as state officials
and representatives of international organisations which can affect regime interplay
through individual leadership and informal networks.
The literature has acknowledged the role of various organisational actors in
managing regime interplay, including 1) major state actors (Skjærseth, 2006
noticed, for example, that Germany played a leadership role in convening the
International North Sea Conferences which speeded up collective decision making
in the OSPAR commission for the protection of the marine environment of the
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North-East Atlantic and in the EU; 2) the governing (see Simon, 2012) and
scientific and technical bodies (see Oberthür et al., 2011) of international treaties;
3) overarching organisations such as UNEP (e.g. Andresen and Rosendal, 2009)
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see
Lesage and Van de Graaf, 2013); 4) international bureaucracies such as the WTO
and CBD Secretariats (Jinnah, 2010, 2011b); and 5) epistemic communities, e.g.,
the Scientific Task Force on Avian Influenza and Wild Birds (Cromie et al., 2011).
Networks of organisational actors also play important functions in interplay
management. These networks can take the form of 5) inter-agency liaison groups
such as the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) (see Reischl, 2012); 6)
government networks such as the G-20 (see Lesage and Van de Graaf, 2013) and
the Paris Club (see Josselin, 2009); and 7) (public-) private partnerships (see
Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2011; Boyer et al., 2002).
Some studies have noticed the influence of individual actors on regime interplay.
Selin and VanDeveer (2003), for instance, observed that linkages between the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the EU are supported
by professional and personal contacts between state and non-state actors involved
in bodies and activities of both regimes. The MEA system, on the other hand, has
witnessed the emergence of “super delegates” and MEA-focussed NGOs which
follow up meetings of various MEAs and facilitate the development of inter-
institutional synergies (UNU, 1999).
Beyond levels of co-ordination of interplay management, Oberthür (2009)
distinguishes between regulatory and enabling modes of management. He explains
that regulatory interplay management is based on prescription and proscription of
behaviours, allocation of regulatory authority, and sometimes enforcement and
implementation of decisions. It may involve substantive elements (e.g., a hierarchy
of rules) and procedural requirements (e.g., on information exchange or impact
assessments). Regulatory and enabling modes of management involve a wide
range of policy instruments. In an EPI context, these include: 1) communicative
instruments providing longer-term vision and objectives and enabling flexibility in
the way in which they are made operational; 2) organisational instruments such as
inter-departmental co-ordination groups; and 3) procedural instruments aiming to
affect how policy decisions are made, e.g., strategic environmental assessments
(Jordan and Lenschow, 2008).
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Formal agreements between MEAs, which usually take the form of a Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) or a Memorandum of Co-operation (MoC), can be
described as examples of regulatory interplay management. Many of these
agreements contain obligations on information exchange and participation in joint
activities (Scott, 2011). Some are supported by detailed joint work programmes
such as those that the CBD Secretariat has concluded with other biodiversity-
related MEAs, and a few of them even include provisions on conflict resolution,
e.g., the 2004 MoC between the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the
CBD Secretariat on Co-operation between the CBD Secretariat and the Secretariat
of the International Plant Protection Convention, and the 2009 MoU between the
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme and the CBD
Secretariat (ibid.).
Enabling interplay management relies on learning and capacity building as means
of persuasion. Oberthür (2009) identifies structures of enabling interplay
management at different levels of co-ordination. At the level of overarching
institutional frameworks, UNEP has a mandate to disseminate information across
international institutions (yet lacks capacity to deliver this function effectively). Joint
management structures promoting cognitive interaction include joint bodies (e.g.
the Joint Liaison Group of the Rio Conventions), expert assessments (the scientific
bodies of the climate change and ozone regimes, for example, have developed
joint assessments on the use of fluorinated greenhouse gases), and partnerships
(promoting the transfer of knowledge). Learning within individual institutions is
significantly shaped by treaty secretariats, which usually have representation at
meetings of other institutions, and can identify, on this basis, policy models or
potential for assistance.
Oberthür (2009) notes that enabling modes of management prevail at the
international level. This is attuned with developments in domestic arenas, where
soft communicative instruments for environmental mainstreaming tend to be more
popular than harder organisational or procedural instruments (Jordan and
Lenschow, 2010).
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2.3.2 Vertical linkages: Exploring the symmetry of cross-level
influence
Policy integration and policy coherence in conditions of international regime
complexity emanate from two distinct, but inter-dependent, governance systems:
one based on international institutions and another one embedded in national
political systems. Linkages between global and national institutions (adjacent
linkages as opposed to remote linkages, e.g., global-local interactions) may or may
not be symmetrical. As Young (2002) explains, symmetry occurs when two
institutions influence each other in reciprocal ways. When one institution affects
another without triggering an equivalent response, linkages between the two
institutions are asymmetrical. Symmetry involves a two-way dynamic where action
at one level informs, and is informed by, action at other levels (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen, 2012). Gray (2003) notes, for instance, that the secretariats of MEA
agreements can facilitate national implementation, but this depends on the
provision of relevant information from state parties. This section borrows two
analytical frameworks from international studies to explore how global action
influences domestic policy (policy coherence outputs) and how, in turn, national
perspectives shape global governance (policy integration processes). These
frameworks provide elements to examine the symmetry of linkages between
regime complexes and policy coherence (see Figure 2.3).
2.3.2.1 Global influence on national implementation
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) identify four pathways through which global
governance arrangements influence national policy: international rules,
international norms and discourse, markets, and direct access to domestic policy-
making. These four pathways can be associated with three different modes of
governing behaviour at lower levels of jurisdiction (see Kern and Alber, 2008):
governing by regulation (either through hard rules or soft norms and discourses),
governing through enabling (via markets or direct access to domestic policy-
making) and governing by provision (delivered through direct access pathways).
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Bernstein and Cashore’s framework can be used to examine how global action
within regime complexes shapes national implementation practices.
Figure 2.3 A framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence. Step 2: Exploring the symmetry of vertical linkages
In Bernstein and Cashore’s (2012) framework, international rules are associated
with binding obligations and policy prescriptions emanating from international
treaties and powerful international organisations, respectively. Many international
treaties include conflict clauses which clarify the relation between treaties to
prevent contradictions, but they rarely incorporate obligations to create synergies
(van Asselt, 2011).
International norms and discourse set general standards of behaviour of a non-
binding character. Jinnah (2011b) noticed that the CBD CoP has not provided clear
guidance on how the overlap between the biodiversity and climate change regimes
should be managed. In contrast, the CBD Secretariat, acting within its zone of
discretion, has managed to shape how state parties understand the interface
between biodiversity and climate change. Analysing CBD official documents
addressing the biodiversity-climate interface between 2000 and 2007, Jinnah
shows that the CBD Secretariat reframed biodiversity from a passive recipient of
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climate impacts to an active element of climate solutions with a view to making
biodiversity conservation more attractive to developing countries. A sample of
fourth national reports to the CBD appeared to reveal that the Secretariat’s
marketing campaign influenced national discourses on biodiversity-climate linkages
(ibid.)
Markets can be strategically manipulated to instil domestic policy change. Market
mechanisms have been used to curb deforestation in developing countries,
including through money transfers, debt relief, and tradable emissions permits.
These instruments affect countries differently depending on their forest endowment
(see Leplay and Thoyer, 2011). Within IEG, proposals for using financial
mechanisms to promote a more coherent implementation of MEAs at the national
level date back to the first conference on synergies and coordination between
MEAs organised by the United Nations University in July 1999 (see UNU, 1999).
Market mechanisms intended to link different sectors or policies may or may not be
the result of inter-institutional synergy. For instance, the inclusion of migration
clauses in EU trade agreements may be interpreted as a concerted effort among
EU institutions to use the EU’s market power to incite co-operation on migration
from recalcitrant parties. Lavenex and Jurje (2013) show, however, that the issue-
linkage is not the result of co-ordinated strategic action but reflects the internal
evolution of EU migration policy.
Direct access to domestic-policy making can take the form of direct funding,
education, training, assistance, capacity-building and/or co-governance via
partnerships. International agencies and bureaucracies have supported the
development of synergies among MEAs at the national level. This includes efforts
to streamline national reporting, information and knowledge management systems,
and technical guidance. UNEP, through its Division on Environmental Law and
Conventions, provides capacity-building for a coherent implementation of MEAs
(Rose, 2011). The secretariats of the Rio Conventions have sponsored a number of
expert meetings and workshops promoting country-level synergies among the Rio
Conventions and other MEAs since 1997 (see Chasek, 2006; Masundire, 2006).
Early studies suggested that international help to foster national co-ordination had
proved unsuccessful (see Boyer et al., 2002), and recent inter-ministerial
discussions on IEG sponsored by UNEP have placed capacity-building at the top of
the agenda for IEG reform (see UNEP Doc UNEP/GC.26/18).
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Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggest that isolating the effects of pathways of
influence is practically difficult and even unnecessary because collective influence
is ultimately achieved through the interaction of different mechanisms and
processes. Findings from a study on environmental mainstreaming (external EPI) in
developing countries are nonetheless worth mentioning. Between 2007 and 2008,
the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) conducted ten
regional and country-based surveys to examine national experiences in the
integration of environmental concerns into development policies (see Dalal-Clayton
and Bass, 2009). The study revealed that the environmental safeguards required
by donors of international development assistance are a major driver of
environmental mainstreaming. International commitments, in contrast, were found
to be only moderately important drivers. These results would suggest that influence
through the pathway of direct access to domestic policy-making (and markets) can
be more effective than influence through rules, norms and discourses (all of which
create, to a more or less extent, international commitments) in developing country
contexts. Indeed, some have noticed that governing by regulation has lose appeal
as a means of dealing with multi-level environmental governance (Plummer and
Armitage, 2010; Kern and Alber, 2008).
2.3.2.2 National influence on regime complexes
As defined in section 2.1, international governance develops from decisions
adopted in inter-governmental fora. Preparation and participation in those meetings
is thus crucial to influence inter-treaty co-operation. It is at these stages where
domestic and foreign policy become strongly inter-twined (see Hanf and Underdal,
1998). Goodwin (2013) has recently examined what he calls the “internal
modalities” of preparation and participation in CoPs to environmental treaties.
Internal modalities comprise the set of norms and routines governing how national
delegations prepare for meetings and how they will participate in the actual working
sessions (ibid.). Goodwin focusses on the internal modalities of delegations to
CoPs, but internal modalities also operate on occasion of meetings of other inter-
governmental bodies within and beyond the field of international environmental
policy. Goodwin’s approach provides a useful framework for examining national
influence on the evolution of regime complexes.
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The aim of preparations for international meetings is to define a national position.
Goodwin (2013) observes that internal preparations for MEA meetings are usually
steered by the lead implementation agencies. Ideally, consultations have to be
sought with other ministries, the legislative and judicial branches of the state, and
private actors. These consensual activities provide some legitimisation to
international governance processes (Brunnée, 2002). Broad engagement with
other actors is nonetheless difficult to achieve due to time constraints and the
diversity of interests that need to be reconciled. Thus, some modalities of
preparation privilege dialogue with selected stakeholders. Examining the internal
modalities for preparation and participation of the United Kingdom (UK) in Ramsar
CoP meetings, Goodwin notes that national positions arise from internal
consultations within the Natura 2000/Ramsar Steering Committee (a forum
convened by the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland overseeing national implementation) and the Natura
2000/Ramsar Forum (an advisory body made up of representatives of government
departments, statutory agencies, and NGOs). Both groups have well established
memberships. In other cases, internal preparations for MEA meetings are more
centralised and controlled. Van Toen (2001) observed that in some countries of the
Asia Pacific region the ministries of foreign affairs engaged in MEA negotiations
without seeking the input of focal points and agencies with implementation
responsibilities.
Bodansky (2010, p.115) suggests that national positions resulting from internal
preparations “may variously reflect enduring national interests, the interests of a
particular group that has successfully lobbied for it, or bargaining among different
governmental actors”. Sometimes, he notices, they can be the by-product of other
factors such as governmental change. Because multiple actors, positions and
interests are involved in domestic consultations, it is not always possible to identify
a stable national interest (ibid.).
The internal modalities of participation, as described by Goodwin, require decisions
concerning the compositions of delegations. Two dimensions need to be
considered: the size of delegations and the level of experience of delegates. It is
well known that developed countries tend to send large delegations to international
meetings as compared with developing countries. Examining lists of participants in
meetings of the Ramsar CoP, Goodwin found that some countries, most of them
developed states, are represented by “super delegations” of ten or more delegates,
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whereas developing and least developed states normally send between two and
three representatives. Schermers and Blokker (2011) observe that large
delegations usually contain more subject experience (see below) and are able to
engage in multiple negotiations and meetings. However, small delegations tend to
be more flexible and more coherent in their views than large ones (ibid.).
Levels of experience of national delegations vary. Goodwin points out that the
“super delegations” of countries such as the United States and China attending
Ramsar CoP meetings normally include officials with previous experience. Some
individuals have represented their states at several CoP meetings, although their
influence on negotiations is not always clear. Subject experience is in many cases
required to negotiate specific conference items. National experts may be needed to
cover specialist areas; and this poses a problem for countries which cannot afford
to send large delegations. Goodwin further notes that, beyond intra-CoP dynamics,
inter-CoP experience is essential to ensure that activities under one regime
complement those undertaken in the framework of other regimes.
National delegations, according to Goodwin, normally act upon the instructions
given by their governments. Citing a classical work by Hadwin and Kaufmann
(1960), Goodwin suggests that instructions should ideally result from inter-
ministerial dialogue, be sanctioned at the highest political level, and set specific
objectives and activities while giving some leeway of action in case of unexpected
events. He notes that the UK’s participation at Ramsar CoP meetings generally
reflects this approach. In some cases, however, instructions play a less important
role. Bodansky (2010) notices that Russia’s position in the negotiations of post-
2012 commitments on climate change varied depending on the agency heading the
delegation. At one meeting, Russia even appeared to be represented by two
delegations with different views (ibid.). Bodansky also points out that many
delegates from developing countries do not seem to act according to specific
instructions, defending positions that reflect their own beliefs rather than a national
interest.
Influence on actual negotiations may come from different forms of leadership.
Examining decision-making in the UN General Assembly, Keohane (1967)
distinguished three types of political influence. In the first instance, a state may
affect the policies of other delegations by acting within, between, or without respect
to caucusing groups. Caucuses are groups operating within international
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organisations that share common interests and co-ordinate their national positions
to exert influence (Schermers and Blokker, 2011). Andresen (2007) identifies three
main negotiating groups in IEG: the United States and its allies, the EU and its
allies, and the Group of Seventy-Seven (G-77) and China. He observes that the
shape and direction of environmental governance institutions have been strongly
shaped by the United States and the EU. The G-77, however, has not necessarily
been less influential. Emerging from the first session of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964, the G-77, comprising
133 developing states to date, has been successful in promoting the inclusion of
specific provisions for developing countries (for example, on technical and financial
assistance) in MEA texts (Carruthers, 2007). Keohane (1967) suggests that when
negotiating blocs are formed by like-minded states, the gain and losses of joint
ventures are shared by the coalition members; conversely, when a group emerges
out of the threats and promises of one member, gains and losses are absorbed by
the organising power.
A second type of political influence identified by Keohane (1967) comes about
when a state proposes “an item for the agenda that no other state would be willing
to propose but that no state is willing to oppose” (p.223). In this case, a state
achieves influence by altering the decision-making context rather than by affecting
the policies of certain delegations. Finally, a third form of influence is reaped by
states that are in a pivotal position when lines between members begin to be
drawn. The votes of these states, Keohane notes, will generally determine the
outcome of negotiations.
Goodwin points out that the autonomy of states to set their own modalities of
preparation and participation in international meetings may be constrained by
external controls emanating from international law, the treaty establishing the CoP,
and the rules of procedure for CoP meetings (for example, on stakeholder
consultation, the timing of document circulation, the credentials of delegates,
delegate qualifications, and the running of negotiations). His work suggests that
external controls in international biodiversity governance do not impose major
constraints on internal modalities.
Some internal modalities of preparation for and participation in international fora
gain special saliency when countries attempt to influence inter-treaty co-operation.
Schermers and Blokker (2011) suggest that consistency in national positions is
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essential to improve co-ordination in the activities of international organisations. In
their view, consistency can be achieved through three main avenues: 1) when the
same individuals represent states in different fora; 2) when ministries of foreign
affairs and/or inter-departmental committees ensure that national delegates adopt
the same standpoint in different venues; and 3) when special offices or national
missions abroad have administrative responsibilities for different organisations,
fostering awareness of existing linkages. If, as Hanf (2000) suggests, the
formulation of national positions and the negotiation in international venues are
linked to the subsequent phase of implementation, consistency in the national
positions defended in overlapping venues would also ensure consistency in the
national implementation of the inter-connected regimes. It is an open question,
however, whether and how consistency in national positions contributes to policy
integration and policy coherence at global and national levels, respectively (as
Gauttier (2004) and Jones (2002) explain, consistency implies absence of
contradiction whereas coherence requires complementarity of action in the
achievement of common goals).
2.3.3 Determinants of co-evolution: Identifying intervening factors
Co-evolution implies that greater integration in a regime complex prompts
increased coherence in national implementation, and vice versa, enabling coherent
governance. To enhance co-evolution, it is necessary to address the factors that
facilitate and/or prevent horizontal integration (in the regime complex) and
coherence (in national implementation), as well as the vertical transfer of influence.
The third element of the co-evolution framework summarises these factors based
on contributions from different studies and an empirical focus on IEG (see Figure
2.4). Determinants of horizontal and vertical inter-connections in situations of
regime complexity are unpacked below.
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Figure 2.4 A framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence. Step 3: Understanding intervening factors
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2.3.3.1 Horizontal aspects
To examine the factors affecting horizontal integration and coherence, the study
relies, in principle, on EPI studies. EPI is concerned with integration rather than
coherence, but, as stated in section 2.2., EPI and coherence can be approached
under similar analytical lenses. EPI is a process shaped by three elements:
institutions, politics and cognitive predispositions (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).
Thus, an initial set of institutional, political and cognitive factors affecting horizontal
integration and coherence can be proposed. Based on Hogl and Nordbeck (2012),
these factors are defined as follows:
1. Institutional factors encompass the principles, norms, rules and procedures
shaping how interplay is managed.
2. Political factors relate to the diversity of interests, power asymmetries and
conflicts involved in an interplay context.
3. Cognitive factors are the frames of reference, ideas or paradigms that
influence actors’ preferences.
Two other categories are here introduced to refine the framework:
4. Organisational factors associated with the structure and functions of the
social units that make institutions operational.
5. Executive factors or the practical capabilities to manage interplay.
Organisational and executive factors are discussed alongside institutional and
cognitive factors, respectively. As noticed in section 2.1, institutions and
organisations are strongly interrelated, and the fine line separating the two is
sometimes hard to sustain empirically. Cognitive and executive factors have a
similar inter-connection. Oberthür (2009), for instance, identifies learning and
capacity building (which can be associated with the cognitive and executive factors
affecting horizontal integration and coherence as explained above) as two distinct
elements of enabling modes of interplay management. Others consider learning as
part of capacity building while acknowledging the difference between the cognitive
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and executive dimensions of the concept (Boyer et al. (2002), for example, make a
distinction between the qualitative and physical aspects of capacity-building).
Factors affecting policy integration and policy coherence in conditions of
international regime complexity are unpacked next.
2.3.3.1.1 Institutional and organisational factors
A study by Biermann et al. (2009b) on the fragmentation of global governance
architectures provides a sound basis for exploring the institutional factors affecting
integration in regime complexes. Biermann et al. suggest that the presence or
absence of synergy in global governance architectures depends on three factors:
the degree of institutional integration; the existence and degree of norm conflicts;
and the type of actor constellations.
Institutional integration in Biermann et al.’s framework is associated with the degree
of centralisation around one (or more) core institution(s). Centralisation arguably
facilitates synergistic interaction. Powers et al. (2007), for instance, affirm that
regime nesting enables institutional complementarity. They exemplify their point by
showing how bilateral military alliances between former Soviet Union states are
nested within broader multilateral security agreements that are part of a regime
complex evolving around the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Bilateral
and multilateral treaties not only complement each other, but sum up to create a
coherent system of security arrangements in the region. Orsini et al. (2013)
observe that centralised regime complexes have delivered more positive
governance outcomes than fragmented ones. Approaching regime interplay using
social network analysis, Böhmelt and Spilker (2013) claim that international
institutions which are central in a network tend to display similarities in their
institutional design (provided they fall within the type of soft-law institutions).
The degree to which overlapping norms and rules are compatible is a well-known
factor affecting the extent of synergy in inter-institutional relationships. Regimes
interacting within the same policy field would normally engage in synergistic
interaction because their norms, rules, and missions are largely compatible; in
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contrast, when interaction involves regimes from different domains addressing very
different issues, potential for conflict is higher (Wilson, 2008; Gehring and
Oberthür, 2006a; Rosendal, 2001a). Broader institutional frameworks cutting
across individual regimes also impact on institutional interactions. Zelli et al. (2013)
argue that liberal environmental perspectives favouring market-based governance
not only shape the operations of environmental regimes, but affect the interactions
between environmental and non-environmental institutions. They noticed the
dominance of liberal environmentalism in different areas of the regime complex for
trade and the environment.
Actor constellations in regime interplay settings can be examined by comparing the
memberships and constituencies of the elemental regimes. There is agreement
that overlap in memberships facilitates inter-institutional synergy. Gehring and
Oberthür (2009, 2006a) suggest that when two institutions pursuing different
objectives have similar memberships, a jurisdictional delimitation is established to
avoid conflict between the two regimes. This ideal type of institutional interaction
characterises the relationship between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (see Oberthür and Gehring, 2006b). In cases where two institutions
display similar objectives and memberships, complementarities may be realised
based on the different governance means available from each regime (Gehring and
Oberthür, 2009, 2006a). The interaction between the Intergovernmental Forum on
Forests (IFF) and the CBD exhibits patterns of this type (see Rosendal, 2001b).
Domestic and international constituencies also need to be taken into account.
Committed constituencies supporting specific regimes may block synergies with
overlapping regimes if they perceive a threat to their independence and existence
(von Moltke, 2001a).
Based on the three criteria discussed above, Biermann et al. (2009b) distinguish
three ideal types of fragmentation in global governance architectures: synergistic,
co-operative and conflictive. In situations of synergistic fragmentation, the
elemental regimes are closely integrated around one core institution, have
compatible norms, and are supported by all major players. Conversely, in
conditions of conflictive fragmentation, the elemental regimes have unrelated
decision-making procedures, embrace incompatible normative frameworks, and
have different memberships and constituencies. Co-operative fragmentation stands
in between these two types.
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The organisational dimensions of synergy processes in areas of environmental
governance are relatively well-known. Briceño (1999) identified a number of
organisational challenges affecting the creation of synergies among the Rio
Conventions, including different administrative arrangements, separate financial
mechanisms and scientific and technical bodies, different relationships with
specialised agencies, and geographical dispersion of treaty secretariats. Similar
challenges are encountered in other areas where MEAs overlap, and are at the
heart of proposals for clustering compatible MEAs (see Oberthür, 2002; von
Moltke, 2001b). Independent organisational arrangements, however, do not always
hinder inter-institutional synergy as there are positive stories of close collaboration
between agencies based at different locations (UNU, 1999).
Resembling developments at the international level, the management of regime
interplay in domestic arenas can be affected by the degree of fragmentation of
national institutions. It has been suggested that political systems distinguished by
high ministerial independence reinforce sectoral thinking, whereas those promoting
sector responsibility favour strong internal co-ordination (Jordan and Lenschow,
2010). For example, examining problems of policy co-ordination in the New
Zealand government in the second half of the 1980s, Boston (1992, p.94) noticed
that legislative changes reinforcing vertical relationships between departments and
their portfolio minister(s) led to a situation where the former “became less
concerned with the collective interest of the government and more concerned with
producing the outputs desired by their respective portfolio minister(s)”. This had a
negative impact on inter-departmental co-ordination (ibid.). The act of co-ordination
is itself affected by the normative frameworks in which it is embedded. In their
study on networks on public administration, Isett et al. (2011, p.164) highlight the
importance of policy context, noting that networks are “shaped and constrained by
institutional rules as well as regulatory procedures and norms that are specific to
the policy arena”.
Other factors of a more organisational character affect national-level synergies.
The implementation of a single MEA is, in many cases, supported by various
national focal points who may be housed by different ministries, agencies and/or
departments. This picture becomes more complex when other MEA processes are
taken into account. Co-location within the same building facilitates regular contact
(Van Toen, 2001). Dispersion across different ministries/agencies may result in a
sound division of labour, common pooling of resources and shared ministerial
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responsibility; but co-ordination problems may arise when lines of communications
between ministries/agencies are weak (Boyer et al., 2002). Examining synergies
between biodiversity, land degradation and climate change in a community forestry
project in Romania, Stringer et al. (2009) observed that limited communication
between ministries in charge of implementation of the United Nations Convention to
Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the CBD, stemming from the sectoral
operation of Romanian government ministries, hampered synergies between the
two regimes.
2.3.3.1.2 Political factors
The relationships between the elemental organisations of a regime complex are
shaped by political factors which are nicely captured by Abbott et al. (2013, 2012)
in their framework for exploring the strategies and growth rates of organisations in
conditions of institutional proliferation.
Abbott et al. notice that organisations pursue substantive (e.g. conservation of
biological diversity) and organisational (e.g. survival, autonomy and influence)
goals. Two or more organisations are in harmony when they regard their
substantive and organisational goals as complementary or, at least, compatible.
They enter into discord when they perceive that their substantive and/or
organisational goals are conflicting. In conditions of actual or potential discord, the
strategic choices of organisations will be determined by three factors: relative
power, adaptive opportunities, and strategic flexibility. Relative power relates to the
material, ideational and/or positional asymmetries among regimes (see also Perez,
2006). Adaptive opportunities in a dense institutional environment allow an
organisation to (re-)focus its activities on areas where there is limited overlap or
discord. Strategic flexibility has to do with the ability of an organisation to pursue
adaptive strategies. This characteristic is determined by the autonomy of the
organisation and its adeptness to locate policy niches in which it can prosper. It is
thus related to the comparative advantages it enjoys vis-à-vis competing
organisations (see UNU, 1999).
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The three strategies that, according to Abbott et al., organisations may pursue
when regime density creates discord, are competition, mutual adjustment and
adaptive adjustment (see also Gehring and Faude, 2013). When organisations opt
for competition, one of them will dominate if differences in power are substantial.
Mutual adjustment strategies may involve symmetric or adverse asymmetric
adjustments, depending on whether costs are distributed more or less equally.
Symmetric adjustments will occur when organisations have comparable power.
Otherwise, the more powerful organisation will be less willing to co-operate out of
concern that it might get a smaller slice of the pie (UNU, 1999). Weak
organisations which are unable to compete and cannot bear the costs of adverse
asymmetric adjustment will pursue unilateral strategies of adaptive adjustment,
generally by finding and securing a functional niche in the regime complex. To
adjust or adapt, weak organisations not only depend on the existence of adaptive
opportunities, but also on their own strategic flexibility. If both conditions are
absent, weak organisations will be forced to exit. Abbott et al. note that strategies
of mutual and adaptive adjustment seek to avoid or reduce conflict, whereas
competition strategies do not.
Other than organisational politics, individual personalities can influence the way in
which two regimes interrelate (see also section 2.3.1.2). Kaufmann (1980) notes,
for instance, that UN debates and decisions are significantly affected the
personalities of national delegates. Discussions on synergies, whether in UN
venues or elsewhere, may not be alien to this observation.
Political factors also affect the creation of synergies between environmental
regimes at the national level. Many studies on MEA implementation have referred
to the lack of co-ordination among agencies and officials with MEA responsibilities
as one of the major impediments to more coherent implementation (e.g. Chasek et
al., 2011; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et al., 2006; Van Toen, 2001). In many cases,
lack of co-ordination is explained by political disputes and turf wars, especially
when cross-sectoral interactions are involved. The different segments of an
administration not only have their own cultures and routines, but are inclined to
defend their competences, resources and autonomy from outsiders (Jordan and
Lenschow, 2010). Van Toen (2001) noticed that in some countries of the Asia
Pacific region, ministries of foreign affairs participating in MEA negotiations failed to
involve MEA implementation agencies and to share information with them. Co-
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ordination problems are sometimes caused by the same organisational structures
supporting MEA implementation (see section 2.3.3.1.1.2).
Leadership can play a key role in realising national-level synergies. Individual policy
entrepreneurs within governmental bureaucracies, political parties, NGOs and
expert communities have facilitated transitions towards more sustainable water
management in the Netherlands, the United States, China and Germany,
respectively (see Meijerink and Huitema, 2009). Pittock (2011), examining
synergies between climate and non-climate sectors (energy, water, and biodiversity
conservation) in nine jurisdictions, identified engagement of senior government
leaders as an important enabling factor.
2.3.3.1.3 Cognitive and executive factors
Cognitive factors shaping integration processes in regime complexes are difficult to
disentangle. Empirical observations generally suggest that processes of diffusion
and learning leading to shared knowledge improve synergy among associated
regimes (Oberthür and Stokke, 2011). Common frames of reference may
counteract the lack of political will, path-dependency, institutional lock-in and strong
vested interests that hinder regime integration (Gupta and Sanchez, 2012).
Processes of diffusion and learning are strongly associated with the political
saliency of interplay issues, which increases in situations of crisis or amid growing
evidence of potential hazards (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010). Both shared
knowledge and political saliency are considered important conditions for successful
management of regime interplay (see Oberthür and Stokke, 2011).
The interplay of public and private regimes for sovereign debt restructuring, as
discussed by Josselin (2009), illustrates some of the cognitive factors affecting
regime inter-linkages. Between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s both regimes
(associated with the Paris and London Clubs respectively) helped restructure large
amounts of sovereign debt in spite of existing normative tensions. Josselin explains
that repeated interactions between public and private officials generated shared
understandings and enabled alignment around common objectives. The 1994
Mexican economic crisis brought to the fore the normative inconsistencies between
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the two regimes. This, according to Josselin, reflected uncertainties regarding
burden-sharing amid a proliferation of actors and instruments in sovereign lending.
Uncertainties were eventually reduced through an improved dialogue between
Paris Club creditors and private investors.
The executive capacities of international organisations to manage regime interplay
are relatively limited. Scholars have noticed an international governance dilemma
whereby the growing functions that international organisations are expected to fulfil
are not accompanied by the provision of the authority and resources required to
support the development and implementation of international law (Eberlein and
Newman, 2008; Keohane, 2001). Until recently, UNEP was perceived as the
archetype of this capacity gap. Envisaged to be the global authoritative voice for
the environment, UNEP has fallen short in its mandate to co-ordinate
environmental activities throughout the UN system (Ivanova, 2007, 2005). Within
the UN hierarchy, UNEP has less independence and authority than UN specialised
agencies and related organisations such as the WTO. At the same time, while
enjoying the same status than other UN programmes, e.g., the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), UNEP has a comparatively smaller budget
(Ivanova, 2007). These asymmetries, however, may be corrected as UNEP is
upgraded (see Chapter 1). In most cases, it is mainly through cognitive means that
international organisations can exert influence on regime interplay. To illustrate, the
WTO Secretariat, the bureaucratic component of the WTO’s organisational
machinery, has been able to shape the overlap between trade and environmental
regimes through expertise-based authority, institutional memory, social networks,
and strategic marketing (Jinnah, 2010).
The cognitive and executive aspects of interplay management at the national level
achieve visibility when approached as capacity building issues (see section 2.3.3.1
above). As defined by Ohiorhenuan and Wunker (1995, p.3), capacity building “is
concerned with creating or enhancing a society's ability to perform specific tasks”.
They distinguish four dimensions of capacity building: 1) human resources, 2)
organisational processes; 3) physical resources; and 4) support generation. Human
resources comprise the technical, administrative, professional and management
skills of staff. Training is an elemental aspect of this dimension, and scholars and
practitioners have recognised its importance for more coherent implementation of
MEAs (e.g. Boyer et al., 2002). Van Toen (2001) observed that MEA officials in the
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Asia Pacific region often had little knowledge and time to develop synergies in
national implementation.
Organisational processes relate to the management capabilities and internal
procedures of ministries/agencies. Organisational cultures and preferences may be
included in this category as they have consequences for the management of
regime interplay. For example, Stringer et al. (2009) observed that synergies in the
implementation of the Rio Conventions in Romania were compromised by
organisational structures and habits (inherited from the country’s Communist past)
unsympathetic to participatory processes.
Physical resources in Ohiorhenuan and Wunker’s framework relate to material
aspects, most notably, financial capacities. Van Toen (2001) noticed that limited
financial resources were one of the main obstacles that Asia-Pacific countries
faced to improve synergies among MEAs. Infrastructure capacities may also be
considered among the physical resources associated with capacity-building.
Knowledge management systems are considered important tools for generating
synergistic solutions in the implementation of MEAs (see Chasek et al. 2011). In
many cases, however, data collection and information exchange is deficient, the
knowledge collected is not adequately used to build institutional memory,
information bases are fragmented, and unconnected data sets lead to duplication
of efforts (Chasek et al. 2011; Stringer et al., 2009; Mouat et al., 2006).
Support generation, according to Ohiorhenuan and Wunker, means ensuring
participation and commitment of stakeholders. Activities associated with
communication, education and public awareness fit in this category. Van Toen
(2001) found that in countries of the Asia Pacific region awareness and
understanding of the links between environmental issues was poor, or fair at best,
among civil society and politicians alike, with negative implications for MEA inter-
linkage activities.
Capacity-building is crucial for improved management of regime interplay at the
national level, but its effects can be limited in the absence of a long-term
perspective that ensures the sustainability of capacity (Boyer et al., 2002; Paul,
1995). In many developing countries, capacity utilisation becomes an issue after
capacities have been created (see Kok et al., 2008; Boyer et al., 2002). Moreover,
EPI studies in domestic arenas show that learning often comes from political crises
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triggered by external shocks, and not in response to deliberate attempts to change
actors’ cognitions (see Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).
2.3.3.2 Vertical aspects
Factors affecting how vertical influence travels from the global to the national level
and vice versa can be approached using Underdal’s (2000a, 2000b) framework for
examining the formation of national preferences and the implementation of
international (environmental) agreements. The framework distinguishes three
different models to predict and explain negotiating positions and implementation
records. These three models help visualise the variables that determine whether
national governments seek to influence the direction of global governance in
regime complexes and whether they are responsive to global attempts to influence
synergies in national implementation.
The first model, which Underdal refers to as the unitary rational actor model,
assumes that states are unitary actors concerned with maximising net national
gains. Decision-makers assess options based on the costs and benefits to their
nation. Thus, “a country will accept only regulations from which it expects to reap a
net benefit (or at least not lose), and comply with an agreement it has signed only
as long as compliance costs do not exceed the costs it would incur by defecting”
(Underdal, 2000b, p.343, emphasis in original). This model would explain the
differentiated impact of economic instruments designed by the international
community to instil domestic policy change. Examining the effects of international
policy instruments on reducing global rates of deforestation, Leplay and Thoyer
(2011) show that international incentives can work best in countries with low and
medium forest endowment than in countries with high forest cover. This is because
countries with abundant forests are locked in a development path based on over-
exploitation of forest resources and lack economic alternatives to pursue different
development patterns (ibid.).
The domestic politics model, the second model in Underdal’s typology, posits that
negotiating positions and implementation records are functions of societal
demand/support for environmental policies, and governmental supply of policies for
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protecting the environment. Societal demand and governmental supply usually go
hand-in-hand and “when significant gaps occur, they tend to be closed one way or
the other, with moderate time-lags” (Underdal, 2000b, pp.375-376).
Societal demand for environmental policy is influenced by perceptions of damage
and abatement costs, but two other factors are equally important, notably: 1) the
values, interests, and beliefs of different segments of society; and 2) the presence
and strength of actors or agents (e.g. NGOs, political parties, or the media)
articulating, amplifying, aggregating and even shaping societal interests and
concerns. Chasek (2010) points out that NGOs and civil society play important
roles in facilitating functional communication linkages between global MEA
processes and national implementation practices, and in ensuring that the
operation and implementation of MEAs are attuned with local agendas.
Governmental supply of environmental policy is contingent upon four major
determinants: 1) the ideological profile of the cabinet in power; 2) the relative
strength of the environmental branch of government; 3) the extent to which
government controls state policy; and 4) the extent to which government controls
society (the latter two dimensions are relevant primarily to the analysis of
implementation). As Underdal explains, the ideological profile of the government is
connected with the political will to act, whereas the other dimensions – which he
calls the structural variables – relate to the institutional capacity to develop and
implement environmental policies. He claims that political will and institutional
capacity are necessary conditions for governmental supply of environmental
policies. Masundire (2006) notices that in some developing countries high-level
support for the implementation of the UNCCD reflects in the incorporation of
desertification concerns into national development plans or poverty reduction
strategies. In these cases, desertification issues have greater chances of making
inroads into the development projects funded by donors (ibid.).
Institutional capacity is a well-known factor affecting implementation of international
environmental commitments, but also impinges upon upstream policy-making
processes, including agenda setting, framing, analysis and policy development and
design (Sagar and VanDeveer, 2005). MEA meetings require 100 days of
negotiations annually (Chasek, 2010). This creates a burden especially for
developing countries which cannot have representation at all meetings (sometimes,
however, as Schermers and Blokker (2011) note, countries fail to attend not
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because of low capacity, but due to lack of interest or because international bodies
are not considered competent authorities to address the matter in question).
Delegations of developing countries attending MEA meetings are often small in size
and lack the diplomatic and technical skills that negotiations require (Masundire,
2006; Boyer et al., 2002). They are sometimes composed of staff from the missions
and embassies of the country where meetings are held (ibid.). Problems of
representation prevent full participation in negotiations, especially when contact
groups are involved, and limit the influence of developing countries on international
policy (Masundire, 2006). Those problems have implications at the subsequent
stage of implementation because, as Masundire (2006) notices, delegations come
back to their home countries with incomplete information about MEA
implementation requirements. In some cases, states deliberately abstain from
advancing or supporting a policy due to their potential financial implications
(Kaufmann, 1980).
At this point it is important to distinguish between a country’s capacity to improve
coherence in the implementation of overlapping regimes (capacity to develop
horizontal linkages) and its capacity to interlace these activities with upstream
policy integration processes in regime complexes (capacity to develop vertical
linkages). Countries may co-ordinate implementation activities for domestic policy
purposes and not always in the pursuit of global environmental goals. In such
cases, capacity needs to develop horizontal and vertical linkages may differ, hence
the importance of capacity-building efforts to consider the concerns of both
suppliers/donors and users/recipients (Sagar and VanDeveer, 2005).
The third model in Underdal’s framework, the social learning and policy diffusion
model, emphasises the ideational foundations of policy-making and policy-
implementation processes. As Underdal (2000a p.75) explains, “while models I and
II both see decision-making as the essence of the policy process, our third model
focuses primarily on processes of searching, learning and transnational diffusion of
knowledge and ideas” (emphasis in original). Information data collection and
sharing has been highlighted as one of the main challenges in the implementation
of MEAs in the Pacific Islands (Chasek, 2010) and has also been signalled as an
implementation barrier in African countries (see Gray, 2003).
The three models for conceptualising negotiating behaviour and compliance are not
mutually exclusive. As Underdal (2000a, p.82) points out, the question “is not which
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model is ‘true’ but rather how much of the variance observed can each of them
account for” (emphasis in original). The three models draw attention to different
factors the saliency of which is likely to vary depending on context.
2.4 Concluding remarks
Morin and Orsini (2013a) have observed that regime complexes create a problem
of policy coherence at the national level. They suggest that regime complexes and
policy coherence co-evolve, meaning that changes at one level trigger adjustments
at another. Because they perceive policy coherence as a problem of foreign policy,
Morin and Orsini fall short of explaining whether regime complexes and public
policies (national implementation arrangements) display similar co-evolution
patterns. This matter is of particular saliency in areas of environmental and
sustainable development governance where the perceived fragmentation of
institutions within and across jurisdictional levels has led to recurrent calls for
institutional reform (see Ivanova, 2012; Bernstein and Brunnée, 2011). This
research aimed to analyse the inter-connections between regime complexes and
(public) policy coherence to assess the extent and determinants of co-evolution.
In this chapter, an approach was proposed to examine the co-evolution of regime
complexes and policy coherence from a public policy perspective. According to it, in
conditions of regime complexity, policy integration processes at the global level are
dynamically inter-linked to policy coherence outputs at the level of national
implementation. The coherency of governance as a whole is shaped by this
interaction.
Based on studies on cross-level interplay (Young, 2006) and multi-level politics
(Benz and Eberlein, 1999), this chapter claimed that co-evolution requires
differentiation of decision-making arenas (i.e. a separation of global and national
governance systems) and their subsequent coupling through enabling modes of
management such as information exchange, communication and persuasion. Co-
evolution should result in positive system change or coherent governance. Building
on these propositions, this chapter developed a framework for the analysis of co-
- 56 -
evolution in conditions of international regime complexity. The framework provides
analytical elements to explore 1) whether policy integration processes and policy
coherence outputs (separated through patterns of differentiation) display similar
evolution patterns; 2) how they are inter-connected (through loose coupling); and 3)
what the challenges and barriers to co-evolution are (determinants of positive
system change). The three components of the model aimed to elucidate whether
(first research objective), how (second research objective), and under what
conditions (third research objective) regime complexes and national implementation
systems co-evolve.
To assess whether policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs are
congruent, the framework compares the policy goals and institutional arrangements
of the regime complex with the policy objectives and implementation arrangements
of the political units. Policy goals and objectives are assessed based on whether
they seek to enhance synergy in the operation/implementation of the constituent
regimes of the complex, and whether synergy involves co-exploitative and/or co-
explorative undertakings (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011). The
correspondence between institutional and implementation arrangements is
considered by examining how they differ in terms of polity (structures for co-
ordination), politics (ability of individual and/or organisational actors to exert
influence) and policies (instruments and modes of management).
The framework then examines how regime complexes and national implementation
systems become loosely coupled by analysing how global governance influences
domestic policy (either through normative means or through cognitive and utilitarian
pathways) and how domestic developments shape the direction of global
governance (through foreign policy channels). Positive feedback loops emerge
when influence runs back and forth between governance levels (Karlsson-
Vinkhuyzen, 2012).
Since co-evolution requires independent evolutions in the first place (patterns of
differentiation precede loose coupling), the drivers of, and barriers to, policy
integration and policy coherence need initial consideration when factors affecting
the co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation systems are
examined. Loose coupling challenges should next be considered. The co-evolution
framework suggests that policy integration processes in regime complexes are
determined by the degree of fragmentation of governance architectures (Biermann
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et al., 2009b), the autonomous institutional arrangements of the elemental regimes
(Churchill and Ulfstein, 2000), organisational strategies to manage discord (Abbott
et al., 2013, 2012), the development of cross-institutional knowledge (Oberthür and
Stokke, 2011) and institutional capacity (Eberlein and Newman, 2008; Keohane,
2001). Policy coherence in national implementation, in turn, is shaped by the
degree of ministerial independence or horizontal fragmentation of the political
system (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010); the extent of dispersion of national focal
points within and across ministries/agencies (Boyer et al., 2002; van Toen, 2001);
turf battles and political leadership (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010; Bardach, 1996);
as well as human, technical, financial and communicative capacities (Chasek et al.,
2011; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et al., 2006; Boyer et al., 2002). Determinants of
loose coupling include cost-benefit calculations of state actors, domestic politics,
and social learning and policy diffusion processes (Underdal, 2000a, 2000b).
Tackling barriers to loose coupling is critical for enhancing co-evolution: effective
loose coupling ensures that problems of policy integration and coherence are
addressed in a co-ordinated manner with a view to more cohesive evolutions.
Ensuing chapters apply the co-evolution framework to the cluster of biodiversity-
related conventions and the implementation of its constituent regimes in LAC
countries to assess problems of coherent governance.
3 Research design and methodology: Exploring the co-evolution
of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
systems in LAC
This chapter discusses the methodology employed to examine the co-evolution of
regime complexes and national implementation systems. The first section
underlines the philosophical assumptions guiding this research. The second section
explains the research strategy justifying why the biodiversity cluster and the
implementation of its constituent regimes in LAC were selected as empirical area of
focus. Methods for data collection and analysis are explained next, followed by a
discussion of ethical issues and methodological limitations. A summary of the
chapter is provided in a concluding section.
3.1 Philosophical worldview
This study embraces pragmatism as research philosophy. Pragmatism is a theory
of thought and action founded on the primacy of practice (Hellman, 2009). It is
problem-centred, pluralistic and real-world practice oriented (Creswell, 2009).
Theory is “a belief held to be true, or, more pragmatically still, a tool to think about
thought and action which is held to enable us to cope better” with the problem at
hand (Hellmann, 2009 p.639). Indeed, “such philosophy teaches us to think of the
practical consequences that will follow the acceptance of a belief” (Bertilsson,
2004, p.375).
For pragmatists, what matters is the methodological question of methods as tools
for science and, more specifically, the adequacy of methods to the problem of
focus (Kaag and Kreps 2012; Hellmann, 2009).Following Friedrichs and Kratochwil
(2009), this study views “pragmatism as the reflexive practice of discursive
communities of scholars... and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful
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knowledge… are two sides of the same methodological coin” (ibid.). The approach
and framework for examining co-evolution of regime complexes and national
implementation systems relies on contributions from different disciplines to
advance understanding of the problem and generate policy-relevant knowledge.
3.2 Research strategy
The logic of enquiry developed by the founder of American pragmatism, Charles
Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), served as the specific research strategy to approach
the problem of co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation
systems. Friedrichs and Kratochwil’s (2009) abduction strategy provided
complementary insights. As explained by Zaiotti (2013), Peirce’s logic of enquiry
consists of three interrelated steps: abduction, deduction and induction. Abduction
is “an act of insight” conducive to the formulation of “reasonable (working)
hypothesis” (Bertilsson, 2004, pp.376-377). It recognises “individual sensation in
knowing” and implies that nothing new can be learned by framing reality with
concepts that express disciplinary conventions (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2009, p.644). A
field of research is characterized by the confluence of concepts that transcend
professional bodies of knowledge (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009). It can be
divided into a number of subfields or domains through further conceptual
distinctions (ibid.). Abduction proceeds in a way whereby “[c]ore concepts and the
field, as well as conceptual distinctions and domains, are mutually constitutive”
(ibid., p.717). The co-evolution framework presented in Chapter 2 is exemplary of
this abduction process.
Deduction is the second step in Peirce’s logic of enquiry. It “consists in figuring out
the plausible consequences that would result from the acceptance of a working
hypothesis” (Zaiotti, 2013, no pagination). In exploring the veracity of an abductive
inference, the pragmatic researcher will normally focus on either the most important
or the most typical cases in the field of research (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009).
Here, the framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and
national implementation systems is empirically applied to the cluster of biodiversity-
related conventions and the implementation of its constituent regimes in LAC. The
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importance of examining co-evolution in biodiversity governance was explained in
the introduction chapter and is further discussed in the next section.
The final stage in Pierce’s logic of enquiry is induction or the validation of the
working hypothesis through some form of experimentation (Zaiotti, 2013). Induction
occurs when the researcher relates empirical observations to the original abductive
inference. Specific data analysis techniques are used in this study to contrast
empirical findings to theoretical propositions (see section 3.3.2). Through this
exercise, the co-evolution framework is revisited and its practical consequences
assessed.
3.3 The cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and national
implementation systems in LAC
The cluster of biodiversity-related conventions (see Table 3.1) was selected as
empirical area of focus for several reasons. First, studies on regime interplay in
IEG have focussed on a limited number of areas, namely, global climate, oceans,
and subject areas falling in the intersection of trade and environmental regimes
(Oberthür and Gehring, 2011). Biodiversity has been identified as an area where
further empirical research is needed (ibid.). Second, the on-the-ground effects of
international conservation policies are little understood (Ferraro and Pattanayak,
2006). Third, there is growing concern over the need to mainstream biodiversity
issues into all areas of decision-making and economic sectors (see Chandra and
Idrisova, 2011; TEEB, 2011; CBD Secretariat, 2010; Rands et al., 2010; UNEP,
2010). Limited biodiversity mainstreaming is considered one of the main drivers of
biodiversity loss (CBD Secretariat, 2010). Nevertheless, the current focus on inter-
sectoral integration downplays the importance of intra-sectoral integration for
effective biodiversity mainstreaming (see Ugland and Veggeland (2006) in a food
safety policy context). Fourth, the literature has examined regime complexes
characterised by institutional competition (e.g. Margulis, 2013; Struett et al., 2013;
Helfer, 2009) or where divisions of labour have been established (e.g. Gehring,
2011; Stokke, 2011), disregarding other governance systems displaying more
synergistic interaction. The biodiversity cluster is one of these systems as is
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apparent from its high levels of inter-treaty co-ordination (see Caddell, 2011).
Synergies among biodiversity-related conventions have been the focus of a
relatively large number of studies (e.g. UNEP-WCMC, 2012; Baakman, 2011;
Caddell, 2011; Simon, 2011; Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010; Jardin, 2010; Andresen
and Rosendal, 2009; Urho, 2009), but national-level synergies have only been
examined in the context of the implementation of the Rio Conventions and other
MEAs (e.g. Chasek, 2010; Masundire, 2006; Van Toen, 2001). Fifth, empirical
observations suggest that synergies in the biodiversity cluster have developed
more rapidly than national-level synergies (see Jardin, 2010; Masundire, 2006).
The cluster thus provides an ideal setting to explore co-evolution dynamics.
Table 3.1 The cluster of biodiversity-related conventions
Convention Date of adoption Date of entry
into force
Fi
rs
tg
en
er
at
io
n
co
nv
en
tio
ns
Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
(the Ramsar Convention)
2 February 1971 21 December
1975
Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC)
16 November
1972
17 December
1975
Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES)
3 March 1973 1 July 1975
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals (CMS)
23 June 1979 1 November 1983
Se
co
nd
ge
ne
ra
tio
n
co
nv
en
tio
ns
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 22 May 1992 29 December
1993
International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA)
3 November 2001 29 June 2004
LAC was considered a suitable region to examine national implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions MEAs. The region is considered a “biodiversity
superpower” on account of its natural capital, with the potential to becoming the
world leader in the provision of biodiversity and ecosystem services (Bovarnick and
Alpizar, 2010). Governments in the region have thus powerful incentives to support
- 62 -
biodiversity conservation. Moreover, 9 LAC countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) are members of
the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries, a mechanism for consultation
and co-operation that brings together the most biologically diverse countries of the
world. The group was established in 2002 with the aim of advancing common
interests and priorities related to the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity (CBD, 2002). Taken together, LAC countries comprise more than 47%
of the membership of the group (19 countries as of June 2011), which reveals their
relative weight in international biodiversity policy.
The biodiversity cluster is portrayed in this research as the nucleus of the regime
complex for biodiversity protection. To justify this approach, it is first necessary to
situate the cluster within the broader international governance system for
biodiversity. It is estimated that there are at least 150 MEAs relating to biodiversity
(see Knigge et al., 2005). In addition, a number of inter-governmental organisations
deal with issues that have relevance to biodiversity (see van den Hove and
Chabason, 2009). At the core of the system is the CBD, a framework agreement
that establishes the wider context in which more specific biodiversity-related
instruments should be implemented (McGraw, 2002). Based on Wilson (2008),
three zones of interplay in the international governance system for biodiversity can
be noticed: 1) a close zone, where interaction between the CBD and other
institutions primarily concerned with the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity unfolds; 2) a cognate zone of interaction between the CBD and
institutions addressing different but cognate issues such as climate change or
desertification; and 3) and a remote zone, where interaction between the CBD and
institutions focussing on very different issues, for example trade liberalisation, takes
place (see Figure 3.1). The regime complex for biodiversity protection can be
initially located in the close zone of interplay of the system. Scholars and
practitioners recognise six major MEAs interacting in this zone, namely, the CBD,
the Ramsar Convention, the WHC, CITES, the CMS, and the ITPGRFA (UNEP-
WCMC, 2012; Urho, 2009). These conventions (which make up the so-called
cluster of biodiversity-related conventions) form the nucleus of the regime complex
for biodiversity protection. The six conventions are briefly described next based on
information available from the conventions’ websites (for a more detailed
discussion, see Appendix A).
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Figure 3.1 Zones of interplay in the international governance system for biodiversity
The CBD has 193 parties to date (November 2013). It pursues three objectives: 1)
the conservation of biological diversity; 2) the sustainable use of its components;
and 3) the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of
genetic resources (Article 1). On a substantive level, parties to the convention have
two general obligations: 1) to develop national strategies, plans or programmes for
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, or adapt existing instruments
to this purpose; and 2) to integrate biodiversity considerations into sectoral and
cross-sectoral strategies, plans or programmes (Article 6). The CoP is the central
plenary organ of the convention. Its work is supported by the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) and a permanent
secretariat administered by UNEP.
The Ramsar Convention, which owes its name to the Iranian city where it was
adopted, comprises 168 parties. It provides a framework for national action and
international co-operation for the conservation and wise use of wetlands. Parties
are required to designate suitable wetlands within their territories for inclusion in a
- 64 -
List of Wetlands of International Importance as well as considering their
international responsibilities for the conservation, management and wise use of
migratory species of waterfowl when selecting wetlands for inclusion in the List
(Article 2). Parties shall promote the conservation and wise use of wetlands and
waterfowl populations through national land-use planning, nature reserves,
management actions, and public education and training. Co-operation is
encouraged in cases of transboundary wetlands or shared wetland systems. The
main bodies of the convention are the CoP, the Standing Committee, the Scientific
and Technical Review Panel and the Ramsar Secretariat, housed by the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).
The WHC has 190 parties committed to identifying, protecting, conserving,
presenting and transmitting to future generations the cultural and natural heritage
situated within their territories (Article 4). General obligations include the integration
of heritage protection into planning programmes; the establishment of services and
staff for the protection of heritage sites; developing scientific and technical research
to address conservation threats; taking appropriate measures for the conservation
of heritage properties; and maintaining training centres for the protection of such
heritage (Article 5). Heritage sites of outstanding universal value are inscribed in
the World Heritage List (Article 11). The World Heritage Committee reviews
implementation of the Convention and its work is overseen by the General
Assembly of States Parties to the Convention. The World Heritage Centre,
administered by UNESCO, provides secretariat services.
CITES, with 179 parties, regulates the international trade in specimens of wild
animals and plants. Species protected by CITES are listed in three Appendices:
Appendix I includes threatened species the trade of which should be authorised
only in exceptional circumstances; Appendix II features species which may face a
threat to their survival if their trade is not regulated, as well as “look-alike” species;
Appendix III contains species subject to regulation in specific countries that require
international co-operation so that their trade is effectively controlled (Article II).
Trade in CITES species is based on a system of permits and certificates issued by
the appropriate national authorities. The CoP is the governing body of the
convention. Other treaty organs include the Standing Committee, the Animals and
Plants Committees, and the CITES Secretariat (administered by UNEP).
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The CMS aims to conserve migratory species and their habitats. Migratory species
protected by the treaty are included in two Appendices: endangered species are
listed in Appendix I and those with an unfavourable conservation status are
inscribed in Appendix II. The 119 parties to the convention are expected to take
appropriate measures for the conservation of migratory species in general, provide
immediate protection for Appendix-I species, and conclude (formal) Agreements for
the conservation and management of species in Appendix II (Article II, par. 3).
Parties are further encouraged to negotiate agreements (whether legally binding or
not) for the protection of any species that cross one or more national jurisdiction
boundaries (whether or not included in the Appendices of the Convention) (Article
IV, par.4). The convention operates through four permanent bodies: the CoP, the
Standing Committee, the Scientific Council and the Secretariat (under the auspices
of UNEP).
The ITPGRFA promotes the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture, and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of their utilisation, “in harmony with the Convention on
Biological Diversity” (Article 1.1). Parties to the treaty (131 to date) are required to
promote an integrated approach to the exploration, conservation and sustainable
use of PGRFA (Article 4) and develop appropriate legal and policy measures for
the sustainable use of those resources (Articles 6). They are encouraged to take
measures to protect the rights of local communities and farmers on account of their
contribution to the on-going development of the diversity of crops that feed the
world (Article 9). The treaty provides the establishment of a Multilateral System of
Access and Benefit-Sharing comprising a group of selected crops that are freely
available to potential users for purposes of research, breeding and training.
Recipients of the genetic materials agree to share any benefits derived from their
use through four possible mechanisms: exchange of information, access to and
transfer of technology, capacity-building, and sharing of monetary and other
benefits of commercialisation (Article 13). The Governing Body is the decision-
making organ of the treaty. Day-to-day administration of the convention is run by a
Secretariat hosted by FAO.
The biodiversity cluster displays the six defining characteristics of a regime
complex as outlined in Chapter 2. First, the principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures of its constitutive regimes exhibit some degree of divergence.
Morin and Orsini (2013a, p.42) observe that, within the regime complex for
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biodiversity protection, there are internal tensions between “anthropocentric and
ecocentric principles, conservationist and preservationist norms, ecosystemic and
species-specific rules, as well as voting and consensus-seeking procedures”.
These tensions derive from different approaches to biodiversity: the first-generation
conventions adopted in the 1970s are essentially focussed on conservation,
whereas the second-generation conventions concluded during and in the aftermath
of the 1992 Earth Summit embrace sustainable development agendas (Jardin,
2010; McGraw, 2002). Orsini et al. (2013) suggest that the existence of divergence,
if successfully managed, creates non-diverging relations. A study by the Ministry of
the Environment of Finland, supported by expert interviews and workshops,
observed that the six conventions of the biodiversity cluster are making efforts to
ensure co-operation among biodiversity-related instruments, and perceive each
other as favourable co-operation partners (see Urho, 2009).
Second, the biodiversity cluster comprises six elemental regimes, well above the
minimum number (three) necessary to create a social network. The CBD is the
core institution of the cluster. Figure 3.2 illustrates the density and centralisation of
institutional relationships in the cluster as emerging from the formal co-operative
agreements between its constituent regimes.
Third, the biodiversity cluster addresses a specific subject matter which is narrower
in scope than the issue-areas governed by its elemental regimes. Biodiversity
conservation is at the core of the mandates of the six conventions of the cluster.
Nevertheless, at least four conventions pursue broader objectives. The CBD is
perceived as a sustainable development convention (McGraw, 2002), the WHC
protects both natural and cultural heritage, CITES is sometimes considered both a
protectionist and a trading treaty (Lyster, 1985), and the ITPGRFA sees food
security as an overriding concern. The Ramsar Convention and the CMS are more
conventional conservation instruments. The governance domains of the
biodiversity-related conventions intersect with the issue-areas of regimes and
organisations beyond the biodiversity cluster, making the conventions part of other
regime complexes (Orsini et al., 2013).
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Figure 3.2 Inter-linkages in the biodiversity cluster as emerging from formal co-operative agreements
* The MoU was signed by UNESCO (covering both the WHC and the Man and the Biosphere Programme) and CMS (WHC Doc WHC-09/33.COM/5C).
** A note by the CBD Secretariat dated 10 December 2003 indicated that a MoC was being developed with the World Heritage Centre (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/19). At the 29th session of the
World Heritage Committee (2005), the World Heritage Centre reported that a MoU had been signed with the CBD (WHC Doc WHC-05/29.COM/INF.5). A copy of the memorandum could not be
obtained.
*** The Joint Work Plan also committed the Secretariat of the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA), one of the CMS Regional Agreements.
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Fourth, the constituent elements of the biodiversity cluster have memberships
which overlap to some extent. The CBD and the WHC have virtually reached
universal participation, with 193 and 190 parties respectively. CITES (179 parties)
and the Ramsar Convention (168 parties) have lagged slightly behind. The
ITPGRFA (131 parties) and the CMS (119 parties plus 34 countries participating in
regional agreements concluded under the CMS umbrella) have attracted fewer
countries, but the size of their memberships is still significant. Overlapping
memberships have been noticed in the literature. Masundire (2006), for instance,
observed that most African states are parties to the CBD, the WHC and CITES.
This study similarly found that 25 out of 36 countries of the LAC region are part of
at least four biodiversity-related conventions (mainly the CBD, the Ramsar
Convention, the WHC and CITES; see Section 3.3 below).
Fifth, the biodiversity-related conventions are engaged in institutional interaction.
Orsini et al. (2013) suggest that the elemental regimes of a complex need to
interact with at least one of their counterparts. They notice that, while interacting
regimes stand at the same level from a legal perspective, their interactions may be
affected by political and ethical hierarchies. The specific governance domains of
the non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions are functionally nested into the
broader issue-area governed by the CBD. That has created some degree of
institutional nestedness. Powers et al. (2007) suggest that the degree to which an
institution is nested into another may vary from complete nestedness (when one
institution is fully embedded in a broader institution) to partial nestedness (when
one institution incorporates elements of another, potentially has components which
no other institution possesses, and is not completely embedded in a third
institution). Partial nesting is observed in the biodiversity cluster, where an
incomplete, and contested, process of “CBD-ification” is taking place (see Caddell,
2011).
Sixth, policy-makers and practitioners see interactions among biodiversity-related
conventions as posing a governance challenge (clustering, for instance, has long
been raised as an option for streamlining governance in the cluster). As Orsini et al.
(2013) point out, perceptions ultimately determine the boundaries of a regime
complex. At the national level, the boundaries of the biodiversity regime complex
sometimes have different framings. Masundire (2006) observes that many African
- 69 -
countries perceive a great deal of overlap between the objectives of the CBD and
those of other biodiversity-related conventions, including the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the UNCCD, which are
not normally considered constituent elements of the biodiversity cluster. These
countries might see the regime complex for biodiversity protection as extending
beyond the ambit of operation of the six major biodiversity-related MEAs. There is
nonetheless agreement among national governments and international agencies
that these six conventions stand at the centre of the international governance
system for biodiversity (see Ministry of the Environment of Finland, 2010).
3.4 Materials and methods
3.4.1 Data collection
Empirical data was obtained from 1) interviews with international experts and CBD
national focal points; and 2) primary (official documents, reports and proceedings)
and secondary (academic research) documentary sources. Specific procedures for
data collection are next described.
This study started in late 2010 as an open enquiry into the horizontal and vertical
linkages between biodiversity-related institutions in the pursuit of global biodiversity
targets. Plans were made to collect most empirical evidence through research
interviews. As Bradshaw and Stratford (2005, p.72) suggest, interviews are “a good
way to develop an in-depth understanding of the positions and issues surrounding
any particular research interest”. Interviews with international experts and CBD
focal points were primarily intended to retrieve information on horizontal linkages in
the biodiversity cluster and at the level of national implementation, respectively. All
interviews were expected to generate relevant information on vertical linkages. As
the research progressed, and the argument of the co-evolution of regime
complexes and national implementation systems fine-tuned, some of the
information collected would be of greater value than other.
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To identify potential interviewees with expertise on co-operation in the biodiversity
cluster, a sample of international organisations and agencies with active
participation in meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions was developed.
The secretariats of the six conventions of the cluster were included in this group by
default. Other organisations and agencies were included in the sample based on
the following procedures. Lists of participants of meetings held between April 2002
and October 2010 were compiled from the conventions’ websites. The timeframe
coincides with the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target at CBD CoP6 (The
Hague, Netherlands, 7-19 April 2002) and its revision at CBD CoP10 (Nagoya,
Japan, 18-29 October 2010). The Target marked a turning point in international
biodiversity governance as it became the central focus of international biodiversity
policy within the period 2002-2010. Meetings of the governing bodies of the
conventions of the cluster (but not of their subsidiary bodies) were considered in
the selection process. Some attendance lists could not be obtained, namely, seven
lists of participants of meetings of the World Heritage Committee (26COM, 27COM,
28COM, 30COM, 31COM, 33COM, and 34COM), and two lists of participants of
meetings of the CBD CoP (CoP6 and CoP7).
Eighteen out of 27 potential lists were examined. Sorted according to the parent
convention, the 18 lists were distributed as follows: CITES (4), Ramsar Convention
(3), CMS (3), ITPGRFA (3), CBD (3), and WHC (2). The lists were reviewed to
identify the most active organisations within each forum. The analysis focussed on
IGOs and international NGOs.
An international organisation was considered to have regular presence in
biodiversity venues if its representatives attended at least four meetings of different
conventions between April 2002 and October 2010. Eight IGOs and 9 international
NGOs fell within this category (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). The number of IGOs was
effectively reduced to 7, as one of the organisations registered under the category
of IGOs (the CBD Secretariat) in the lists of participants had already been included
in the sample within the target group of treaty secretariats.
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Table 3.2 IGOs attending high-level meetings of four or more biodiversity-related conventions over the period 2002-20101
Table 3.2 IGOs attending high-level meetings of four or more biodiversity-related conventions over the period 2002-2010
IGO Number of
conventions
visited
Number of meetings attended per convention
RAMSAR WHC CITES CMS CBD ITPGRFA Total
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 4 3 - 4 1 3 3 14
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 4 3 - 4 3 3 - 13
UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre 4 2 - 3 2 3 1 11
Secretariat of the Agreement on the Conservation of
African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA)
4 3 - 1 3 2 - 9
1 Participation in eighteen meetings held between 2002 and 2010 was considered, including 3 meetings of the Ramsar CoP, 2 sessions of the World Heritage
Committee, 4 meetings of the CITES CoP, 3 meetings of the CMS CoP, 3 meetings of the CBD CoP, and 3 sessions of the Governing Body of the
ITPGRFA. The specific meetings covered were as follows: 1) Ramsar CoP8 (Valencia, Spain, 18-26 November 2002); 2) Ramsar CoP9 (Kampala, Uganda,
8-15 November 2005); 3) Ramsar CoP10 (Changwon, Republic of Korea, 28 October - 4 November 2008); 4) WHC 29COM (Durban, South Africa, 10-17
July 2005); 5) WHC 32COM (Quebec City, Canada, 2-10 July 2008); 6) CITES CoP12 (Santiago, Chile, 3-15 November 2002); 7) CITES CoP13 (Bangkok,
Thailand, 2-14 October 2004); 8) CITES CoP14 (The Hague, the Netherlands, 3-15 June 2007); 9) CITES CoP15 (Doha, Qatar, 13-25 March 2010); 10)
CMS CoP7 (Bonn, Germany, 18-24 September 2002); 11) CMS CoP8 (Nairobi, Kenya, 20-25 November 2005); 12) CMS CoP9 (Rome, Italy, 1-5 December
2008); 13) CBD CoP8 (Curitiba, Brazil, 20-31 March 2006); 14) CBD CoP9 (Bonn, Germany, 19-30 May 2008); 15) CBD CoP10 (Nagoya, Japan, 18-29
October 2010); 16) ITPGRFA GB1 (Madrid, Spain, 12-16 June 2006); 17) ITPGRFA GB2 (Rome, Italy, 29 October-2 November 2007); and 18) ITPGRFA
GB3 (Tunis, Tunisia, 1-5 June 2009). Other high-level meetings celebrated between 2002 and 2010 were not considered in the analysis as no attendance
lists could be obtained. These meetings include six meetings of the World Heritage Committee (26COM, 27COM, 28COM, 30COM, 31COM, 33COM, and
34COM) and two meetings of the CBD CoP (CoP6 and CoP7).
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Table 3.2 IGOs attending high-level meetings of four or more biodiversity-related conventions over the period 2002-2010
IGO Number of
conventions
visited
Number of meetings attended per convention
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)
4 3 - 2 1 - 3 9
United Nations University 4 2 - 2 1 3 - 8
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO)
4 2 - 1 1 3 - 7
Secretariat of the Great Apes Survival Partnership
(GRASP)
4 1 - 1 1 3 - 6
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Table 3.3 International NGOs attending high-level meetings of four or more biodiversity-related conventions over the period 2002-20102
NGO Number of
conventions
visited
Number of meetings attended per convention
RAMSAR WHC CITES CMS CBD ITPGRFA Total
IISD - International Institute for Sustainable
Development
5 3 - 4 3 3 3 16
IUCN - International Union for Conservation of
Nature
5 3 2 4 3 3 - 15
WWF 5 3 1 4 3 3 - 14
Greenpeace 5 1 2 4 1 3 - 11
BirdLife International 4 3 - 3 3 3 - 12
IFAW - International Fund for Animal Welfare 4 1 - 4 3 3 - 11
FACE - Federation of Associations for Hunting and
Conservation of the European Union
4 1 - 3 2 2 - 8
Wildlife Conservation Society 4 1 - 4 1 3 - 9
World Association of Zoos and Aquariums 4 2 - 3 2 2 - 9
2 Eighteen high-level meetings held between 2002 and 2010 were considered. See footnote 1.
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The 16 organisations above and the 6 secretariats of the biodiversity-related
conventions comprised the original interview sample (see Table 3.4). Invitations to
participate in the research were sent via e-mail. Interviews were requested with at
least two experts to discuss synergies in the biodiversity cluster. Invitations were
accompanied by a concept note outlining the aim and scope of the research (see
Appendix B). Twenty organisations responded to the invitation. Eighteen of them
provided contact details of potential interviewees, with whom communication was
established. The other two organisations considered the possibility of participating
in the research, but interview arrangements could not be made.
In parallel, interviews were sought with CBD national focal points in 15 LAC
countries to discuss synergies in the implementation of the conventions of the
biodiversity cluster. This was a reasonable number considering that the region is
composed of 36 states as per the World Bank’s 2011 country classification. The 15
countries were selected as follows. States that are parties to four or more
biodiversity-related conventions (as of April 2011) were first identified. These states
(25) were then ranked according to their wealth of biological diversity (as measured
by the GEF Benefits Index for Biodiversity) (see Table 3.5).
Following the same procedures applied to approach potential interviewees in
international organisations, electronic communication was established with the
primary national focal points to the CBD in the first 15 countries of the sample.
Interviews were requested with at least two CBD focal points (as explained in
Chapter 2, conventions like the CBD require the designation of more than one focal
point). They were deemed to be in an appropriate position to provide an overview
of synergies in the national implementation of biodiversity-related conventions in
light of the CBD’s nature as framework convention. Potential interviewees were
reached in all countries but Venezuela. To stay within the 15-country target, contact
was sought and successfully established with CBD authorities in Jamaica (the
sixteenth country of the sample).
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Table 3.4 Sample of international organisations contacted for interview purposes
Secretariats of the biodiversity-related
conventions
IGOs International NGOs
1. Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
(Ramsar Convention)
2. Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (WHC)
3. Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES)
4. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals (CMS)
5. Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
6. International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture
(ITPGRFA)
7. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
8. United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP)
9. UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre
(UNEP-WCMC)
10. Secretariat of the Agreement on the
Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory
Waterbirds (AEWA)
11. United Nations University
12. United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
13. Secretariat of the Great Apes Survival
Partnership (GRASP)
14. IISD - International Institute for Sustainable
Development
15. IUCN - International Union for Conservation of
Nature
16. WWF
17. Greenpeace
18. BirdLife International
19. IFAW - International Fund for Animal Welfare
20. FACE - Federation of Associations for Hunting
and Conservation of the European Union
21. Wildlife Conservation Society
22. World Association of Zoos and Aquariums
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Table 3.5 LAC countries that are contracting parties to four or more biodiversity-
related conventions (as of April 2011)1
Country GEF Benefits
Index (GBI) for
Biodiversity2
Number of
conventions
adopted
Conventions not
yet adopted
Brazil 663.7 5 CMS
Mexico 503.1 4 CMS and
ITPGRFA
Colombia 380.0 4 CMS and
ITPGRFA
Peru 241.0 6 --
Ecuador 199.4 6 --
Venezuela 178.2 5 CMS
Argentina 122.9 6 --
Chile 107.3 6 --
Bolivia 91.9 5 ITPGRFA
Cuba 89.8 6 --
Panama 78.0 6 --
Costa Rica 73.6 6 --
Guatemala 58.9 5 CMS
Honduras 52.7 6 --
Dominican
Republic
45.0 4 CMS and
ITPGRFA
Jamaica 32.8 5 CMS
Nicaragua 23.7 5 CMS
Paraguay 22.2 6 --
Suriname 20.2 4 CMS and
ITPGRFA
Trinidad & Tobago 16.0 5 CMS
Belize 12.4 4 CMS and
ITPGRFA
Uruguay 9.5 6 --
Santa Lucia 6.5 5 CMS
El Salvador 5.5 5 CMS
Antigua & Barbuda 3.0 5 ITPGRFA
Since interviewees were geographically dispersed and were presumed to work
under tight work schedules, remote interviews were carried out. Remote interviews
are those which are conducted through telephone, remote video, e-mail and instant
messaging (King and Horrocks, 2010). This study relied on Voice-over Internet
Protocol (VoIP) services and e-mail surveys to conduct remote interviews. VoIP
services are computer-mediated tools that convert voice into either a digital signal
1 The 15 countries of the sample are highlighted in grey.
2 GEF, 2008
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or a regular telephone signal so that a user can communicate with another one
using VoIP services or a regular phone (McFadden and Price, 2007). VoIP-based
interviews were done via Skype, a VoIP service and software application that
allows users to make voice and video calls over the Internet. Participants were
asked to select between two modalities of Skype interviewing: 1) Skype-to-Skype
interview; and 2) Skype-to-telephone interview. The use of video in Skype-to-Skype
interviews was discarded from the outset as it could cause slowdowns or breaks in
transmission and raise privacy concerns among interviewees. E-mail surveys were
offered as an alternative option in such cases where potential participants
expressed an intention to participate in the research but were unable to set a
specific date and time for a Skype-based interview.
Prior to the interview, participants were requested to complete a participant consent
form (see Appendix C). The consent form should be read in conjunction with the
research concept note and covered issues of privacy and confidentiality, participant
risk, right to withdrawal, management of data, and ownership of data (Mann and
Stewart, 2000). Participants were given assurances that no information would be
disclosed which could lead to their identification, such as personal names, job
positions and, in the case of international experts, names of employing
organisations.
A total of 25 interviews with international experts were conducted between
September 2011 and January 2012. Twenty-three took the form of individual
interviews and 2 were carried out as joint interviews. All interviews were done in
English. According to their organisational affiliation, interviewees belonged to three
different groups: secretariats of the biodiversity-related conventions (8
interviewees), IGOs (5 interviewees), and international NGOs (10 interviewees).
Two other interviewees had a different affiliation. Excluding these two cases, six
secretariats of the biodiversity-related conventions, five IGOs and seven NGOs
were represented with at least one interviewee. Two secretariats, one IGO and one
NGO were represented with two interviewees. Three participants pertained to the
same organisation (an NGO).
Eighteen interviews with CBD national focal points took place between December
2011 and April 2012: three were questionnaire-based interviews, three Skype-to-
Skype interviews and twelve Skype-to-landline interviews. Of these latter twelve,
two were joint interviews involving two participants. Skype-based interviews were
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done in Spanish and English depending on official languages or the particular
preferences of interviewees (note that the researcher is a Spanish native speaker).
Ten countries were represented with one interviewee, whereas another five (Chile,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Jamaica) were represented with two participants.
Skype-based interviews followed a semi-standardised format (see Berg, 2007). In
advance of the interview, participants were provided with a list of general questions
to be the basis of discussion (see Appendix D). As the interview progressed, some
questions were reframed and others omitted based on the responses received. The
length of the interviews varied between 25 and 45 minutes. The interviews were
recorded with a Skype audio recorder (Pamela) and encrypted using Sophos
encryption software. Edited transcriptions of audio recordings were made,
encrypted, and sent to interviewees for validation. Only two participants
(international experts) proposed changes to their respective transcripts.
Table 3.6 Documentary sources
Primary sources
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action
Plans (NBSAPs)
Decisions and resolutions of the governing
bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions
National reports to the conventions of the
biodiversity cluster
Official documents on inter-treaty co-
operation (available as conference and/or
information documents at meetings of the
conventions), including reports of BLG
meetings.
UNEP special reports
Proceedings of meetings and workshops on
synergies among biodiversity-related
conventions (e.g. the Nordic Symposium on
synergies among biodiversity-related MEAs
held in Helsinki, Finland in April 2010)
Secondary sources
Journal articles and book chapters addressing co-operation in the biodiversity cluster
Documents were used as another source of empirical data. In historical research, a
distinction is often made between primary and secondary documentary sources. As
Marwick (1989) explains, primary sources were created within the period being
investigated; whereas secondary sources are produced later, making use of the
primary sources. Primary sources include archive collections, rare printed
materials, government printed materials, newspapers and periodicals; secondary
sources range from research-based specialist work (e.g. journal articles) to general
works or textbooks (ibid.). Table 3.6 displays the primary and secondary
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documentary sources used in this research. Most of the documents reviewed were
retrieved online from the websites of the relevant suppliers. Others, notably books,
were accessible from the University of Leeds’ library.
3.4.2 Data analysis
Research materials provided empirical evidence relevant to the three objectives of
this study. In addressing specific objectives, however, this research relied more on
certain materials than on others. To explore similarities between policy integration
processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs at the level of
national implementation (first objective of this research), this study was informed, in
essence, by interviews with national focal points, MEA decisions and resolutions
and other documentary sources. Vertical linkages between the biodiversity cluster
and national implementation systems (second research objective) were analysed
mostly through the interviews with national focal points, NBSAPs and national
reports. Factors affecting the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national
implementation systems (associated with the third objective of this research) were
retrieved, fundamentally, from the interviews with treaty secretariats, international
experts and national focal points.
Most documentary sources were approached using basic documentary analysis
techniques involving theorisation and interpretation through the lens of a theoretical
framework (see McCulloch, 2004). More systematic procedures were employed to
examine interview transcripts, NBSAPs, national reports, and MEA decisions and
resolutions. These are explained below. Note that some of the materials were in
Spanish, but the researcher, Spanish native speaker, did not require a translator to
analyse them. This safeguarded the integrity of the data.
To examine interview transcripts, thematic analysis was used. Thematic analysis
consists of identifying recurring motifs in the text which are relevant to the research
questions (King and Horrocks, 2010; Bryman, 2008). The goal of thematic analysis
is not only to produce a list of themes, but to organise those themes in a way that
reflects how they are interrelated. This generally involves establishing hierarchical
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relationships such that the more general themes encompass a number of specific
subthemes.
King and Horrocks (2010) identify two alternative styles of thematic analysis. One
of them is template analysis, which requires the construction of a coding structure –
the template – based on the analysis of a sub-sample of the empirical data with a
view to applying it to the rest of the material. Some themes may be added or
amended as the researcher moves across the texts, with the template being
continually adapted until it captures the essence of the material being studied.
Another style is matrix analysis, where units of analysis (e.g. individuals and
groups) are tabulated against concepts or issues related to the research questions.
Tabulation is aided by visual displays (the matrices) featuring categories that assist
the coding process.
A combination of matrix and template analysis was used in this research. The
framework for examining the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy
coherence (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3) guided the analysis process. As explained
in Chapter 2, the co-evolution framework involves three main elements associated
with the three research questions. The three elements comprise more specific
components. These elements and components were converted into categories and
sub-categories to create a template for the analysis of research materials. The
template, in its original version, failed to fully capture the essence of the data. In
light of empirical observations, the literature was further revised and the theoretical
framework adjusted. This led to changes in the original template. A revised
template was then applied to the materials. The process continued until the
template provided a full picture of the problem of focus. At this final stage, the three
main categories of the template, as supported by relevant empirical evidence, were
examined separately to answer each of the three research questions. Findings
across categories were then compared to reach general conclusions with regard to
the aim of this study. The coding process, at its different stages, was assisted by
specialised software (NVivo).
First-generation NBSAPs (most of them in effect throughout the 2000-2010
decade) in 14 countries of the sample were examined to determine whether they
incorporated commitments from biodiversity-related conventions other than the
CBD and/or synergies among biodiversity-related agreements (a copy of the
Dominican NBSAP could not be obtained). To this end, specific references to any
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of the non-CBD conventions of the biodiversity cluster and more general references
to biodiversity-related agreements were traced.
National reports to the biodiversity-related conventions were consulted to assess
how international norms promoting synergies between conventions have affected
national implementation. Contracting Parties of the Ramsar Convention, the WHC,
CITES, the CMS and the CBD are required to submit regular reports on national
implementation. ITPGRFA parties are exempted from that obligation. National
reports produced by the 15 countries of the sample in the context of efforts to
achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target were compiled. The focus was on national
reports covering the period between April 2002 (when the 2010 Target was
adopted) and October 2010 (when new global biodiversity targets were set). The
reports falling within this timeframe are displayed in Table 3.7. Some of them
reported developments occurring before April 2002 (i.e., the 1st WHC Periodic
Reports and CITES Biennial Reports 2001-2002) or after October 2010 (National
Reports to Ramsar CoP11 and CMS CoP10), but they remained inserted, at least
partially, within the 2010 Target timeframe.
The formats and/or guidelines for presenting the national reports listed in Table 3.7
were revised to see whether state parties were invited to give an account of
synergies between MEAs at the national level. That information was not requested
in three cases (1st and 2nd WHC Periodic Reports, and CITES Biennial Reports
2001-2002) and the relevant reports were thus discarded from the analysis. The
formats and/or guidelines for submitting the remaining reports were further
examined to identify key questions and/or elements addressing synergies between
MEA activities. The input required from parties was of two types: in some cases,
state parties were asked to discuss synergies in the implementation of two
conventions; in other cases, more general information on MEA inter-linkages was
sought. The analysis focussed on these latter reporting requirements. The
questions and reporting elements on which the analysis was based are listed in
Table 3.8.
National reports of LAC countries were accessed online at the websites of the
biodiversity-related conventions. Some reports were missing (see Table 3.9), and
information on synergies between MEA implementation processes was absent in
some of the existing reports (see Table 3.10). This study relied on the available
information.
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Table 3.7 National reports to the biodiversity-related conventions requiring
information on implementation activities developed in the context of efforts to
achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Target3
CBD Ramsar
Convention
WHC4 CITES5 CMS
3rd National
Reports (2005)
4th National
Reports (2009)
National Reports
to CoP9 (2005)
National Reports
to CoP10 (2008)
National Reports
to CoP11 (2011)
1st Periodic
Reports (late
2002)
2nd Periodic
Reports (2012)
Biennial
Reports 2001-
2002 (2003)
Biennial
Reports 2003-
2004 (2005)
Biennial
Reports 2005-
2006 (2007)
Biennial
Reports 2007-
2008 (2009)
Biennial
Reports 2009-
2010 (2011)
National
Reports to
CoP8 (2005)
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2008)
National
Reports to
CoP10 (2011)
Decisions and resolutions adopted within the timeframe of the 2010 Biodiversity
Target (2002-2010) were examined to visualise preferred avenues (levels of co-
ordination) to improve synergy (decisions by CBD CoP10 were not considered as
their adoption occurred against the background of revised biodiversity targets
which opened a new phase in international biodiversity governance). Because the
biodiversity cluster has evolved around one core institution (the CBD), the analysis
focussed on CBD decisions creating inter-linkages with the specialist regimes of
the biodiversity cluster, and on decisions and resolutions by the specialist regimes
seeking to enhance synergy with the CBD. These decisions were initially arranged
in two different groups.
3 The list includes the national reports informing on measures and actions adopted between
April 2002 and October 2010 to implement the biodiversity-related conventions. The
year in which reports were due are indicated in parenthesis.
4 The year in which reports from LAC countries were due is indicated in the parenthesis.
5 CITES Parties are required to prepare an annual report on their CITES trade and a biennial
report on legislative, regulatory and administrative measures to implement the
convention. To the extent that annual reports are limited to retrieving factual data on
trade in CITES species, only biennial reports are listed in the table.
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Table 3.8 MEA inter-linkages in formats and/or guidelines for submitting national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions8
Table 3.8 MEA inter-linkages in formats and/or guidelines for submitting national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions
Convention National Reports9 Reporting elements requiring information on MEA inter-linkages
CBD
3rd National Reports (2005)
Parties were asked if they were “taking steps to harmonize national policies and
programmes, with a view to optimizing policy coherence, synergies and efficiency in the
implementation of various multilateral environment agreements (MEAs) and relevant
regional initiatives at the national level”
4th National Reports (2009)
Parties were required to include a chapter on sectoral and cross-sectoral integration or
mainstreaming of biodiversity. Paragraph 2(c) of the guidelines for preparing the chapter
indicated that integration should be considered in terms of “other convention processes
besides the Convention on Biological Diversity, such as the processes under the four
other biodiversity-related conventions (CITES, Convention on Migratory Species, Ramsar
and the World Heritage Convention), the Rio conventions (UNFCCC, UNCCD), and
others”.
Ramsar Convention National Reports to CoP9 (2005)
Parties were invited to inform if mechanisms were “in place at the national level for
collaboration between the Ramsar Administrative Authority and the focal points of other
multilateral environmental agreements”
8 National reports informing on implementation activities taking place between April 2002 and October 2010 were considered.
9 The year in which reports were due are indicated in parenthesis.
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Table 3.8 MEA inter-linkages in formats and/or guidelines for submitting national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions
Convention National Reports9 Reporting elements requiring information on MEA inter-linkages
Ramsar Convention
National Reports to CoP10
(2008)
National Reports to CoP11
(2011)
Both reports asked parties how national implementation of the Ramsar Convention could
“be better linked with implementation of other multilateral environmental agreements
(MEAs), especially those in the ‘Biodiversity cluster’ (Ramsar, Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), Convention on Migratory Species (CMS), CITES, and World Heritage
Convention), and UNCCD and UNFCCC”
Parties were once again required to inform if there were “mechanisms in place at the
national level for collaboration between the Ramsar Administrative authority and the focal
points of other multilateral environmental agreements”
CITES
Biennial Reports 2003-2004
(2005)
Biennial Reports 2005-2006
(2007)
Biennial Reports 2007-2008
(2009)
Biennial Reports 2009-2010
(2011)
The four reports required parties to inform whether measures had “been taken to achieve
co-ordination and reduce duplication of activities between the national authorities for
CITES and other multilateral environmental agreements (e.g. the biodiversity-related
Conventions)”
CMS
National Reports to CoP8 (2005)
National Reports to CoP9 (2008)
National Reports to CoP10
(2011)
In the three reports, Parties were expected to provide information about measures
undertaken to implement CMS Resolutions on co-operation with other conventions and
international processes.
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Table 3.9 Status of national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions submitted by LAC countries10
Table 3.9 Status of national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions submitted by LAC countries
Country National Report11
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports to
CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2011)
Argentina            
Bolivia            
Brazil          Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Chile            
10 National reports informing on implementation activities taking place between April 2002 and October 2010 were considered. A tick indicates that the report is
available online, whereas a cross denotes that the report is missing.
11 The year in which reports were due are indicated in parenthesis.
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Table 3.9 Status of national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions submitted by LAC countries
Country National Report11
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports to
CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2011)
Colombia          Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Costa Rica          The
convention
entered into
force in July
2007
 
Cuba          The
convention
entered into
force in
February
2008
Cuba was
not a Party
to CMS prior
to the
deadline for
submission
of national
reports

Dominican
Republic
         Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Ecuador            
Guatemala          Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
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Table 3.9 Status of national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions submitted by LAC countries
Country National Report11
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports to
CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2008)
National
Reports
to
CoP10
(2011)
Honduras          The
convention
entered into
force on 7
September
2006
 
Jamaica          Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Mexico          Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Panama            
Peru            
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Table 3.10 Reporting of MEA inter-linkage activities in LAC countries
Country National Report13
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports
to CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2011)
Argentina  14          N/A
Bolivia N/A N/A    N/A N/A N/A N/A   
Brazil  15        Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Chile       N/A N/A N/A   
12 The table shows whether LAC countries addressed MEA inter-linkages in their national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions. A tick indicates that the
key reporting elements identified in Table 3.8 were addressed, whereas a cross denotes failure to provide the required information. The abbreviation N/A
(Not Applicable) means that the national report was not submitted or is missing from online databases. Note that Costa Rica, Cuba and Honduras joined
CMS after 2005 and were thus not expected to submit a report to CMS CoP8. Cuba was not in an obligation to prepare a report for CMS CoP9 either,
because the country became a CMS Party after the deadline for submission of national reports (see Table 3.9).
13 The year in which reports were due are indicated in parenthesis.
14 The chapter on biodiversity mainstreaming does not include information on synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs, as required by the CBD’s guidelines
for the fourth national report. However, the issue is briefly covered in other sections.
15 See footnote 14.
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Table 3.10 Reporting of MEA inter-linkage activities in LAC countries
Country National Report13
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports
to CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2011)
Colombia      N/A N/A N/A  Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Costa Rica        N/A  N/A  
Cuba  16    N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Dominican
Republic
     N/A N/A N/A N/A Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Ecuador         N/A   
Guatemala       N/A N/A N/A Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Honduras  17     N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Jamaica  N/A       N/A Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
16 Synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs are indirectly addressed by reference to processes of sectoral integration.
17 See footnote 14.
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Table 3.10 Reporting of MEA inter-linkage activities in LAC countries
Country National Report13
CBD Ramsar Convention CITES CMS
3rd
National
Reports
(2005)
4th
National
Reports
(2009)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP11
(2011)
Biennial
Reports
2003-
2004
(2005)
Biennial
Reports
2005-
2006
(2007)
Biennial
Reports
2007-
2008
(2009)
Biennial
Reports
2009-
2010
(2011)
National
Reports
to CoP8
(2005)
National
Reports
to CoP9
(2008)
National
Reports
to CoP10
(2011)
Mexico  18       N/A Not a CMS Party as of April 2011
Panama   N/A      N/A   
Peru     N/A  N/A  N/A   N/A
18 See footnote 14.
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The search for institutional inter-linkages was guided by Gehring and Oberthür’s
(2009, 2006) causal analysis of institutional interaction. According to this approach,
the influence an institution exerts upon another originates from the decisions taken
by its members. Influence does not run back and forth between the interacting
institutions, but runs in one direction from the source to the target (Gehring and
Oberthür, 2006). A case of institutional interaction is established if three elements
are identified: 1) the source institution and, in particular, the decision(s) from which
influence emanates; 2) the target institution and, more specifically, the
component(s) that are subject to the influence of the source institution; and 3) a
cause-effect relationship connecting the two institutions (Gehring and Oberthür,
2009, 2006). The approach implies that there cannot be a case of interaction
without an effect within the target institution or the issue-area governed by it (ibid.).
The CBD was treated as the source and the biodiversity-related conventions as the
target institutions in the CBD group. The roles were switched in the non-CBD
group. The analysis did not explore the effects of the source institution on the
target institution as the aim was not to examine real-world cases of interaction
between biodiversity-related conventions, but to identify the level of co-ordination
required, namely, inter-institutional co-ordination, unilateral adaptations within the
interacting regimes, and/or autonomous action outside collective decision-making.
The categorisation process evolved as explained below:
1. Using Adobe Reader, the retrieved decisions were reviewed looking for
specific and general references to the target institution(s). Terms entered in
the search box included:
a. For specific references to the CBD: Convention on Biological
Diversity or CBD.
b. For specific references to other biodiversity-related MEAs:
Convention on Wetlands or Ramsar Convention; World Heritage
Convention or WHC; Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species or CITES; Convention on the Conservation of
Migratory Species, Convention on Migratory Species or CMS;
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources or ITPGRFA.
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c. For general references to biodiversity-related MEAs: biodiversity-
related conventions, biodiversity conventions, biodiversity-related
multilateral environmental agreements, biodiversity-related
agreements, and biodiversity-related treaties. More ambiguous
allusions to the biodiversity-related MEAs in terms of, for example,
multilateral environmental agreements, conventions, treaties and
organisations, were not tracked, as those references did not carry
an explicit intention to create linkages within the biodiversity cluster.
2. The paragraphs containing the references were extracted from the text and
listed in an Excel record. Notes were taken on the section of the decision
from which the paragraphs were retrieved, e.g., the preamble, the main
body of the Decision, an annex or appendix, etc.
3. Building on the principle that action triggers interaction (Gehring and
Oberthür, 2006), paragraphs were subtracted from the analysis if they were
located in any of the following sections:
a. Preamble
b. Annexes and appendices, including guidelines, programmes of
work, action plans, convention strategies, etc. While some of these
instruments may incorporate actions creating institutional inter-
linkages, those actions are only indirectly mandated by the
governing bodies and might not reflect an outright intention to affect
institutional interaction processes.
c. Main body of a Decision when no specific action was requested by
the governing body, e.g., when it merely took note of a joint report or
welcomed progress in the implementation of joint activities.
4. The remaining paragraphs featured action-oriented decisions establishing
institutional inter-linkages between the source and the target institution(s).
Two CBD Decisions were found to require exactly the same action from the
target institution, namely, CBD Decision IX/16 par. 6 and CBD Decision
IX/19 par. 7. To avoid double-counting, the two decisions were collapsed
into one.
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5. The analysis then proceeded to examine the level of co-ordination required
to enhance synergy. The exercise involved identifying the actor(s)
mandated/required by the source institution to implement a Decision. Eight
different types of actions intended to improve synergy with the target
institution(s) were distinguished and grouped into three general categories
in accordance with the three general levels of co-ordination outlined earlier.
Some Decisions incorporated two or more actions unfolding at different
levels; others required action at no definite level. A separate category was
created to account for these special cases.
Decisions promoting unilateral action by bodies of the source and target
institution(s) were conceived of as falling under the category of unilateral
management and not as cases of autonomous management. This obeyed
to the fact that convention bodies are less autonomous in their operation
than state and non-state actors. While convention bodies may take
advantage of the leeway granted by their principals (contracting parties) to
pursue specific agendas, they rarely act outside of the mandates they
receive. Their operation is largely constrained to the boundaries of collective
decision-making.
6. Each decision was ascribed to the appropriate co-ordination category.
Classifying a decision was normally a matter of looking at the actor(s)
addressed by the governing body. To illustrate, Resolution X.19 par. 9 by
the Ramsar CoP instructed the Ramsar Secretariat to disseminate
Ramsar’s guidance for integrating wetland conservation and wise use into
river basin management, including by actively approaching other MEAs,
especially the CBD and the UNECE Water Convention. The case required
unilateral action by the Ramsar Secretariat and was categorised
accordingly.
In some cases, however, the actions mandated/required by a governing
body to enhance synergy with the target institution(s) had to be
implemented by actors which it did not address directly. For instance, in
Decision VIII/20, the CBD CoP requested the Executive Secretary to invite
the Ramsar Convention to take the lead in developing a national reporting
framework on inland water biodiversity. While the Executive Secretary was
mandated to take action, it was the Ramsar Convention which ultimately
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had to implement the decision. In other words, implementation would come
through unilateral action by the Ramsar Convention and not through
unilateral action by the CBD Secretariat.
A special case arose in connection with CBD Decision IX/12 par. 14(b). The
decision requested the CBD Secretariat to invite relevant experts to address
the CBD’s Working Group on Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) on various
technical issues, including on the information technology environment used
by the ITPGRFA’s Secretariat for accessing genetic material protected by
the Treaty. Action by relevant experts was needed to implement the
decision. The decision could thus be classified as a case of autonomous
action by non-state actors. This was not deemed appropriate, however,
because implementation of the decision was not contingent upon the
autonomous action of a specific actor. If an expert invited to address the
CBD’s Working Group on ABS refused to collaborate, alternative experts
could be sought. It was expert input and not autonomous action that was
demanded. The extent of synergy between the CBD and the ITPGRFA
would be determined by the CBD’s Working Group on ABS and not by
individual experts. The decision effectively entailed action at the level of
unilateral management.
3.5 Ethics and limitations
This section discusses ethical issues and general limitations associated with the
research methods. Research involving human participants requires consideration of
three ethical issues: 1) privacy and confidentiality; 2) informed consent; and 3)
harm (Dowling, 2005). Privacy and confidentiality is especially important when
interviewees include high-profile subjects (Odendahl and Shaw, 2001). Some of the
officials and experts interviewed in this study might fall in this category. To ensure
confidentiality, researchers need to take care not to disclose any information
through which respondents can be easily identified, including personal traits and
organisational affiliations (ibid.). Bearing this in mind, international experts
participating in this research are identified with distinctive tags composed of two
letters and one random number. The two letters only indicate the type of
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organisation to which the interviewee is ascribed (TS standing for a treaty
secretariat; IG standing for an IGO; NG standing for an NGO; and OT standing for
other). A quote ascribed to Interviewee IG3, for instance, refers to the extract of an
interview conducted with an IGO official. Quotes from some participants are
sometimes not accompanied by a tag. This is done discretionally throughout the
text to maintain confidentiality in those cases where the use of a tag could lead to
the identification of the participant. In a similar fashion, the names and positions of
interviewed CBD authorities are kept anonymous and only linked to the country
they represent. In cases where two participants were from the same country, they
are distinguished by letters A and B.
Informed consent was obtained prior to the interviews. As mentioned earlier,
research participants were given a concept note and an informed consent form.
Interviewees were requested to complete, sign and return the consent form in
advance of the interview. Most interviewees followed these instructions. A few of
them, however, granted their consent via e-mail (copies are kept of electronic
communications between the researcher and the participants).
Management and ownership of data are two important aspects of informed
consent. Some aspects of data management were mentioned earlier. Interviews
were recorded using specialised software (Pamela) and edited transcriptions were
made. Word-for-word transcriptions (featuring poor grammar, colloquial speech,
false starts to sentences, repetitions, and “ers” and “umms”) were discarded
because they could cause embarrassment or discomfort to participants having
access to the texts (Dunn, 2005). Minor edits were introduced that did not alter the
intended meanings of phrases, sentences and ideas. To ensure the integrity of
data in cases where they happened to fall into the hands of individuals who could
make an undue use of them, both audio files and interview transcripts were
encrypted using Sophos encryption software.
It is generally considered that data is the property of the interviewee and that they
should normally determine what information is made public (King and Horrocks,
2010). Earlier it was pointed out that participants in this research were provided
with a copy of the transcripts of their interviews and offered the possibility of
requesting textual changes. Two interviewees exercised this right by suggesting
(small) corrections to their transcripts. Participants were made aware that interview
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data could be used in future research, that it would be stored for 10 years and then
destroyed.
Harm was not a relevant issue in this research because participants were not
required to discuss a personal condition or private matters, but to share
professional experiences. Sensitive information might have been disclosed and
recorded during an interview. To the extent that audio files were encrypted,
however, that information cannot be accessed by third parties. Moreover,
participants were granted access to their interview transcripts to ensure that any
compromising information contained therein was removed from the text.
The use of documents for research purposes may pose three ethical dilemmas
relating to: 1) the legal framework affecting documentary research, including issues
of copyright, freedom of information and data protection; 2) the identification of
specific organisations and individuals in the documents; and 3) the position of the
researcher vis-à-vis the institution(s) producing the documents being studied
(McCulloch, 2004). As applied to the present study, these issues were not
significant. All documents consulted were publicly available. Their public character
means that they do not contain personal or any other sensitive information that
could pose a risk to the integrity of individual subjects. No documents with
classified information were used. There is no relationship of any type between the
researcher and the governments and organisations authoring the documents
examined. The agency sponsoring this study, Mexico’s National Council on Science
and Technology, had no involvement in the drafting of the Mexican NBSAP, the
only document published by the Mexican government consulted in this research.
Ethical issues emerging at the stage of data analysis relate primarily to the
interpretation of data. In qualitative research, the same body of material may be
interpreted differently by two or more individuals even if the same theoretical and
methodological approaches are used. Biases can be avoided if researchers reflect
on how own motivations and prior assumptions may affect the examination of data
(Waitt, 2005). In the present case, there were no particular motivations or
assumptions that could have influenced the interpretation of collected materials.
The academic and ethnic background of the researcher may have had an effect on
the way in which texts were approached. As a graduate of International Relations
from a developing country, the researcher may be inclined to conceive international
politics in terms of a North-South equation, and thus be tempted to search for
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antagonisms where they are absent. However, because empirical data was
examined in the light of the theories and methods brought to the analysis, biases
were reduced (Titscher et al., 2000).
Research ethics were extensively discussed in the Ethical Review Form submitted
to a University Faculty Research Ethics Committee in mid-July 2011 for its
consideration and approval. Ethical approval (Reference: AREA 10-194) was
granted on 5 September 2011 (note that the research approach and methods were
subject to slight changes afterwards and that the online surveys originally planned
were never launched).
Some limitations in the methods used to examine the implementation of the
biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries need to be acknowledged. While
global synergies in the biodiversity cluster were examined from the perspectives of
various actors and documentary sources, synergies at the level of national
implementation were largely retrieved from the narrative accounts of state officials.
This raises three issues which limit the extent and depth of the research. First, the
analysis of national experiences in the implementation of the biodiversity-related
conventions is not based on a systematic review of MEA implementation systems.
Documentary evidence was limited. National reports to the biodiversity-related
conventions provided little, unspecific and, in some cases, contradictory,
information on domestic efforts to synergise MEAs implementation (see Chapter 5,
Section 5.1.2). Country reports produced in the context of the National Capacity
Self-Assessment (NCSA) programme, a GEF’s initiative to assist countries in
determining their capacity development needs to implement the Rio Conventions
and other MEAs (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3), were of limited value as they
focussed on integrated management across environmental issue-areas (and not
necessarily within the biodiversity sector). The researcher was not aware of other
documents addressing synergies in the implementation of biodiversity regimes,
although interviewees drew attention to documents where issue-linkages were
considered. These were not consulted, however, because they did not raise regime
inter-linkages in an explicit way. A systematic review of national implementation
could have been pursued through further interviews with government officials, but
problems of access posed a major obstacle to this.
Second, participants were expected to provide an honest account of the issues and
problems arising in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions.
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Interviewees were given assurances of privacy and confidentiality to encourage
them to offer a fair assessment. Nevertheless, given that participants were
ultimately representatives of national governments, some of them may have tried to
portray the best picture of the situation examined. This applies especially to high-
ranking officials.
Third, because the analysis of national experiences in the implementation of
biodiversity-related MEAs relies more heavily on subjective accounts than on
factual evidence, comparisons are difficult to make. Indeed, the analysis aimed to
identify general trends and challenges rather than to delve into specific national
circumstances. Best practices are thus hard to highlight.
3.6 Concluding remarks
The methodology employed to address the research’s aim of examining the co-
evolution of regime complexes and national implementation systems was
discussed in this chapter. The study endorses a pragmatist philosophy where
theory is a tool for action (Hellmann, 2009). A pragmatist approach to research
should result in social scientific knowledge that resonates within and across
communities and enables orientation in the social world (Friedrichs and Kratochwil,
2009). In line with this, the research strategy is based on Charles Peirce’s logic of
enquiry that sees abduction as the key inferential mode and seeks to produce
middle-range theories with a social and practical focus (Kaag and Kreps, 2012;
Bertilsson, 2004). Co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation
systems is explored with reference to the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions
and the implementation of these conventions in LAC countries. Empirical evidence
was collected from interviews and various documentary sources. Materials were
examined through thematic analysis, basic theorisation techniques, and other ad
hoc documentary analysis procedures.
Findings are reported in the next three chapters (Chapters 4-6, each addressing a
specific research question). The discussion chapter (Chapter 7) synthesises the
main findings and highlights key contributions.
4 The biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems
in LAC: Horizontal dimensions of co-evolution
The governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions have established a
clear differentiation between global and national governance as they create inter-
linkages between conventions. Between 2002 and 2010, 179 decisions promoting
synergy between the framework and specialist regimes of the biodiversity cluster
were adopted (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Almost 68% of those decisions required
co-ordination at the international level, whereas nearly 22% required countries to
improve synergies in national implementation. The governing bodies of the
conventions have not been particularly enthusiastic about mandating national-level
co-ordination, giving states ample leeway to decide whether, and to what extent,
synergies are created on the ground.
This chapter examines whether the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
practices in LAC countries displays similar evolution patterns (addressing the first
objective of this research). If there has been co-evolution, some similarities can be
expected. Horizontal integration processes are compared to examine the degree of
(a)symmetry between global and national governance. The assessment constitutes
an important first step in the analysis of the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster
and national implementation practices in LAC countries in line with the framework
presented in Chapter 1.
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Table 4.1 Decisions adopted by the CBD CoP promoting synergy with other biodiversity-related conventions (arranged according to the level of co-
ordination involved)
Target
institution(s)
Required action
Inter-institutional co-ordination Unilateral management Autonomous management Multiple
levels /
Level
unclear
Action by
overarching or
external
organisations
Collaboration
between
convention
bodies
Action
by
CBD’s
bodies
Action by the
target
institution’s
bodies
Action
by
CBD’s
Parties
Action by
CBD’s
Parties
and other
actors
Collaboration
between state
actors
Action
by non-
state
actors
Other forms
of
autonomous
action
Ramsar
Convention
2 11 2 7 3 2 - - 1 2
WHC - - - - - - 1 - - -
CITES - 4 - - - - - - - -
CMS - 1 1 - 1 - - - - 2
ITPGRFA 3 4 1 2 1 2 - - - 1
Multiple
conventions19
1 13 3 2 2 1 2 1 - -
All 6 33 7 11 7 5 3 1 1 5
39 18 17 5
19 This category includes Decisions targeting two or more biodiversity-related conventions.
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Table 4.2 Decisions adopted by the governing bodies of five biodiversity-related conventions promoting synergy with the CBD (arranged according
to the level of co-ordination involved)
Source
institution(s)
Required action
Inter-institutional co-ordination Unilateral management Autonomous management Multiple
levels /
Level
unclear
Action by
overarching
or external
organisations
Collaboration
between
convention
bodies
Action by
bodies of
the
source
institution
Action
by
CBD’s
bodies
Other forms
of unilateral
management
Action by
Parties to
the
source
institution
Action by
Parties to
the
source
institution
and other
actors
Collaboration
between
state actors
Action
by
non-
state
actors
Other forms
of
autonomous
action
Ramsar
Convention
3 20 6 2 - 6 4 2 1 1 4
23 8 14 4
WHC - 1 - - - - - - - - 1
1 - - 1
CITES 1 10 6 1 - 2 - 4 - - 2
11 7 6 2
CMS 1 9 2 - 1 4 1 1 - - 1
10 3 6 1
ITPGRFA - 1 - - - - - - - - 2
1 - - 2
All 5 41 14 3 1 12 5 7 1 1 10
46 18 26 10
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The first sections of the chapter examine horizontal integration in the biodiversity
cluster (section 4.1) and in the implementation of its constituent regimes (section
4.2) based on the goals/objectives pursued and the institutional/implementation
arrangements that make synergies possible. The analysis of horizontal integration
processes in the biodiversity cluster relies on scholarly research and primary
documentary sources (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3), as well as on interviews with
treaty secretariats and international experts. Synergies in national implementation
are examined using information retrieved from interviews with national focal points
as complemented with empirical evidence from national reports and NBSAPs. The
chapter compares horizontal linkages at global and national levels (section 4.3),
and ends with general conclusions.
4.1 Horizontal integration in the biodiversity cluster
4.1.1 Overview
Morin and Orsini (2013a) distinguish four stages in the life cycle of a regime
complex: 1) atomisation; 2) competition; 3) specialisation; and 4) integration (see
Chapter 2, Section 2.2). Most observers would agree that the cluster of biodiversity-
related conventions is somewhere in the middle between the stages of
specialisation and integration. There are nonetheless different views as to how far
the cluster has moved towards increased cohesiveness.
The biodiversity-related conventions have devoted significant time and resources to
improve inter-treaty co-ordination, but the outcomes of these efforts are disputed
(Caddell, 2011). Jóhannsdóttir et al. (2010) suggest that synergies have developed
weakly. In their view, there are no coherent controls for the regulation and
management of biodiversity, the substantive obligations of the conventions have
remained unchanged, and member states have failed to take ownership of existing
liaison processes. Caddell (2011) observes moderate success, noticing progress in
areas of common focus (e.g. species, habitats or conservation threats), but also
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barriers created by strategic uncertainty, disparate working practices and resource
constraints. From a less critical perspective, Jardin (2010) claims that the
biodiversity-related conventions have developed measures and policies which
sometimes overlap, but in most cases complement each other. Most treaty
secretariat officials and international experts agreed that the biodiversity cluster is
more integrated than in the past, but one interviewee observed that integration is
still “patchy and incomplete” (Interviewee OT2).
The biodiversity cluster has undergone a process of “CBD-ification” or integration
under the CBD (Caddell, 2011). The CBD pursues three objectives: the
conservation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources (CBD
Article 1). As a framework convention, the CBD has no legal ramifications for pre-
existing biodiversity-related agreements (as an umbrella convention would), but
only impacts on subsequent agreements (McGraw, 2002). Indeed, the ITPGRFA
was drafted in harmony with the CBD and pursues its same objectives in the issue-
area of plant genetic resources. But the CBD still provides a wider context for the
implementation of pre-existing agreements (McGraw, 2002). Thus, the first-
generation conventions, traditionally associated with narrow conservation agendas
focussed on the protection of species and habitats, have gradually embraced
sustainability principles in their operations (Jardin, 2010).
This process of “CBD-ification” has not advanced without difficulties. On the one
hand, the incorporation of sustainability considerations in the programmes of work
of the first-generation biodiversity-related conventions has been slow in some
cases. Back in 2005, a note on options for enhanced co-operation prepared by the
BLG proposed the broader application of the CBD’s ecosystem approach to the
management of World Heritage sites, wetland sites, and sites located along routes
of migratory species (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2). Within the WHC,
official discussions on mainstreaming sustainable development in world heritage
conservation only started in 2010 (see WHC Doc WHC-10/34.COM/5D). In the
case of CITES, steps have been taken to address the socio-economic dimensions
of wildlife trade, but some parties remain reluctant to encourage sustainable uses
of wildlife (see Velázquez Gomar and Stringer, 2011).
There has also been dissatisfaction with what seems to be an asymmetrical
integration. The integration of species or sites protected under the first generation
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conventions into the programmes of work of the CBD was signalled as an area for
enhanced co-operation in the 2005 BLG note (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-
RI/1/7/Add.2). Interviews with treaty secretariat officials suggest that the CBD has
been reluctant to accommodate the concerns of other conventions. Some of them
believed that, until recently, the BLG was a CBD’s instrument for implementing its
own mandate and that the CBD and the other conventions are often not seen as
equal partners despite the latter having technical instruments to affect outcomes on
the ground (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1.1).
Partial integration has been achieved in several areas. Examples include the joint
preparation and/or endorsement of technical guidance; standardisation of
taxonomy and nomenclature; knowledge management; outcome-oriented
indicators; outreach activities; joint field missions and projects; and joint capacity-
building activities (see section 4.1.2). Nevertheless, co-operation opportunities
have not been fully exploited and/or explored. The 2005 BLG note cited earlier
discussed options for enhanced co-operation in the context of on-going initiatives
and in other areas (see CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2). More recently, a
Nordic symposium on synergies in the biodiversity cluster (Helsinki, Finland, 8-9
April 2010), which brought together 50 experts in international biodiversity
governance, including representatives of national governments, treaty secretariats
and UN bodies, identified five areas where joint action is most needed: 1) the
science-policy interface; 2) harmonisation of reporting; 3) streamlining of meeting
agendas; 4) joint information management and awareness-raising; and 5) capacity
building, compliance, funding and review mechanisms (Ministry of the Environment
of Finland, 2010).
At a bilateral level (interactions between, rather than among, conventions),
relationships between the CBD and the specialist regimes of the cluster display
different degrees of complementarity. The CBD-Ramsar interface appears
particularly robust. The Ramsar Convention acts as the lead partner of the CBD in
implementing CBD activities related to wetlands. In the words of one expert, the
CBD has effectively “outsourced” its work on wetlands to the Ramsar Convention
(Interviewee OT2). At its eight meeting, the CBD CoP recognised that “the close
cooperation between the two conventions sets a good example in building
synergies between conventions to effectively deliver the objectives of both
conventions” (CBD Decision VIII/20). Joint activities have focussed on the
implementation of the CBD’s programme of work on inland waters biodiversity as a
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narrow sphere of interest (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/38; Interviewee OT2).
However, to the extent that inland waters, commonly referred to as wetlands, are
present in all terrestrial biomes (including agricultural ecosystems, forests, dry and
sub-humid lands, and mountains), linkages with other CBD’s programmes of work
are necessary (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/38). This would allow better
recognition of the role of wetlands in delivering key ecosystem services such as
water supply and water purification (ibid.). Holistic perspectives based on cross-
biome approaches have not been explored in on-going co-operation efforts, mainly
because water has not been fully recognised as a cross-cutting issue in the CBD’s
implementation (ibid.).
The CBD recognises CMS as its lead partner for migratory species. Nevertheless,
the CMS has struggled to find as solid a nexus with the CBD as that achieved by
the Ramsar Convention (Interviewee OT2). Potential for improving synergy
between the CBD and the CMS has been noticed. The CMS model of regional
agreements, for instance, could inform the development of transboundary sites
under the CBD’s programme of work on protected areas (CBD Doc
UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2).
As mentioned earlier, the objectives of the CBD and the ITPGRGA are closely
aligned. While the two agreements embrace different approaches to ABS – the
ITPGRFA provides a multilateral system for facilitated access to a pool of plant
genetic resources considered the most important to food security; whereas the
CBD allows scope for bilateral agreements between providers and users of genetic
resources – potential conflicts have been contained due to mutual recognition of
each other’s jurisdiction (Interviewee NG10).
The CBD and CITES had a strained relationship in the recent past (Interviewee
NG3). The two conventions co-operate on issues such as sustainable use,
economic incentives and international trade (CITES Doc CoP14 Inf. 28); and
mutual references can be found in several decisions adopted by the CBD and
CITES CoPs (CITES Doc CoP13 Doc. 12.1.1). However, the integration of the
CBD’s principles into CITES’ operative work has not been widely supported
(Interviewee NG5) and opportunities for co-operation remain unexploited. In 2004,
an expert workshop on promoting CITES/CBD cooperation and synergy (Isle of
Vilm, Germany, 20-24 April) identified a number of areas where synergies could be
further developed and areas where co-operation should be initiated (see CITES
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Doc CoP13 Inf. 15). The latter related to GEF funding; ABS; co-ordination of area-
based and species-based systems of management; compliance and enforcement;
and labelling and green certification. Creating synergy in these areas requires the
broader application of CITES as an instrument that creates economic incentives for
sustainable use (see CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2). Sustainability is
nonetheless a divisive issue within CITES (see Velázquez Gomar and Stringer,
2011).
Policy integration between the CBD and the WHC occurs to some extent. While
few WHC Decisions refer to the CBD, elements of the CBD’s agenda have been
considered in the design of WHC’s initiatives such as the World Heritage Marine
Programme (Interviewee TS3). The fact that sustainable development is a relatively
new concept within WHC policy circles (see above) suggests, however, that
integration under the CBD’s framework has only been partial.
The cluster of biodiversity-related conventions has not yet achieved a stage of
integration akin to the trade regime based on the WTO (which Morin and Orsini
(2013a) portray as an example of a regime complex evolving into a more cohesive
regime) or to the chemicals regime (which, according to Selin (2010),
encompasses four MEAs inter-connected in cognitive and practical ways). But the
cluster cannot be equated with other regime complexes where competition prevails,
e.g., the food security (Margulis, 2013) and maritime piracy (Struett et al., 2013)
complexes, or where divisions of labour have been established at the expense of
more synergistic interaction, e.g., the regime complex for trade and the
environment (see Gehring, 2011). Instead, the cluster is evolving from a stage of
specialisation towards gradual policy (but not yet institutional) integration.
4.1.2 Policy goals
The management of regime interplay in the biodiversity cluster can be
characterised along three lines: 1) co-operation is not merely directed at avoiding
conflict (consistency), but at enhancing synergy (coherence); 2) it is based on co-
exploitation rather than on co-exploration (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1); and 3) it
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emerges around specific issues and under limited strategic direction. These
elements are unpacked below.
Regime interplay may be managed to avoid conflict or enhance synergy (Oberthür,
2009). Caddell (2011, p.57) observes that the biodiversity-related conventions have
managed regime interplay “not to resolve inherent conflicts but, rather, to improve
collaborative working practices in discharging their respective mandates”.
Decisions and strategic plans of the conventions acknowledge the importance of
co-operation between them (see UNEP-WCMC, 2012).
In seeking to enhance synergy, the biodiversity-related conventions have been
cautious not to compromise the existing division of labour. The 2005 BLG note on
options for enhanced co-operation stressed that the particular value of each
convention “must be maintained even while seeking to bring closer together the
work of the different conventions” (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2 par. 5).
It further added that “the goal of enhanced cooperation should be to add value to
existing efforts, not to homogenize initiatives or focus only on collaborative
approaches when specialization by a single convention might at times better serve
biodiversity objectives” (ibid.). This suggests that the biodiversity-related
conventions are less interested in exploring opportunities for joint management (co-
exploration) than on exploiting available resources in support of on-going initiatives
(co-exploitation) (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011).
The biodiversity-related conventions have not followed the same approach to co-
operation as the chemicals and hazardous waste conventions, where a clustering
process is taking place which is often portrayed as a model for the biodiversity
cluster. The process started in 2006 with UNEP’s proposal to consolidate the
secretariats of the three conventions of the cluster (Perry, 2012). That same year
governments adopted the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals
Management (SAICM), an umbrella mechanism to foster the sound management of
chemicals which has, among its key objectives, to enhance synergies between
existing institutions and processes at different levels (Selin, 2010). The clustering
process has resulted in the streamlining of the administrative functions of the
conventions, and is expected to lead to programme co-ordination and joint
decision-making (see Perry, 2012). Simon (2012) describes the process as a co-
exploitative endeavour with no clear end point.
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One of the treaty secretariat officials who was interviewed observed that “rather
than streamlining administrative processes, we have been working on substantive
issues” (Interviewee TS5). Indeed, co-operation has emerged around issues of
common interest (Caddell, 2011). Examples include:
 Joint preparation and/or endorsement of technical guidance. The Guidelines
for Incorporating Biodiversity-related Issues into Environmental Impact
Assessment Legislation and/or Processes and in Strategic Environmental
Assessment, adopted by the CBD CoP through Decision VI/7, have been
endorsed by the Ramsar and CMS CoPs (see CMS Resolution 7.2 and
Ramsar Resolution VIII.9).
 Standardisation of taxonomy and nomenclature, for example, in lists of
species used by CITES and CMS (see CITES Doc CoP15 Doc. 12).
 Knowledge management activities, most of them UNEP-led initiatives
intended to harmonise MEA information systems. Examples include the
InforMEA portal, a web-based tool which harvests key information from
MEAs (including decisions, news, meetings, memberships, national focal
points and reports); and the so-called TEMATEA project, an online
database that structures commitments under different biodiversity-related
conventions in six thematic modules to facilitate coherent implementation.
Efforts to streamline national reporting may also be included in this category
(see CMS Doc UNEP/CMS/Inf.10.17 and CMS Doc UNEP/CMS/Inf.9.14).
 Outcome-oriented indicators to assess achievement of global biodiversity
targets. The Ramsar Convention, CMS and CITES participated in the 2010
Biodiversity Indicators Partnership (2010 BIP), an initiative which brought
together over 40 agencies with the purpose of developing a suite of
complementary indicators to assist the monitoring of the 2010 Target (BIP
Secretariat, 2012).
 Outreach activities to mainstream biodiversity into other policy sectors. Joint
statements have been delivered at high-level international meetings (e.g.
the 2005 UN World Summit) and joint activities have been organised on
occasion of special events (e.g. the International Biodiversity Day) (see
CBD Doc BLG-4/REP, CBD Doc BLG-5/2, CBD Doc BLG-6).
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 Joint field missions such as those undertaken by the Ramsar Convention
and the WHC to sites protected under both conventions (Jardin, 2010).
 Joint field projects, for example, the Great Apes Survival Partnership, a
UNEP-led initiative to address the decline of great apes (GRASP
Secretariat, 2013). Five biodiversity-related conventions (the CBD and the
first generation agreements) are involved.
 Joint capacity-building activities such as the CBD/ITPGRFA capacity-
building workshops on access to genetic resources and sharing of the
benefits arising out of their utilisation (ITPGRFA Secretariat, 2011;
ITPGRFA Doc IT/GB-4/11/12).
 Dissemination of best practice. The CBD and the CMS Secretariats have
collaborated on the dissemination of case-studies on the conservation and
sustainable use of migratory species and their habitats (CBD Doc
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/19).
Urho (2009) observes that co-operation in the biodiversity cluster has evolved
haphazardly. The cluster has lacked a policy framework analogous to the SAICM.
The 2010 Biodiversity Target fostered co-operation but it did not necessarily bring
greater alignment of agendas (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.3.1). Moreover, co-
operation has evolved haphazardly (Urho, 2009). Proposals for a joint strategic
vision and joint work plan for the six conventions have not gained track (see CBD
Doc BLG-6). The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, adopted at CBD
CoP10, is nonetheless intended to serve as the overarching framework for
biodiversity within the cluster and across the UN system more generally (the
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020).
4.1.3 Institutional arrangements
Approached along the triad of polity, policy and politics, institutional co-operative
arrangements in the biodiversity cluster can be described as follows. From a polity
perspective, the cluster displays characteristics of a lead-organisation governed
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network. Hard procedural instruments and soft organisational mechanisms are
essentially employed to develop synergies. In terms of politics, the cluster is a
public network of organisations with different preferences and material capabilities.
Institutional arrangements are discussed in this section.
Synergies in the cluster emanate from decentralised co-ordination. As Caddell
(2011) observes, the texts of the biodiversity-related conventions provide little
guidance on ways to achieve synergy. As he explains, “although most BRCs
[biodiversity-related conventions] contain conflict clauses to address their
relationship with alternative treaties upon their activities, such provisions have
ultimately shed little light upon their purported interaction with each other” (p.49).
Rules of international law such as the lex posterior (where two treaties deal with the
same subject matter, the treaty later in time prevails over the earlier one) and the
lex specialis (where two treaties deal with the same subject matter, the more
specific rules override the general ones) address regime interplay by establishing a
normative hierarchy (see Marceau, 2001). However, as Caddell notes, distinct
treaties operating within similar spheres of activity do not generally form a natural
hierarchy. Indeed, in the biodiversity context, “the relationship between treaties has
overwhelmingly been one of partnership, not purported dominance” (Caddell, 2011,
p.55).
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that the biodiversity-related conventions regard inter-
institutional co-ordination a key mechanism for improving synergy. Across the
conventions, the number of decisions requiring inter-institutional co-ordination
overrides those requiring action at lower levels of co-ordination. Inter-institutional
co-ordination may require decision-making beyond the interacting institutions
(overarching institutional frameworks) or may only involve joint management
(Oberthür, 2009). Within the group of decisions promoting inter-institutional co-
ordination, those calling for action by external organisations and bodies represent a
small number. In contrast, there is a strong inclination towards joint management or
network governance.
Synergies between/among conventions have emerged from an executive cluster
(the BLG) and from co-operative agreements (Caddell, 2011). The BLG was
established in 2004 as a mechanism for enhancing coherence and co-operation in
the implementation of the conventions (CBD Decision VII/26 par. 2). The BLG
originally comprised the CBD and the first-generation conventions, with the
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ITPGRFA joining the group in 2006. Its membership is circumscribed to the
executive bodies (treaty secretariats) of the six conventions of the biodiversity
cluster. The BLG is complemented by the Chairs of the Scientific Advisory Bodies
of Biodiversity-related Conventions (CSAB) group. At the request of the BLG, the
CSAB held its first meeting in 2007 with the aim of exploring areas of intellectual
co-operation and their translation into policy (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/CSAB1/3). The
CSAB has a broader membership, bringing together representatives from the six
conventions of the biodiversity cluster and other biodiversity-related agreements, as
well as officials from UNEP and other international organisations and initiatives
working on biodiversity issues.
Co-operative agreements have usually taken the form of Memoranda of
Understanding and Co-operation (MoUs/MoCs), and have been operationalized
through work programmes, joint initiatives and thematic co-operation, for example,
on sustainable use, environmental impact assessment or site-based conservation
(UNEP-WCMC, 2012; Caddell, 2011). Figure 3.2 maps the formal agreements
concluded between 1996 and 2010 in the biodiversity cluster. Co-operation is
supported by organisations like UNEP and IUCN (see Andresen and Rosendal,
2009).
Provan and Kenis’ (2007) typology of network governance forms helps to
characterise governance modes in the biodiversity cluster. They distinguish three
types of networks: 1) participant-governed networks, where members interact in a
relatively equal basis and collectively make decisions and manage network
activities; 2) lead organisation-governed networks, where co-ordination occurs
through a lead organisation that is a network member; and 3) externally governed
networks, where a network administrative organisation (NAO) that is not a network
member takes responsibility for co-ordinating and sustaining the network. The
biodiversity cluster can in principle be described as a participant-governed network
because decisions and activities are jointly agreed by its members despite existing
differences in material capabilities and performance. In practice, it operates as a
lead organisation-governed network, with the CBD acting as the network broker.
The CBD has established co-operative agreements with each of the other
members of the network (see Figure 3.2) and acts as the convenor and de facto
co-ordinator of the BLG (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2.1). UNEP, having a mandate
to co-ordinate MEAs, has sometimes been seen as a potential NAO. Nevertheless,
its co-ordination tasks have been thwarted by turf battles with competing
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organisations, its geographical and funding situation, and problems of internal
organisation (see Andresen and Rosendal, 2009).
Co-operation between/among biodiversity-related conventions also unfolds outside
of the biodiversity cluster, both within the broader international governance system
for biodiversity (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2) and the more encompassing IEG
system. In the first case, co-operation involves mechanisms such as the Inter-
agency Liaison Group on Invasive Alien Species, the Biodiversity Indicators
Partnerships and the CBD’s Global Taxonomy Initiative. Co-operation on cross-
cutting IEG issues emerges, for example, through the UN system-wide
Environment Management Group (EMG) and the MEA Information and Knowledge
Management Initiative led by UNEP. In addition, the biodiversity-related
conventions are members of other regime complexes, e.g., the forest regime
complex (see Reischl, 2012), where further co-operation occurs.
Because networks have a tenuous legal basis (they emerge from and are
supported by soft-law decisions), they are highly decentralised and have no policy-
making authority. The extent and depth of synergies in the biodiversity cluster is
ultimately determined by the governing bodies of the conventions. Networks can
nonetheless influence policy. The joint development of technical guidance and its
subsequent endorsement at the political level provides an obvious example of that
influence. But networks may affect policy in more subtle ways. For instance, the
World Heritage Centre’s Natural Heritage Strategy, endorsed by the World
Heritage Committee at its 30th session (Vilnius, Lithuania, 2006), incorporates
elements of the CBD’s agenda such as the 2010 Biodiversity Target and the
ecosystem approach (WHC Doc WHC-06/30.COM/INF.6A). While the Strategy
was drafted in the absence of collaboration with the CBD, its preparation coincided
with the signing of an MoU between the World Heritage Centre and the CBD
Secretariat (see CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/19; WHC Doc WHC-
05/29.COM/INF.5). Co-operation with the CBD might have not been sought as the
Strategy was being prepared, but collaborative action preceded the formulation of
the Strategy.
It has been noticed that synergies in international governance are generally
achieved through the unilateral action of interacting regimes (or even by means of
autonomous interplay management) but not through deliberate inter-institutional co-
ordination (see Oberthür and Stokke, 2011; Oberthür, 2009). Nevertheless, in the
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biodiversity case, unilateral adaptations cannot be easily disassociated from the
joint management activities taking place in different networks.
4.2 Horizontal coherence in the implementation of biodiversity-related
conventions in LAC countries
4.2.1 Overview
Most conventions require state parties to designate one main focal point and a
number of technical focal points with issue-specific responsibilities. Because these
focal points are spread across ministries, agencies and/or departments, intra- and
inter-institutional co-ordination needs to be sought to ensure coherence. There is a
wide perception among treaty secretariat officials and international experts that
countries have made feeble efforts to co-ordinate implementation of the
biodiversity-related conventions (Interviewees TS8, TS5, NG4). It is a common
view that synergies in the biodiversity cluster are stronger than synergies at the
level of national implementation. In the words of a treaty secretariat official “the
levels of collaboration and interface at the international level have not been fully
filtered down to the national level” (Interviewee TS8). Various experts coincided in
the opinion that the greatest challenge for enhancing synergy between conventions
lies in the ambit of state action (Interviewees IG1, IG6, NG9, NG4). One of them
observed that “there is too much emphasis on co-ordination between secretariats,
when the real action should be at the level of state parties” (Interviewee TS5).
The above views may result from deficient lines of communication between the
biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems. In the view of one of the
experts interviewed, “co-ordination at the national level has always happened to a
great extent” (Interviewee IG5). However, “information of how implementation of
the biodiversity-related conventions is taking place at the national level is often
lacking at the international level” (ibid.). Indeed, as the next chapter will show,
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levels of reporting on activities directed at enhancing synergies between/among
conventions are generally low.
Efforts to improve synergy in the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions
are underway in most LAC countries. Most of the national focal points interviewed
informed that synergies have regularly occurred and/or are showing progress.
Indeed, the CBD official from the Dominican Republic was the only one who
acknowledged that national-level synergies have developed poorly.
The question arises, however, as to how far synergies have gone. As mentioned in
Chapter 1, Morin and Orsini (2013a) propose four ideal types of policy coherency:
1) erratic, 2) strategic, 3) functionalistic, and 4) systematic. As is apparent from the
evidence presented below, in most LAC countries, the implementation of the
biodiversity-related conventions is based on a functionalistic approach, with no
strong indications of moving into a stage of systematic policy-making. LAC
countries have generally achieved a successful division of labour, but not always
substantive complementarity, in the implementation of the conventions. It appears
from the interviews conducted that duplication of efforts in national implementation
is uncommon. In most cases, however, opportunities for streamlining
implementation activities remain under-exploited. Participants recognised potential
for enhancing synergy (Chilean, Colombian, Dominican, Jamaican and
Panamanian Interviewees), improving complementarity (Costa Rican and
Ecuadorian Interviewees), strengthening joint work (Argentinian Interviewee), and
achieving greater co-ordination and alignment (Mexican Interviewee A).
Some MEA interfaces have grown stronger than others. Across the region, the
interplay between the CBD and three of the first generation conventions (the
Ramsar Convention, CITES and the CMS) is regularly co-ordinated. In some
cases, co-location of national focal points within the same agency facilitates co-
operation. In Ecuador, there is a decent degree of synergy between the CBD, the
Ramsar Convention and CITES because the offices of the national focal points for
those conventions are close to each other (Ecuadorian Interviewee B). CBD
officials in Panama share the same office with the national focal point to CITES and
they maintain regular communication with Ramsar authorities housed in the same
department. In Mexico, there is close collaboration between CBD and CITES focal
points based in the National Commission for Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity
(CONABIO). Co-ordination is also reported between CONABIO and the National
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Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) in the implementation of the
Ramsar Convention. A Jamaican participant reported collaboration between MEA
focal points in the Ministry of Water, Land, Environment and Climate Change and
their counterparts in the National Environment and Planning Agency. CBD officials
in the Chilean Ministry of Environment co-operate with Ramsar and CITES
authorities based in other agencies and ministries (Chilean Interviewee A).
Synergies between the CBD and the two conventions administered by non-
environmental organisations (the WHC and the ITPGRFA) are, in many cases,
underdeveloped. A CBD official in Jamaica noticed that the WHC and ITPGRFA
focal points are based outside of environment ministries and communication with
them is not close. Similarly, a CBD focal point in Argentina recognised that greater
work is needed to enhance synergies with the WHC and the ITPGRFA. In Mexico,
co-ordination between CBD officials in CONABIO and WHC focal points is minimal
(Mexican Interviewee A). In countries such as Bolivia and Panama, however, there
seems to be good levels of collaboration between CBD and WHC officials.
Interaction between CBD and ITPGRFA officials is also occurring in a number of
countries. However, that relationship can sometimes be conflictive. In Colombia
and Panama, there have been frictions between CBD authorities in environment
agencies and ITPGRFA officials in agriculture ministries over ABS issues. In
Panama, for example, conflicts stem from determining whether the use of genetic
resources involves food security (the ITPGRFA’s sphere of competence) or bio-
prospection (falling under the CBD’s remit). A Colombian interviewee suggested
that tensions between focal points are more political than technical in nature, and
have required mediation from the foreign affairs ministry.
Co-ordination is happening (especially within the environment sector), but attempts
at integrated management of biodiversity-related MEAs are rare. Some countries
have informed of efforts in this direction in their national reports. Three countries
did it in reports covering implementation activities undertaken between 2003 and
2005: Colombia in its third CBD report (drawing attention to the National Action
Plan on Biodiversity), Costa Rica also in its third CBD report (considering an action
plan for joint implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs), and Panama in its
report to CMS CoP8 (commenting on plans to integrate CMS-related activities into
a future NBSAP). More recently, Honduras has notified of on-going work towards a
joint work plan for the implementation of biodiversity-related agreements. At the
time when the interviews were conducted, no other countries seemed to be taking
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similar steps (see section 4.2.2 below). Overall, the coherency of implementation
arrangements in LAC countries is less advanced than regime integration in the
biodiversity cluster.
4.2.2 Policy objectives
From a functional perspective, the management of biodiversity-related conventions
in LAC countries can be described as follows: 1) it seeks to create (and enhance)
synergy rather than contain conflict; and 2) it does not follow a strategic direction,
but emerges around concrete issues. The management approach is essentially the
same as that observed in the biodiversity cluster, but subtle differences can be
noticed which are brought to light in the ensuing discussion.
The implementation of MEAs in developing countries tends to be
compartmentalised, with different environmental issue-areas addressed separately
rather than in a holistic manner (Mouat et al., 2006). Treaty implementation
requires adjustments in existing institutional frameworks: “it is a process which
develops in incremental steps; progress is swift in some cases, but not in others”
(Argentinian Interviewee). Countries employ distinct procedures and instruments to
implement biodiversity-related conventions. In Chile, for instance, implementation
of the CBD relies on technical guidance available from the CBD Secretariat; CITES
activities have been assisted by capacity-building workshops; and CMS-related
operations are based on regional co-operation (Chilean Interviewee A). Different
implementation arrangements often imply different capacity requirements in terms
of organisation, human resources, and scientific research (Honduran Interviewee).
Duplication of efforts in the implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs, as
mentioned earlier, does not seem to occur. But implementation arrangements are
occasionally compromised by duplication of ministerial competences. In Colombia,
for instance, the ministries of environment and agriculture, housing the primary
focal points for the CBD and the ITPGRFA respectively, both have authority over
matters of genetic resources, an area where the mandates of the two conventions
intersect. Inter-institutional co-ordination has been sought to manage institutional
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overlap (Colombian Interviewee). Overlapping ministerial responsibilities were also
noticed by Bolivian and Mexican participants.
The strategic plans and/or programmes of the conventions of the biodiversity
cluster contain provisions on co-operation with other biodiversity-related
agreements (see UNEP-WCMC, 2012). In contrast, requirements for coherent
implementation of biodiversity-related conventions are missing from national policy
planning. An Ecuadorian participant observed that “we do not have a working
programme that encourages national focal points to create synergies… and allows
a systematic monitoring of co-ordinated work”. A CBD official in Panama
commented that integrated implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs has only
recently been considered in the context of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-
2020. Honduras is exploring approaches for more integrated implementation of
MEAs. Participants from other countries did not bring up similar initiatives.
Synergies tend to be missing in strategic frameworks on biodiversity. Table 4.3
shows whether synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs were considered in
the first-generation NBSAPs. The Brazilian NBSAP is the only strategy that
explicitly incorporated objectives related to MEA inter-linkages. The Argentinian,
Bolivian and Cuban strategies did not address synergies between MEAs directly,
but considered implementation requirements under different conventions.
International commitments were virtually neglected in the rest of the NBSAPs. In
the Pacific Islands, MEA inter-linkages have similarly lacked a strategic orientation
(Chasek, 2010).
In the biodiversity cluster, co-operation in areas of shared interest is common. Such
thematic co-operation is also widespread at the level of national implementation.
For example, synergies have been established around international events and in
the pursuit of external resources. In most LAC countries, biodiversity focal points
take part in internal consultation meetings in preparation for high-level meetings of
biodiversity-related agreements (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2). Participants from
Panama and Honduras reported co-ordinated action to elaborate national reports.
CBD focal points in Peru have attended CMS meetings. Both Panamanian and
Bolivian interviewees indicated that national focal points co-operate in the context
of GEF project proposals. In Jamaica, national CBD and Ramsar authorities
collaborated on the organisation of the Fifth Pan-American Regional Meeting of the
Convention on Wetlands in Jamaica in December 2011 (Jamaican Interviewee A).
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Table 4.3 NBSAPs and synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in LAC
countries
Synergies explicitly addressed
Country NBSAP and year of adoption Comments
Brazil Política Nacional da
Biodiversidade
2002
The strategy features three objectives in
the area of international co-operation,
one of which is to create synergies in the
implementation of international
environmental agreements adopted by
the country.
Explicit references to implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs other than the
CBD
Country NBSAP and date of adoption Comments
Argentina Estrategia Nacional sobre
Diversidad Biológica
2003
In section XVI of the strategy, Argentina
commits to implementing international
environmental agreements and
enhancing the country’s capacity to
participate in international environmental
fora.
Bolivia Estrategia Nacional de
Biodiversidad
2001
One of the priorities of the strategy is to
improve implementation of international
environmental agreements, in particular,
the CBD, the Climate Change
Convention, the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention, CITES and the
Ramsar Convention.
Cuba Estrategia Nacional para la
Diversidad Biológica y Plan de
Acción en la República de Cuba
1999
One of the goals of the strategy is to
strengthen international co-operation,
including through an active involvement
in the implementation of the CBD and
other related instruments.
Synergies and/or implementation of non-CBD conventions are not explicitly
considered
Chile - Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2003)
Colombia - Política Nacional de Biodiversidad (1995)
Costa Rica - Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2000)
Ecuador - Política y Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad del Ecuador 2001-2010
(concluded in 2000 and officially endorsed in 2007)
Guatemala - Estrategia Nacional para la Conservación y Uso Sostenible de la Biodiversidad
y Plan de Acción (1999)
Honduras - Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad y Plan de Acción (2001)
Jamaica - National Strategy and Action Plan on Biological Diversity (2003)
Mexico - Estrategia Nacional sobre Biodiversidad de México (2000)
Panama - Estrategia Nacional de Biodiversidad (2000)
Peru - Estrategia Nacional sobre Diversidad Biológica (2001)
Inter-linkages have also been developed in the formulation and implementation of
national policies and programmes on biological diversity. In Panama and Honduras,
national MEA authorities participate in the review of policy and normative
frameworks for biodiversity. A CBD official from Panama highlighted the recent
involvement of biodiversity focal points in the development of a REDD+ strategy (a
mechanism for Reducing greenhouse gas Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation, as well as through sustainable management of forests, conservation
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of forest carbon stocks and enhancement of carbon stocks). MEA focal points were
collaborating to update the NBSAP and the national policy on wetlands at the time
when interviews were conducted (Panamanian Interviewee). In Chile, CBD and
Ramsar officials were involved in drafting a strategy for the conservation of Andean
highlands (Chilean Interviewee). On the implementation side, CBD authorities in
Panama have supported their WHC counterparts in holding capacity-building
workshops for protected area managers. In Honduras, there has been collaboration
on awareness raising workshops.
The examples above suggest that co-operation between MEA departments and
agencies has been more co-exploitative than co-explorative as per Parmigiani and
Rivera-Santos’ (2011) ideal forms of inter-organisational relationships (the focus
has been on executing regular activities rather than on creating new ones).
However, co-exploration is not entirely absent in the region. In Cuba, national
workshops on synergies have been organised to explore areas of collaboration and
develop proposals for joint management (these activities have been highlighted in
the country’s reports to the Ramsar and CITES CoPs).
The empirical evidence also reveals that co-operation comprises different ambits of
treaty implementation. In an early study on MEA implementation in the Asia-Pacific
region, Van Toen (2001) observed that national focal points established
communication for three main purposes: preparation of national reports, exchange
and harmonisation of information, and elaboration of national strategies. LAC
experiences bring to light other areas of co-operation such as joint events and
workshops, and joint ventures to attract funding.
4.2.3 Implementation arrangements
Described along the triad of polity, policy and politics, implementation
arrangements supporting synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs at the
national level can be described in the following terms. From a polity angle, actor
networks make synergies possible, but core networks of biodiversity focal points
are not easily distinguishable. When policy aspects are considered, soft
organisational mechanisms predominate. In terms of politics, actor networks
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comprise government officials from different ministries, agencies and/or
departments, and, in some cases, civil society actors. As the next discussion
shows, management systems are generally less developed than those established
in the biodiversity cluster.
The biodiversity cluster is a stable network that has its most visible expression in
the BLG and the CSAB but is also based on formal mechanisms for co-operation
such as MoUs/MoCs and joint work programmes. At the national level, core
networks of biodiversity focal points are difficult to identify (and so peripheral
networks) both because there are different understandings of what a cluster of
biodiversity-related agreements entails; and because these different
understandings do not always create visible networks (supported on concrete
policy instruments). These two peculiarities of MEA implementation processes are
disentangled next.
Some MEA officials have a narrow understanding of biodiversity-related
conventions as those administered within the environmental sector (usually the
Ramsar Convention, CITES, the CMS and the CBD, but also other multilateral
conventions of a lower profile). Others, in contrast, have a loose conception of
biodiversity-related agreements which extends beyond the boundaries of the
biodiversity cluster, encompassing for example the climate change and
desertification conventions. An Ecuadorian interviewee went on to say that “when
we talk about synergies, we talk about co-ordination among MEAs in general”.
Indeed, national reports suggest that some countries co-ordinate the overall
implementation of MEAs through inter-sectoral bodies such as the National
Environmental Council in Colombia (mentioned in the country’s fourth CBD report)
and the Environment Committee in Cuba (referred to in the country’s report to
Ramsar CoP11). In other cases, smaller MEA co-ordination offices have been
established within environment ministries (reported by the Dominican Republic in its
second CBD report and by Mexico in its report to Ramsar CoP10) to improve
coherence. Although these mechanisms were not explicitly mentioned by
interviewees from the relevant countries, most of them feature in recent national
reports and can thus be presumed to remain in operation. The MEA co-ordination
office in the Dominican Republic might be the only exception, both because recent
national reports have not referred to it and because the Dominican CBD official
interviewed acknowledged that co-ordination of MEA-related activities was at a low
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level. LAC experiences are not unique to the region. Boyer et al. (2002) noticed, for
instance, that in some Asia-Pacific countries MEA focal points held periodic co-
ordination meetings and/or MEA co-ordination offices had been established to
enhance synergy.
In most cases, however, there are no mechanisms deliberately established to
advance co-ordination in the implementation of (biodiversity-related) MEAs, with
synergies emerging in national committees overseeing the implementation of
specific conventions or supporting a co-ordinated approach to cross-cutting issues.
In Chile, there are national committees responsible for following up the
implementation of the Ramsar Convention, CITES and the CMS. National focal
points of biodiversity-related MEAs are represented in these committees. This
facilitates the creation of synergies between the conventions (Chilean Interviewee
B). Similar committees have been set up in Jamaica (Jamaican Interviewee A).
Cuba has a national commission which co-ordinates the implementation of the
WHC. In Costa Rica, the National Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
promotes synergistic implementation of conventions such as the CBD and the
ITPGRFA related to plant genetic resources. A committee was recently established
in Mexico to identify priority areas for the implementation of the Rio Conventions
with a view to developing GEF project proposals (Mexican Interviewee A).
Honduras has set up a working group which seeks to co-ordinate civil society
activities contributing to the implementation of biodiversity-related conventions and
other MEAs. These synergy mechanisms are not unique to the LAC region.
Committees or reference groups guiding the implementation of specific conventions
are common in countries of Africa (see Masundire, 2006) and the Asia Pacific
region (see Boyer et al., 2002). Likewise, intra-governmental and multi-stakeholder
mechanisms for co-ordinated action on environmental issues have been reported in
other developing countries (see Pittock (2011) on national committees on climate
change).
National co-ordination committees resemble the global task forces and working
groups promoting co-operation between biodiversity-related conventions and other
MEAs and organisations (e.g. the Heads of Agency Task Force on the 2010
Biodiversity Target and the CBD’s Liaison Group on Non-timber Forest Resources).
They are institutional mechanisms for issue-based co-operation which are not
intended to synergise implementation of MEAs but to achieve specific policy goals
through concerted action.
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Synergies in domestic settings tend to follow a less formalised approach than
synergies in the biodiversity cluster. Van Toen (2001) noticed, for example, that few
formal efforts to foster synergies between MEAs had been made in countries of the
Asia-Pacific region. Synergies generally arise through regular dialogue and
communication between national focal points (see section 4.2.1). Good levels of
collaboration sometimes obviate the need for a deliberate integration of synergies
in policy planning. A Panamanian participant observed, for example, that “synergies
sometimes do not have to be explicitly mentioned” when projects are designed. In a
similar vein, another interviewee noticed that “if local institutions display high levels
of integration and collaboration, synergies arise on the ground” (Mexican
Interviewee B).
4.3 Horizontal linkages in biodiversity governance: A comparison of
global and national experiences
Observers have noticed that global co-operation among biodiversity-related MEAs
has not been corresponded with parallel efforts in domestic arenas to improve
coherence in implementation (Jardin, 2010; Masundire, 2006), but have fallen short
of exploring the nature and extent of the gap. This chapter made an empirical
comparison of global- and national-level synergies revealing that inter-treaty co-
ordination has been more ambitious than national co-ordination both in terms of
what is pursued and how it is achieved.
When global policy goals and national policy objectives are compared, the
approach appears similar: the management of regime interplay is directed at
enhancing synergy (rather than avoiding disruption), and is based on co-
exploitation in areas of common focus. However, whereas co-operation in the
biodiversity cluster aims to “bring together” the work of the conventions (CBD Doc
UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2), co-operation at the national level usually arises in
response to particular needs. The adoption of common technical guidance and the
standardisation of nomenclature are illustrative examples of global alignment.
Harmonisation of MEA programmes at the national level is rare. Indeed, synergies
in the biodiversity cluster are pursued through pro-active interplay management
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(Stokke, 2009), whilst national-level synergies typically result from short-term
concerns, sometimes leading to the type of responsive co-ordination associated
with emergent phenomena (see Drabek and McEntire, 2002).
Co-ordination in the biodiversity cluster has a clearer sense of direction than
national-level co-ordination. Until recently, the cluster lacked a strategic framework
commonly embraced by its elemental regimes, but the strategic plans and/or
programmes of the conventions have endorsed co-operative activities among them.
Moreover, the 2010 Biodiversity Target provided some focus for much of the past
decade. Co-operation at the national level has not achieved a similar status.
NBSAPs, the overarching national frameworks on biodiversity, do not usually
incorporate commitments from biodiversity-related MEAs other than the CBD. Of
the first-generation NBSAPs reviewed, the Brazilian strategy was the only one
which explicitly addressed synergies between biodiversity-related conventions.
Institutional and implementation arrangements have points of similarity. Network
governance forms based on mechanisms for inter-institutional co-operation are
dominant at both levels. Nevertheless, differences can be noticed in the ambits of
polity (the structure and composition of networks), policy (the “hardness” of
instruments for inter-institutional co-operation), and politics (the actors and interests
involved).
The biodiversity cluster is an identifiable network that is anchored in a number of
policy mechanisms deliberately intended to synergise convention-related activities,
including hard procedural instruments (MoUs/MoCs and joint work programmes)
and arrangements supporting deeper co-operation (i.e. co-exploration) like the BLG
(Scott, 2011). The biodiversity-related conventions also co-operate outside of the
biodiversity cluster, within broader networks that bring together regimes from
different policy areas. Core and peripheral networks of co-operation are not easily
distinguishable at the national level both because the biodiversity cluster acquires
different boundaries and because these alternative boundaries do not often
materialise into concrete policy instruments (mechanisms purposefully designed to
streamline implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs, whatever this concept
means at the national level, are virtually non-existent). Co-operation emerges
through various inter-agency liaison groups which are issue-focused as well as in
day-to-day implementation. Indeed, some would suggest that existing co-ordination
arrangements do not display the properties of a network structure but of
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collaborative configurations characterised by permanent or regular co-ordination
(see Mandell and Steelman (2003) on different types of collaborative contexts in
public management).
Inter-institutional co-operation is more politicised in the biodiversity cluster. In
domestic arenas, national focal points based in environmental ministries and/or
agencies collaborate with each other, but not always with MEA officials housed by
ministries/agencies in non-environmental sectors. In contrast, within the biodiversity
cluster, the relationships between treaties administered by environmental
organisations (the Ramsar Convention, CITES, the CMS and the CBD) is no
necessarily better than their relationships with treaties attached to other policy
sectors (the WHC and the ITPGRFA). This can be related to the politicisation of
inter-treaty co-operation resulting from the evolution of integration processes in the
cluster. The “CBD-ification” of biodiversity governance has created horizontal
tensions that are sometimes fuelled by the personalities of the heads of executive
agencies (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2.1). At the national level, co-ordination under
the CBD’s framework does not seem to be occurring and synergies are not closely
monitored by high-profile subjects. Political actors play a role in the context of
negotiations and meetings of MEAs, but not always at the implementation stage.
In summary, horizontal linkages at global and national level exhibit similar
characteristics that reveal co-evolution, but also key differences that create an
implementation gap. The more advanced stage of integration achieved in the
biodiversity cluster has not yet triggered improved coherence in national
implementation, as should occur when co-evolution is strong.
The comparison of policy integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy
coherence outputs at the level of national implementation makes important
contributions to the regime interplay literature. Scholars have noticed that where
institutional interaction produces synergistic effects, potential for further
improvement is often left unexploited (Gehring and Oberthür, 2006b). The
biodiversity case confirms these observations. The interplay of biodiversity-related
conventions is essentially synergistic because they all pursue the conservation (and
sustainable use) of biological diversity (conflict emerges, instead, when interplay is
managed). However, opportunities for improving synergy have been untapped at
the global and national levels. In the first case, this is rather surprising due to the
high levels of inter-treaty co-operation involved (Caddell, 2011), but some would
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see unexploited synergies as evidence that co-operation has progressed in the
absence of strategic direction (see Urho, 2009).
Simon (2012) has hinted that the extent and depth of synergies between regimes
bears relation with the predominant form of co-operation, i.e., whether it tends to
privilege co-exploitation (expansion) or co-exploration (learning and innovation)
(see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1). He notices that the clustering process in the
chemicals and hazardous waste sector, which has been hailed as one of the most
outstanding examples of synergy arrangements in IEG (see Wehrli, 2012), is
essentially a co-exploratory endeavour. If co-exploitation and co-exploration are
associated with thematic and generic mechanisms for co-operation, respectively,
co-exploitative relationships prevail in the biodiversity cluster and at the level of
national implementation. Nevertheless, within the more advanced system (the
biodiversity cluster) some forms of co-exploration are taking place (through the
BLG and the CSAB). These observations provide some support to Simon’s
proposition.
The management of synergistic interplay, according to Oberthür (2009), has mostly
occurred through unilateral regulatory action within the institutions in interaction.
This claim needs to be nuanced when considered against the empirical findings of
this research. Network governance forms supported by different organisational
instruments are pervasive in the biodiversity cluster and at the level of national
implementation. Joint management activities in the cluster have rarely translated
into co-ordinated policy decisions. The scope and extent of co-operation is
ultimately determined by the individual decisions of the governing bodies of the
conventions. Nevertheless, unilateral decision-making unfolds in a highly co-
operative environment. Indeed, it is common practice across the conventions to
refer to other agreements and relevant co-operative efforts in the preamble of
decisions that are of the interest of other venues. At the national level, unilateral
means to improve regime inter-linkages seem uncommon. The study found no
evidence of unilateral attempts by MEA lead agencies to influence other
agencies/ministries into specific pathways of action. In many cases, special
committees have been established to ensure intra- and cross-sectoral co-ordination
in the implementation of specific conventions. Thus, in situations where synergistic
interplay is dominant, networks play a more important role in enhancing synergy
than Oberthür implies.
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Of special importance to this research, the similarities perceived between policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs in
national implementation confirm that the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence observed by Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b) in the ambit of
foreign policy extend to the sphere of national implementation.
Morin and Orsini (2013b) observe that interactions within regime complexes are as
diverse as inter-agency relationships in domestic environments and, as a result,
regime complexes and policy coherence do not co-evolve in perfectly symmetrical
ways. Co-evolution in the present case has not created isomorphic governance
systems. Co-operation activities at global and national levels have not developed at
the same pace. Co-evolution might be stronger in Western liberal countries
supportive of deep integration of domestic structures (see Raustiala and Victor,
1998). Some of these countries have been leading advocates of integration in the
biodiversity cluster. During the early negotiations of the CBD, the United States
proposed the creation of an umbrella convention that would streamline existing
conservation agreements, although as negotiations advanced and social and
economic aspects of biodiversity were included in the agenda, it turned into one of
the main opponents of the process (Boisson de Chazournes, 2009). More recently,
following the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target, the EU promoted the
creation of a global partnership on biodiversity comprising the main biodiversity-
related organisations with the CBD at its centre (CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/7/5).
Some suggest that developed countries do not support integration processes in
international governance because fragmented systems allow them to establish a
legal order that serves their interests and that only they have the capacity to
transform (see Drezner, 2010; Benvenisti and Downs, 2007). Institutional
integration in the biodiversity cluster could indeed reinforce sectoral organisation in
international biodiversity governance and increase fragmentation (see Biermann,
2005). Conservation institutions would become stronger and pose a challenge to
institutions in other policy fields that are behind biodiversity threats. This would
allow powerful actors to deploy cross-institutional political strategies to alter the
balance between conservation and human development concerns in the
international agenda (see Alter and Meunier, 2009).
If developed countries have taken special interest in enhancing integration in the
biodiversity cluster, they have presumably been active in creating synergies in the
implementation of the constituent regimes of the cluster at the national level. This
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assumption can nonetheless be disputed. The gap between policy integration
processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs in national
implementation is not an extraneous phenomenon in IEG. Until recently, the IEG
system emphasised policy development over policy implementation (see Kim,
2013). National implementation problems are common in under-resourced
developing countries, but have also been encountered in countries with higher
levels of income. EU countries, for instance, struggled to comply with CBD-related
obligations in the early days of the convention, and as they committed to
undertaking collective, European-level, actions to implement the treaty, new MLG
challenges emerged (see Baker, 2003).
Implementation gaps are, to some extent, an expected outcome in conditions of
institutional proliferation because regime complexes are not deliberately
established institutions governing national behaviour. Indeed, that regime
complexes and national implementation systems display weak co-evolution is in
itself a remarkable finding.
4.4 Concluding remarks
The first objective of this research was to examine whether regime complexes and
national implementation systems display similar evolution patterns. Co-evolution
implies that global governance developments foster domestic policy change and
vice versa. Thus, if co-evolution in areas of regime overlap is occurring, regime
complexes and national implementation systems must exhibit similarities.
Assuming that institutional and implementation overlap require interplay
management or deliberate efforts to enhance positive interactions between and
among regimes (Young, 2011), the co-evolution framework developed in Chapter 2
advanced some elements for comparing policy integration processes in regime
complexes and policy coherence outputs at the level of national implementation. In
brief, global policy goals and institutional arrangements are compared with national
policy objectives and implementation arrangements to examine how congruent
regime complexes and national implementation systems are. The present chapter
made such assessment in the context of biodiversity governance.
- 128 -
Evidence of co-evolution in areas where the biodiversity-related conventions
overlap was found. Policy goals in the biodiversity cluster and policy objectives in
arenas of national implementation are partly coincident: the search for synergy is
based on co-exploitation and thematic approaches. Likewise, both institutional and
implementation arrangements involve network governance forms supported by
mechanisms for inter-institutional co-operation. Previous research had noticed the
co-evolution of global environmental discourses and foreign policies of developing
countries (see Najam, 2005). This chapter unveiled a different facet of the co-
evolution of IEG and national governance in the developing world, namely, the co-
evolution of EPI processes and MEA implementation systems. This finding has two
major implications for the study of the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy
coherence. On the one hand, it shows that there is not only a dynamic interaction
between the life cycle of regime complexes and the coherency of governmental
policy-making (Morin and Orsni, 2013a, 2013b), but also between policy integration
processes in regime complexes and the coherency of national implementation
systems. On the other hand, empirical observations reveal that co-evolution of
international and domestic policies is not confined to a zone of collective
management centred on Western liberal economies (see Raustiala and Victor,
1998) but extends to the developing world. If co-evolution were part of a Western
enterprise aimed at deep integration of national economies (Raustiala and Victor,
1998), developing countries would defy it, which does not seem to occur in the
present case.
Co-evolution has nevertheless been weak. Substantive differences between policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs at the
level of national implementation were observed. Synergies are considered an issue
of strategic importance in the biodiversity cluster: mutual references can be found
in strategic plans, decisions, resolutions and programmes of work of its constituent
regimes. This has created a core network of biodiversity-related agreements
anchored in formal co-operation instruments such as MoUs/MoCs and joint work
programmes. Synergies between/among biodiversity-related agreements are rarely
considered in NBSAPs, the main instruments for implementing international
biodiversity policies at the national level. National clusters of biodiversity-related
agreements, where they exist, have different boundaries to the global biodiversity
cluster, and inter-connections therein tend to be looser and less formal. Such an
implementation gap or vertical disintegration of policy (Hanf and Underdal, 1998) is
a pervasive phenomenon in IEG (see UNEP, 2012a, 2012b). Some would suggest
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that the gap reveals disconnected governance systems, but it rather signals that
governance systems are not co-evolving at the pace and degree required to solve
global environmental problems. It is at this point where vertical linkages between
regime complexes and national implementation systems need to be examined.
When regime complexes and national implementation systems co-evolve, greater
policy integration (coherence) in regime complexes (national implementation) will
trigger greater coherence (integration) in national implementation (regime
complexes). In other words, influence will travel from the more advanced system to
the less developed one. Ideally, this initial interaction should trigger another one in
the opposite direction such that positive feedback loops between regime complexes
and national implementation systems emerge. The extent and symmetry of vertical
linkages in biodiversity governance are addressed in the next chapter.
5 The biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems
in LAC: Vertical dimensions of co-evolution
Vertical linkages between the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
systems in LAC countries form the focus of this chapter. The similarities observed
in institutional and implementation arrangements (see Chapter 4) suggest that
those linkages exist. But because synergy processes have developed more rapidly
in the biodiversity cluster, pathways of global influence on national governance can
be expected to be stronger than vertical flows in the opposite direction (under a co-
evolutionary perspective, greater integration at one level of governance stimulates
integration processes at another). The strength and symmetry of vertical linkages
are examined here. The assessment constitutes the second step in the analysis of
the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence in accordance with the
framework developed in Chapter 2.
This chapter first discusses pathways of global influence on the management of
biodiversity-related conventions in LAC countries. It next explores whether, and to
what extent, LAC countries have made efforts to influence global governance in the
biodiversity cluster. These two sections rely on empirical evidence obtained from
interviews with national focal points as complemented with relevant documentary
sources. A third section considers whether global/national efforts to shape
national/international governance have been more or less reciprocal to assess the
degree of (a)symmetry of vertical linkages. Concluding remarks close the chapter.
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5.1 Global influence on national governance
5.1.1 Overview
Most international observers interviewed in this study agreed that synergies
achieved in the biodiversity cluster have exerted a limited impact on national
implementation. In the words of a treaty secretariat official, “we are more
integrated; whether we are more effective is debatable” (Interviewee TS1).
Participants at BLG meetings have noticed a general disconnect between inter-
governmental processes and day-to-day implementation within countries (CBD Doc
BLG-5/2). Various interviewees considered that collaborative undertakings to
support national implementation have not been fully explored (Interviewees TS5,
IG2, IG6), but recent co-operative agreements reflect an increased emphasis on
enabling synergies at the national level (see Caddell, 2011).
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) identify four different pathways through which global
governance arrangements can influence national policy: 1) international rules, 2)
international norms and discourse, 3) markets, and 4) direct access to domestic
policy-making (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.1). Global governance in the
biodiversity cluster has exerted influence through international norms and discourse
as well as through direct access to domestic policy-making. International rules have
marginal relevance as a means of promoting synergies in the implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions. The texts of the conventions of the biodiversity
cluster do not create obligations to achieve synergy in their implementation, nor do
they provide guidance on how to create those linkages (Caddell, 2011). Generally,
the rules emanating from international treaties offer some avenues for addressing
conflicts, but not for enhancing synergies, between regimes (van Asselt, 2011).
Markets have not been deliberately manipulated to foster synergies on the ground.
The GEF has financed biodiversity-related projects with the support of UNEP and
UNDP as implementing agencies (see Andresen and Rosendal, 2009). However,
the provision of external resources to influence national governance falls within the
category of efforts associated with direct access to domestic policy-making (see
Bernstein and Cashore, 2012).
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Pathways of influence emerging from the biodiversity cluster and the way they have
affected national implementation in LAC countries are discussed next.
5.1.2 International norms and discourse
International norms and discourse are a key mechanism for influencing the
management of biodiversity-related conventions at the national level. Normative
avenues through which global governance has sought to affect national
implementation include: 1) resolutions and decisions of governing bodies promoting
co-ordination of MEA implementation activities; 2) state-level actions envisaged in
formal co-operative agreements between conventions (notably joint work
programmes); and 3) high-level political commitments (e.g. global biodiversity
targets).
Several resolutions and decisions have encouraged countries to co-ordinate
activities pursuant to different biodiversity-related agreements. Between April 2002
and October 2010, 179 decisions were adopted promoting synergies between the
CBD and the specialist conventions of the biodiversity cluster (see Tables 4.1 and
4.2). Almost 22% of these decisions required independent or collaborative action
by state actors. Countries have been required to inform on the implementation of
these decisions in their national reports (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2). Global
trends arising from these reports suggest that normative influence on national-level
synergies has not been strong. Table 5.1 shows that a relatively low number of
parties submitting reports to four biodiversity-related conventions (the CBD, the
Ramsar Convention, CITES and the CMS) between 2005 and 2011 informed that
measures had been adopted to synergise MEAs implementation. While this
tendency varies across conventions and reporting periods, the overall picture
denotes that national-scale collaboration and synergy, as required by the governing
bodies of the conventions, have progressed slowly. Within the ITPGRFA, the
parties to which are not mandated to produce national reports, the need for better
co-ordination between national focal points has been noticed (see ITPGRFA Doc
IT/GB-4/11/11).
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Table 5.1 Synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs as arising in national reports: Global trends20
Synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs as arising in national reports: Global trends
Convention National
Reports
Number of Parties submitting
reports on time for their
inclusion in global assessment
reports21
Actions reported to co-ordinate MEA-related activities
CBD 3rd National
Reports
(2005)
33 out of 188 Parties (as of the
end of October 2005)
More than 17%
The CBD Secretariat reports that “an overwhelming majority of reporting Parties” are taking
steps to harmonise national policies and programmes for the implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions.
Source: CBD CoP8 Doc.23
4th National
Reports
(2009)
95 out of 193 Parties (as of
February 2010)
More than 49%
Mechanisms of collaboration among national focal points are hardly mentioned in the
reports.
Source: CBD CoP10 Doc.17; CBD WG-RI-3 Inf.1
Ramsar
Convention
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2005)
110 out of 141 eligible Parties (as
of 20 September 2005)22
More than 78%
33% of Parties report positive developments with regard to improving synergy with other
MEAs, whereas a further 22% inform that they are moving in this direction. The Ramsar
Secretary General notices that in-country collaboration between the national focal points to
the biodiversity-related conventions is an area where progress remains slow.
Source: Ramsar CoP9 Doc.5
20 National reports informing on implementation activities taking place between April 2002 and October 2010 were considered. Global trends in the co-ordination
of MEA-related activities were retrieved from official documents evaluating the content of national reports.
21 The specific reports reviewed are indicated in the next column.
22 There were 146 Parties at the time, but five of them had recently joined the convention and were not expected to submit reports in their first year.
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Synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs as arising in national reports: Global trends
Convention National
Reports
Number of Parties submitting
reports on time for their
inclusion in global assessment
reports21
Actions reported to co-ordinate MEA-related activities
Ramsar
Convention
National
Reports to
CoP10 (2008)
129 out of 157 eligible Parties (as
of 15 August 2008)23
More than 82%
57% of responding Parties inform that they have mechanisms for collaboration between
Ramsar Administrative Authorities and their counterparts for other MEAs. 39% of Parties
also report that the focal points of other MEAs are invited to participate in National Ramsar
Committees.
Source: Ramsar CoP10 Doc.6
National
Reports to
CoP11 (2011)
127 out of 160 Parties (as of 15
May 2012)
More than 86%
The analysis of national reports provides no information on domestic actions intended to
streamline implementation of MEAs (see Ramsar CoP11 Doc.7)
CITES Biennial
Reports 2003-
2004 (2005)
85 out of 169 Parties (as of 31
December 2006)
More than 50%
Over half of the parties do not report the existence of co-ordination mechanisms for
synergising MEAs implementation. Others report that co-ordination of MEA processes
results from the same agency housing national focal points of different MEAs, or from good
communication between different agencies.
Source: CITES CoP14 Inf.15
Biennial
Reports 2005-
2006 (2007)
Biennial
Reports 2007-
2008 (2009)
68 out of 170 Parties (as of 3
February 2010)
40%
48 out of 173 Parties (as of 3
February 2010)
Almost 28%
In both reporting periods, half of the Parties inform that they have taken measures to
ensure co-ordination in the implementation of CITES and other MEAs. Several parties
indicated that the focal points for CITES and other conventions are based in the same
agency, which facilitates co-ordination.
Source: CITES CoP15 Inf.43
Biennial
Reports 2009-
2010 (2011)
A recent document jointly prepared by the Standing Committee’s Working Group on Special Reporting Requirements and the
Secretariat revealed that no analysis of biennial reports was conducted due to the low level of report submission (see CITES
CoP16 Doc. 30)
23 158 states were then members of the convention, but one of them had recently joined the treaty and did not have to submit a report.
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Synergies in the implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs as arising in national reports: Global trends
Convention National
Reports
Number of Parties submitting
reports on time for their
inclusion in global assessment
reports21
Actions reported to co-ordinate MEA-related activities
CMS National
Reports to
CoP8 (2005)
47 out of 89 eligible Parties (as of
31 August 2005)24
Almost 53%
Nine Parties (19%) reported collaboration with other bodies and processes, including the
CBD and the Ramsar Convention.
Source: CMS CoP8 Doc.5/Add1
National
Reports to
CoP9 (2008)
54 out of 108 Parties (as of 31
July 2008)
50%
Ten Parties (18%) reported co-operation with other conventions, notably, the CBD, the
Ramsar Convention and CITES.
Source: CMS CoP9 Doc.10
National
Reports to
CoP10 (2011)
68 out of 113 eligible Parties (as
of 10 June 2011)25
More than 60%
Twenty-seven Parties (40%) reported synergies with other bodies and processes, including
the CBD, the Ramsar Convention and CITES.
Source: CMS CoP10 Doc.11
24 There were 91 parties at the time, but three countries joined the convention from May 2005 and were not expected to submit reports (CMS CoP8 Doc.5)
25 The convention had 116 members when the assessment of national reports was made. However, three parties were not required to submit reports (CMS
CoP10 Doc.11)
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These general trends are confirmed in LAC. Table 5.2 describes and assesses the
measures and/or actions reported by the 15 LAC countries of the sample to
improve coherence in the implementation of the biodiversity-related conventions.
Measures and/or actions reported between 2003 and 2011 are sorted into three
time intervals to evaluate progress (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2., for a detailed
discussion of methods employed in the analysis of national reports). In most cases,
it is unclear whether co-ordination in the implementation of MEAs has improved
with time, but there are also cases where some headway has possibly been made.
More definite conclusions are difficult to achieve because countries tend to provide
limited and unspecific information on synergies, and because the information
reported within and across time intervals is sometimes inconsistent and even
contradictory. To illustrate, in its third national report to the CBD (due in 2005), the
Dominican Republic informed that initial steps had been made to harmonise MEA
policies and programmes through the recently created ministry of environment and
natural resources and a new special office overseeing implementation of MEAs.
The country’s national report to Ramsar CoP9 (due the same year) confirmed that
measures were underway to improve synergies between MEAs on the ground.
However, three years later the Dominican Republic reported to Ramsar CoP10 that
no measures were in place to co-ordinate MEA implementation activities. More
recently (at Ramsar CoP11), the country informed that actions to enhance synergy
have been partly taken, drawing attention to on-going co-ordination between
Ramsar and other MEA processes (but failing to specify more concrete measures).
Some have already called into question the quality of reporting to the biodiversity-
related conventions, associating poor reporting standards with a lack of effective
implementation of MEA obligations (see Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010).
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Table 5.2 Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions informed by LAC countries in their
national reports26
Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Argentina Ministry of Environment is reported
as overseeing implementation of
various MEAs.
Unclear if actions to improve co-
ordination between MEA
processes at the national level are
taking place.
The same measures reported in
the previous period are highlighted.
Co-ordinated work between
technical offices overlooking
different MEA processes is
mentioned. CITES reports
nonetheless indicate that no
mechanisms for improving co-
ordination between MEAs have
been developed.
Unclear
While co-ordination between
national focal points has been
reported recently, there appears
that no other actions to
enhance synergy between
implementation processes have
been undertaken throughout
the decade.
Bolivia The country reported that co-
ordination between national focal
points occurs partly/in some cases.
Mechanisms enabling co-ordination
between technical offices involved
in MEAs implementation are
reported as non-existent.
The country informs that
collaboration mechanisms are in
place, but no specific details are
provided.
Unclear
Information available is
insufficient and, to some
degree, inconsistent.
26 The table relies on national reports to the biodiversity-related conventions covering implementation activities taking place between April 2002 and October
2010. Description of relevant activities and measures is based on information provided by parties in relation to key reporting elements associated with MEA
inter-linkages (see Table 3.8).
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Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Brazil Unclear whether measures have
been taken to improve co-
ordination in the implementation of
MEAs. Overlap between focal
points of the Ramsar Convention
and the WHC is noticed.
No specific mechanisms for co-
ordinating activities across MEAs
are reported. However, there is
participation of MEA focal points in
the National Committee on
Wetlands.
No mechanisms are In place to co-
ordinate MEA implementation
processes at the national level, but
communication and collaboration
between focal points based in the
same ministries exists.
Unclear
The situation virtually remained
unchanged during the period
examined. No actions
deliberately intended to improve
synergy between MEAs were
reported.
Chile The country reported the creation
of Advisory Committees tasked
with examining international
environmental commitments and
their integration into national
policies, plans and programmes;
as well as co-ordinating MEA
activities.
Submitted reports provided no
information on synergy between
MEAs at the national level.
National Committees overlooking
implementation of CITES and the
CMS were established to co-
ordinate inter-institutional action.
Regional collaboration between
Ramsar national authorities and the
focal points of other MEAs is also
reported.
Apparent progress
Further measures were
adopted towards the end of the
decade intended to enhance
coherence in the
implementation of MEAs.
Colombia Efforts to harmonise MEA
programmes at the national level
are on course. The National Action
Plan on Biodiversity is depicted as
a first attempt to integrate
commitments under different
MEAs. Opportunities for enhancing
synergy between MEA processes
were identified in the context of a
GEF-funded project to assess
capacity needs for the effective
implementation of MEAs (NCSA)
The Ramsar report highlights the
National Committee on Wetlands
as a mechanism for co-ordinating
wetland-related actions with the
national focal points of other
conventions.
The National Environmental Council
is presented as a co-ordination body
that enables the creation of
synergies within the environmental
sector and between the
environmental sector and other
sectors more generally. Examples
are provided of policy directives and
programmes resulting from synergy
processes involving multiple
institutions.
Apparent progress
At the beginning of the decade,
there were timid attempts to
enhance complementarity in the
implementation of MEAs.
Subsequent reports suggest
that synergies occur on a more
regular basis, but concrete
examples of collaborative
activities between national focal
points are not provided.
- 139 -
Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Costa Rica Working commissions and groups
have been established to co-
ordinate implementation of
different MEAs. Participation in the
NCSA project is noticed. The
agency responsible for overseeing
the implementation of biodiversity-
related conventions is considering
the possibility of developing an
action plan for joint
implementation.
No mechanisms have been
established to co-ordinate
implementation of MEAs, but there
is good communication between
national focal points.
Progress in improving integration
between MEA processes is
reported, but no specific details are
revealed.
Unclear
Evidence is too thin to suggest
that recent efforts to develop
synergy have improved upon
the actions reported in the first
half of the decade.
Cuba An assessment of capacity needs
for a coherent implementation of
MEAs is taking place in the context
of the NCSA initiative. Attention is
drawn to the Environment
Committee, an inter-sectoral body
composed of institutions with MEA-
related responsibilities. A national
workshop on synergies was run to
identify objectives of synergy
processes and potential areas for
collaboration as well as to develop
proposal for joint strategic action.
Projects involving collaborative
action between national focal
points are highlighted.
Collaborative action within the
Environment Committee and
national synergy workshops are
underlined as processes that
contribute to enhancing
complementarity between MEAs.
The Ministry of Science,
Technology and Environment is
reported to pursue a policy of inter-
sectoral co-ordination which
ensures communication and co-
operation between national focal
points.
Some actions previously reported
are highlighted. The country informs
that the design and implementation
of a number of biodiversity-related
strategies and programmes has
been facilitated by working groups
and national commissions and
councils integrated by
representatives of various
institutions.
Apparent progress
While some activities are
recurrently reported, further
evidence is provided to show
that synergies between MEAs
are happening.
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Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Dominican
Republic
The establishment of the Ministry
of Environment and Natural
Resources triggered a process of
harmonisation of MEA
programmes. A special office was
created within the Ministry to follow
up MEAs implementation.
The country reports having no
mechanisms for co-ordinating MEA
implementation processes.
Co-ordination between national
focal points is reported.
Complementarity of implementation
activities under different
biodiversity-related conventions is
highlighted.
Unclear
No specific measures to
enhance synergy between
MEAs were reported during the
second half of the 2000s.
Ecuador The development of mechanisms
to co-ordinate implementation of
MEAs is incipient. Harmonisation
of MEA programmes is reported as
one of the challenges of policy-
making within the Ministry of
Environment. Workshops have
been conducted to explore
opportunities for developing
synergy and policy coherence.
Examples of joint projects are
provided. These processes are
primarily intended to synergise
implementation of the Rio
Conventions.
The country informs that it has
mechanisms for coordinating MEA
implementation activities: national
focal points exchange information
and collaborate with each other;
four of them are based in the same
department.
The country reports that
responsibility for overseeing
implementation of MEAs falls within
the Ministry of Environment.
Activities undertaken to implement
commitments under specific MEAs
are described. Co-ordination
between national focal points is
again highlighted.
Unclear
No clear indications of progress
are observed. Measures
reported in 2009-2011 were
virtually the same as those
reported in 2006-2008.
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Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Guatemala The country reports that it
participates in the NCSA project to
assess capacity needs for the
implementation of MEAs.
Collaborative efforts to improve
protected areas management and
enhance coherence of institutional
policies are highlighted.
The country reports the existence
of mechanisms for collaboration
between national focal points, but
offers no further details.
Activities carried out to implement
specific MEAs are described.
Examples of synergy in the
implementation of the CBD and the
WHC are provided. Mechanisms for
co-ordination between national focal
points are reported as planned.
Unclear
While there appears that
collaboration between national
focal points is occurring, it is
uncertain whether specific
measures to enhance those
linkages were developed during
the period examined. The
information reported is not
always consistent.
Honduras The country informs that
implementation of the NCSA
project has allowed the country to
identify actions to improve synergy
between MEAs. Collaboration
between national focal points has
occurred in the context of regional
initiatives under the Central
American Commission on
Environment and Development
which create linkages between
MEAs implementation processes.
Preparation of a joint work plan for
the Rio Conventions and the
Ramsar Convention is reported.
The plan is intended to enable
implementation of common
activities through the co-ordinated
work of national focal points.
Further MEAs have been
considered in the joint work plan
which seeks to synergise MEA
processes at the national level. No
status of progress is provided
Unclear
The initiative of an action plan
for joint implementation is
innovative, but it apparently has
not gained track.
Jamaica No actions have been taken to
enhance integration of MEAs at the
national level. Collaboration
between the focal points of the
CBD and the Ramsar Convention
within the National Ramsar
Committee is nonetheless noticed.
Regular collaboration between
national focal points based in the
same agency and/or ministry is
noticed. Ramsar national
authorities are reported to hold
periodic consultations with their
counterparts in other ministries.
Collaboration between national focal
points who are in the same
agency/ministry is, again,
highlighted.
Unclear
Co-ordination between national
focal points was regularly
highlighted. No other actions
intended to enhance synergy
between MEAs were reported
during the decade.
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Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Mexico An NCSA project has been
approved which is intended to
facilitate the creation of synergies
between MEAs implementation
processes. Inter-institutional
committees have been established
to co-ordinate implementation of
specific conventions. The national
biodiversity information system has
generated data which supports the
development of national positions
adopted by the country in
international fora.
The country informs that facilitating
mechanisms are in place to ensure
inter-institutional co-ordination and
regular communication between
national focal points. A foreign
affairs department at the Ministry of
Environment follows up
implementation of all the MEAs the
country has adopted. Working
sessions are planned to examine
issues of common interest across
MEAs and improve linkages
between implementation
processes.
The country reports participation of
various agencies and national focal
points in the National Committee on
Priority Wetlands. Collaboration
within the Committee has enabled
increased mainstreaming of wetland
issues into other institutional
processes. Plans are being
considered to establish a sub-
committee of MEAs national focal
points which would pursue a joint
agenda for wetland conservation.
Regular co-ordination within the
CITES Follow-up Committee is also
reported.
Apparent progress
On-going efforts and future
plans to enhance synergies
between MEAs were constantly
reported during the period
examined.
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Activities and measures intended to enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions in Latin America and the Caribbean
Country Activities and measures intended to improve synergy between biodiversity-related MEAs Assessment of progress
2003-2005 2006-2008 2009-2011
Panama Implementation of the NCSA
project is noted. The project has
allowed the identification of
synergy opportunities in MEAs
implementation. In the context of
CMS-related activities, plans are
reported to integrate migratory
species into a future national
biodiversity strategy.
No specific mechanisms for
collaboration between national focal
points are acknowledged. The
National Environment Agency is
making efforts to develop synergies
between conventions. Participation
of Ramsar authorities in events
organised by other MEAs is
reported. Joint activities between
Ramsar authorities and other
national focal points are also
highlighted.
Lessons from the NCSA project are
highlighted. There has since been
increased collaboration between the
national authorities of the Rio
Conventions on specific initiatives.
Housing the focal points of the
MEAs which the country has
adopted, the National Environment
Agency has enabled a co-ordinated
approach to implementation. Inter-
institutional committees have been
created to follow-up specific
conventions. The management of
Important Bird Areas (IBAs) is
highlighted as an area where
synergies between the Ramsar
Convention, the WHC and the CMS
have been developed. Other
synergy-related activities are
mentioned which were reported in
previous years.
Apparent progress
It is at least apparent that the
NCSA project has facilitated
enhanced co-ordination
between national focal points.
This applies directly to joint
activities between the Rio
Conventions. Whether
synergies between biodiversity-
related conventions have
developed at the same pace is
unclear.
Peru The NCSA project to improve MEA
management at the national level
is under implementation.
Institutions with MEA-related
responsibilities are in permanent
co-ordination to ensure synergy
between implementation
processes.
The country reports that co-
ordination between national focal
points occurs through the National
Environment Council.
Progress in implementation of
specific MEAs is reported. Linkages
between implementation processes
are hardly mentioned. It is noticed,
for instance, that the National
Strategy on Wetlands is not in line
with the CBD-Ramsar joint work
programme.
Unclear
During the period analysed, the
country did not report specific
measures to improve co-
ordination between MEAs.
Information of projects or
initiatives involving different
national focal points was absent
from the reports.
- 144 -
Some formal co-operative agreements in the biodiversity cluster require action by
national focal points. Examples include the 2010 MoC between the CBD and the
ITPGRFA, the third (2002-2006) and fourth (2007-2010) Joint Work Plans of the
CBD and the Ramsar Convention, and the CBD-CMS Joint Work Programme
2002-2005. Inter-treaty agreements featuring state-level obligations are uncommon
in IEG (see Scott, 2011) and the available evidence suggests that they have had
marginal effects on national implementation behaviour. In Peru, a CBD official
attending a recent meeting of the national committee on wetlands turned to the
CBD-Ramsar MoC to draw attention to the linkages between the two conventions
and the need to improve collaboration and mutual support. An Argentinian
interviewee observed that co-operative instruments need to be adapted to the
institutional and socio-economic realities of state parties so that governments
contribute to their implementation. Costa Rican and Mexican interviewees
perceived that MoUs/MoCs fall within the ambit of operation of treaty secretariats
and have a tenuous connection with national implementation activities. Another
Mexican CBD official went on to say that those instruments have not achieved
impact on the ground and parallel instruments should be developed at the national
level to enable joint work among national focal points.
Governments in the UN and other international fora have set quantitative targets as
a means of influencing international and national action (see White and Black,
2004; Jolly, 2003). Targets are soft law instruments that are not backed by
obligations (Harrop and Pritchard, 2011), but can create a sense of common
purpose across agencies working in the same area (White and Black, 2004). They
can thus be conceived of as enabling instruments of interplay management (see
Chapter 2, Section 2.3.1.2). In 2002, the CBD embraced the target-setting
approach with the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target (Harrop and Pritchard,
2011). The Target soon became a policy priority for the BLG (see CBD Doc BLG-
2). It was incorporated into the strategic plans and/or programmes of the non-CBD
conventions and various decisions of their governing bodies referred to it (the
ITPGRFA, which came into force in 2004, provided more nominal support) (see
Table 5.3). The Target, however, hardly encouraged a more synergistic
implementation of the conventions in national arenas.
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Table 5.3 Integration of the 2010 Biodiversity Target into strategic documents and decisions of the non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions
Integration of the 2010 Biodiversity Target into strategic documents and decisions of the non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions
Convention Strategic document incorporating the 2010 Target Decisions referring to the 2010 Target
2010
Target as
a generic
target
2010 Target
as a CBD’s
target
2010
Target as a
WSSD’s
target
2010 Target as
a CBD/WSSD’s
target
2010 Target as
a generic target
2010 Target
as a CBD’s
target
2010 Target as a
WSSD’s target
2010 Target as a
CBD/WSSD’s
target
Ramsar
Convention
Strategic
Plan 2003-
2008
Resolution IX.8
(main text and
annex)
Resolution IX.1
Annex E
Resolution X.10
(Annex 2)
Resolution
IX.1 Annex D
Resolution IX.3
(preamble)
Resolution X.22
(main text, preamble
and Annex I)
Resolution IX.1
Annex D
Resolution IX.2
(Annex 2)
Resolution X.3
(main text and
preamble)
WHC World
Heritage
Centre’s
Natural
Heritage
Strategy
(2006)27
27 The strategy was designed to guide the World Heritage Centre’s work on natural heritage. The strategic objectives of the conventions are outlined in a different
document, namely, the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention.
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Integration of the 2010 Biodiversity Target into strategic documents and decisions of the non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions
Convention Strategic document incorporating the 2010 Target Decisions referring to the 2010 Target
2010
Target as
a generic
target
2010 Target
as a CBD’s
target
2010
Target as a
WSSD’s
target
2010 Target as
a CBD/WSSD’s
target
2010 Target as
a generic target
2010 Target
as a CBD’s
target
2010 Target as a
WSSD’s target
2010 Target as a
CBD/WSSD’s
target
CITES Strategic
Vision
2008-2013
Resolution
13.2
(preamble)28
Decision 13.2 (main
text)
CMS Strategic Plan
2006-2011
Resolution 8.5
(preamble)
Resolution 8.7
(main text and
preamble)
Resolution 8.8
(preamble and
annex)
Resolution 8.18
(main text,
preamble, and
Annexes I and II)
Resolution 9.2
(preamble)
Resolution 9.4
(main text)
Resolution 9.5
(preamble and
annex)
Resolution
8.13
(preamble)
Resolution 9.7
(preamble)
Resolution 8.11 (main
text and preamble)
Recommendation 9.4
(preamble)
Resolution 8.22
(preamble)
Resolution 9.12
(preamble)
28 The Resolution makes an implicit reference to the CBD’s 2010 Target by recalling Target 4.3 of the CBD’s framework to assess progress in the implementation
of the Strategic Plan (including progress towards achieving the 2010 Target).
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NBSAPs were considered a primary instrument for implementing the CBD’s
Strategic Plan 2002-2010 and achieving the 2010 Biodiversity Target (CBD
Decisions VI/26 and VII/30). The CBD’s Parties were encouraged to develop or
review their NBSAPs in light of the CBD’s strategic goals and set national targets
taking into account the framework of goals and sub-targets to facilitate the
assessment of progress towards achieving the 2010 Target (adopted at CBD CoP7
through Decision VII/30). The eighth meeting of the CBD CoP (Curitiba, Brazil, 20-
31 March 2006) endorsed voluntary guidelines to Parties for the review of NBSAPs,
which were intended to serve as a practical tool to assess NBSAPs’ implementation
(CBD Decision VIII/8). The guidelines asked Parties to consider whether
biodiversity concerns were being integrated into non-CBD processes, including into
activities undertaken in the framework of other biodiversity-related conventions
(CBD Decision VIII/8, Annex).
Few LAC countries reviewed their NBSAPs and/or set national targets as required
by the 2010 Target process. In 4 of the 15 LAC countries examined in this research
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Jamaica), NBSAPs were developed following the
adoption of the 2010 Target. Only the Brazilian and Chilean NBSAPs included
national targets. In the rest of the countries, NBSAPs predated the 2010 Target
and did not feature outcome-oriented targets. However, in 2009, Costa Rica
adopted national conservation targets linked to the 2010 Biodiversity Target. As it
seems from the interviews conducted, in most LAC countries NBSAPs were
reviewed as part of preparations for the fourth national reports to the CBD (due on
30 March 2009), rather than as part of on-going monitoring of NBSAP
implementation. More importantly for assessing normative influence on national-
level synergies, of all the NBSAPs prepared or reviewed after the adoption of the
2010 Target, the Brazilian strategy was the only one where MEA inter-linkages
were purposefully addressed (see Table 4.3).
The new international framework for biodiversity embodied in the Strategic Plan for
Biodiversity 2011-2020 is encouraging increased awareness of the need to improve
coherence in the implementation of biodiversity-related agreements as compared
with the previous 2010 framework. The CBD CoP has urged Parties and other
governments to review their NBSAPs in line with the Strategic Plan, taking into
account synergies among biodiversity-related conventions (CBD Decision X/2).
Most of the LAC countries of the sample have already updated their NBSAPs or
have taken steps in that direction. Information retrieved from the interviews
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conducted revealed that some countries have addressed or considered inter-
linkages among biodiversity-related MEAs in their revised NBSAPs (Colombia,
Dominican Republic and Guatemala); while others are taking into account MEA
inter-linkages as they update their strategies (Argentina, Honduras and Panama).
Ecuadorian and Mexican interviewees believed that synergies between the CBD
and other MEAs should arise during the NBSAP review process. Normative
influence through the new Strategic Plan is evident, but it cannot be disassociated
from the financial and technical assistance available for NBSAP review (the Japan
Biodiversity Fund was especially created to develop capacity in developing
countries to implement the Strategic Plan and update their NBSAPs).
5.1.3 Direct access to domestic policy-making processes
Overarching organisations and treaty secretariats have supported LAC countries in
their efforts to improve synergy in the implementation of biodiversity regimes.
Support has come mainly from the GEF, UNDP, UNEP and the secretariats of the
biodiversity cluster.
The GEF is the largest public funder of projects to protect the global environment
(GEF, 2013a). It funds the additional costs “associated with transforming a project
with national benefits into one with global environmental benefits” (ibid.). It serves
as a financial mechanism to five MEAs: the three Rio Conventions, the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, and the Minamata Convention on
Mercury. It further supports various agreements and programmes dealing with
international waters and transboundary water systems. Biodiversity is one of its
seven focal areas, with biodiversity projects comprising about 36% of the GEF’s
portfolio (GEF, 2013b). The financial incentives created by the GEF have triggered
efforts to synergise implementation of MEAs in LAC. Projects that Ecuador has
submitted to the GEF Secretariat have considered factual linkages between MEA
issue-areas in an integrated way (Ecuadorian Interviewee A). In Bolivia and
Panama, the national focal points to the Rio Conventions were collaborating on the
preparation of GEF project proposals at the time when the interviews were
conducted. In Mexico, a special committee was set up to identify needs and
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priorities in the implementation of the Rio Conventions and to streamline the project
portfolio (Mexican Interviewee A).
The GEF has assisted the national management of MEAs through the NCSA
programme. The initiative was launched in January 2000, with UNDP and UNEP as
implementing agencies. It aimed to assist countries in evaluating their capacities to
achieve the objectives of the Rio Conventions and other MEAs. Participating
countries were expected to identify priority issues, capacity constraints, and
capacity development needs, particularly in the areas of biological diversity, climate
change and land degradation (Bellamy and Hill, 2010). A total of 153 countries
were involved in the programme between 2002 and 2006 (GEF, 2013c; Bellamy
and Hill, 2010). NCSA projects were completed in 12 countries of the sample (see
Table 5.4).
In their reports to the biodiversity-related conventions (especially in the third CBD
reports), LAC countries highlighted their participation in the NCSA programme (see
Table 5.2). Interviewees from Jamaica, Panama and Peru acknowledged the
lessons drawn from NCSA projects. Impact is nonetheless difficult to assess from
the interviews conducted. In Costa Rica, the NCSA project informed a recent
initiative to strengthen the synergies in the implementation of MEAs, in particular
the Rio Conventions (Costa Rican Interviewee A). Conversely, the NCSA
recommendations have not been made operational in Ecuador according to one
interviewee.
In an overall evaluation of the NCSA initiative, the GEF highlighted the relevance of
NCSA projects for a more synergistic implementation of MEAs, but noted the little
uptake of NCSA results (GEF, 2011b). The NCSA initiative was developed in
parallel and outside of MEA processes; and there was otherwise little use of NCSA
thematic assessments, cross-cutting analyses and final reports in capacity
development guidance prepared by MEA bodies (ibid.). The new Cross Cutting
Capacity Development (CCCD) strategy seeks to improve the linkages between
GEF and MEA policies. The strategy builds on the NCSA initiative to address
capacity needs that will enhance a country’s ability to meet its obligations under
different MEAs (GEF, 2013d). The strategy focusses on environmental governance
systems (promoting a coherent implementation of MEAs) and the mainstreaming of
global environmental issues into national development frameworks (GEF, 2011b).
Countries eligible for funding are required to review their NCSA reports and action
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plans alongside international, regional and national policy frameworks, including
relevant MEA policies and guidelines (GEF, 2011a). 25 countries, including one
country of the sample (Jamaica), have received financial support for CCCD
projects (GEF, 2013d; GEF, 2011b).
Table 5.4 Status of GEF’s NCSA projects in selected LAC countries1
Country NCSA Status
Argentina Inception
Bolivia2 Completed
Brazil Not started
Chile Completed
Colombia Completed
Costa Rica Completed
Cuba Completed
Dominican Republic Completed
Ecuador Completed
Guatemala Completed
Honduras Completed
Jamaica Completed
Mexico Completed
Panama Action Plan
Peru Completed
UNEP has provided training and capacity-building to support MEA implementation.
Two initiatives have been especially relevant to the LAC countries: 1) a joint
UNEP/European Commission programme aimed at building and enhancing the
capacity of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries to implement and
enforce MEA obligations (the ACP-MEAs project); and 2) the UNEP/IUCN
1 GEF, 2013c
2 The country did not participate in the NCSA programme.
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TEMATEA initiative on issue-based modules for coherent implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions (referred to in Chapter 4).
The ACP-MEAs project started in March 2009 and formally closed in February
2013 (ACP-MEAs Secretariat, 2013a). The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
Secretariat was the regional hub for the Caribbean. Countries were provided with
technical assistance, training, policy support, and advisory services to enhance
their capacity to implement MEAs (CARICOM Secretariat, 2013b). Specific areas
supported by the Caribbean hub included negotiation skills, legal drafting, project
design and management, information management and exchange, MEA
enforcement, harmonised MEA reporting, dissemination of best practice and
success stories, and public awareness (ibid.). One of the Jamaican CBD officials
interviewed drew attention to Jamaica’s participation in one of the regional
workshops organised under the ACP-MEAs project.
A mid-term review of the ACP-MEAs project concluded that the Caribbean hub was
delivering results, with indicators showing that the percentage of progress towards
achieving the overarching goal of strengthening national capacities was only below
50% (ACP-MEAs Secretariat, 2012). The assessment observed that the Caribbean
Hub had sensitised countries to their international commitments and ways to
address them. It nonetheless noticed that human and financial resource constraints
had impaired the Hub’s activities as well as the ability of the CARICOM Secretariat
and national environment agencies to internalise and work within the objectives of
the ACP-MEAs project. This, the document noted, could threaten the sustainability
of the project after its completion.
The TEMATEA project aimed to facilitate understanding of national obligations
under various international and regional biodiversity-related agreements by
grouping MEA decisions and resolutions (and, more specifically, the action-oriented
part of the negotiated texts) based on the issue they address (TEMATEA
Secretariat, 2013). UNEP started working on the project in 2005 and formed a
partnership with IUCN one year later for its further development (Verleye, 2010).
Six issue-based modules were initially developed (ABS, biodiversity and climate
change, inland waters, invasive alien species, and sustainable use), with one
additional module on forest biodiversity added in 2011 (CBD Secretariat, 2011) and
one more on marine and costal biodiversity under development (TEMATEA
Secretariat, 2013). National workshops were held in some countries to support the
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use of the modules and promote communication and co-ordination between MEA
focal points and agencies with a view to improving coherence in national
implementation. In 2008, TEMATEA workshops were held in Cuba (with a focus on
the issue-based modules on invasive alien species and inland waters) and Peru
(where the applicability of the ABS module was tested) (TEMATEA Secretariat,
2013). Both workshops resulted in specific policy recommendations, the status of
which is unclear. Neither the Cuban nor the Peruvian CBD officials interviewed
referred to the TEMATEA project. The initiative does not seem to have affected
national implementation activities in other LAC countries. Interviewees from
Colombia, Panama and Mexico reported interest in the project, but none of them
acknowledged application of the TEMATEA modules at the national level.
Treaty secretariats in the biodiversity cluster have made efforts to bridge the gap
between global and national implementation through workshops, field missions,
joint projects and other capacity-building activities, sometimes in partnership with
other international organisations. Examples include the Ramsar/WHC joint expert
advisory missions to threatened sites recognised as such by the two conventions
(CBD Doc UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/1/7/Add.2); CMS/CITES joint activities in support of
the conservation and sustainable use of Saiga Antelope (Saiga tatarica)
populations in Eurasia (see Caddell, 2011); and the CBD/Ramsar River Basin
Initiative, an information-sharing mechanism that supports an integrated
management of biodiversity, wetlands and river basins (CBD Doc
UNEP/CBD/COP/7/19). More recently, the biodiversity-related conventions have
collaborated to support countries in the revision and updating of their NBSAPs in
the context of the CBD’s NBSAP capacity building workshops (CBD Secretariat,
2013; CBD Doc BLG/8/2).
The effects of these actions sparked mixed views among interviewees. Participants
from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Peru believed that treaty
secretariats have not provided much assistance. CBD officials from Cuba and
Panama acknowledged that the CBD Secretariat has supported national
implementation through capacity-building workshops. They observed, however, that
synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs are hardly discussed in those
seminars. This is because the issue is not a major concern to funding institutions
(Cuban Interviewee). A Panamanian participant considered that CBD workshops
could be a platform for creating synergies between biodiversity-related conventions
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provided that other national focal points were able to attend. This is often not
possible due to lack of funding.
Other participants were more positive about the assistance from treaty secretariats.
In Honduras, technical, institutional and logistical capacities to implement MEAs
have been strengthened through capacity-building. Projects sponsored by treaty
secretariats have enabled improved inter-agency co-ordination (Honduran
Interviewee). In Chile, secretariats have supported projects where different MEA
processes converge (Chilean Interviewee A). CBD officials from Bolivia and
Colombia reported that treaty secretariats have helped in the design of GEF
projects proposals addressing MEA inter-linkages. Bolivian and Chilean
interviewees nonetheless considered that support from treaty secretariats remains
modest.
CBD officials from Brazil and Mexico affirmed that treaty secretariats have assisted
national management of MEAs to the best of their ability; while participants from
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Argentina believed that treaty secretariats
could improve their assistance to countries. A CBD official from Costa Rica
considered that the burden of creating synergies between MEAs at the national
level has been placed on state parties: “I understand that this is an issue of national
sovereignty, but the secretariats could, at the request of countries, offer improved
support for the development of synergies at the national level”. Harmonisation of
national reporting, for instance, can help improve coherence in the implementation
of the biodiversity-related conventions, but despite it being a regular theme in inter-
treaty co-operation processes, progress has been slow. Countries still perceive
inefficiencies in national reporting. The information requested overlaps in many
cases (Colombian Interviewee), and generating reports for different venues
imposes a heavy burden on governments with limited human and financial
resources (Jamaican Interviewee B).
The impact of direct access to domestic policy-making is difficult to measure.
Several LAC countries have benefitted from the capacity-building assistance
received, but it is sometimes unclear whether the lessons learned are actively
applied. In many cases, capacity-building activities are not monitored to ensure that
they are fulfilling their aims in the short and long terms (the ACP-MEAs project
being an important exception). Notably, none of the CBD officials interviewed
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referred to the use of technical guidance on synergies in day-to-day
implementation.
5.2 National influence on global governance
5.2.1 Overview
In 2002, a report by the Ramsar Secretary General on the implementation of the
Ramsar Convention at the global level suggested that “countries have not yet made
the political choice of forging true and effective synergies among MEAs” (Ramsar
Doc COP8 DOC. 5). Some believe that the affirmation remains valid. A common
criticism within the biodiversity cluster is that national governments frequently fail to
adopt coherent positions across biodiversity-related fora. In the words of one
international expert, “a country might defend one position at one meeting and later
on promote a different one in another forum” (Interviewee NG9). National
delegations attending meetings of the biodiversity-related conventions do not
always comprise the same people. Another expert observed, for instance, that
most countries designate different representatives to attend CBD and CITES
meetings (Interviewee NG5). Poor communication between national focal points is
often blamed for the lack of consistent national approaches across biodiversity
venues.
In some cases, however, state actors engage in what Young (2002, p.25) calls the
politics of institutional design and management, which “comes into play when
actors forge links between issues and institutions intentionally in the interests of
pursuing individual or collective goals”. Benvenisti and Downs (2007) suggest that
the world powers are keen to promote the fragmentation of international
governance structures as this allows them to play “chessboard politics” (Alter and
Meunier, 2009) to their own advantage. In contrast, they claim, weaker states
create inter-institutional linkages with a view to a more integrated and democratised
international system where power does not determine outcomes. Experiences
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within CITES are illustrative in this regard. Some parties have been particularly
keen to improve synergy with the CBD to advance wildlife conservation through
sustainable trade. Namibia was an active supporter of the integration of the CBD’s
Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity into
CITES’ operations (see CITES Doc CoP13 Doc. 12.1.1). Other parties, notably, the
United States, have been more cautious in advancing CITES-CBD co-operation.
There are fears that CITES’ trade controls and enforcement powers could be
weakened if sustainability considerations are mainstreamed into CITES’ processes
(Interviewee NG5). As an illustration of this, one of the EU’s strategic objectives for
the fifteenth meeting of the CITES CoP was that “any decisions aimed at
enhancing coordination between CITES and other biodiversity-related conventions
do not undermine the nature of CITES as a global conservation agreement or
CITES’ strict conservation measures” (CITES Doc CoP15 Inf. 30). While these
countries have, at different times, advocated for greater integration of biodiversity-
related agreements through an umbrella convention (United States) or a global
partnership (EU), such proposals might conceal attempts to increase institutional
fragmentation by establishing a sharper demarcation of biodiversity conservation
and human development agendas (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3).
5.2.2 The internal modalities for CoP preparation
This section examines whether LAC countries have made deliberate efforts to
affect global governance in the biodiversity cluster by looking at the internal
modalities of delegate preparation for, and participation in, biodiversity-related
meetings (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.2.2).
Synergies are an elemental, but not always visible, aspect of internal modalities of
preparation. In many LAC countries, internal working meetings are held in advance
of international meetings. In Bolivia, national positions presented in biodiversity-
related fora are negotiated and agreed at workshops attended by officials from
environment and non-environment agencies and civil society representatives.
Jamaican national positions result from internal discussions among governmental
and non-governmental agencies (Jamaican Interviewee A). Chilean positions in
biodiversity-related venues are discussed in the inter-institutional committees
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overseeing implementation of specific conventions (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3).
CBD focal points from Colombia, Costa Rica and Ecuador noticed that MEA
officials attend domestic meetings organised in advance of CBD negotiations. Also,
a Peruvian interviewee noticed the recent participation of UNFCCC and UNCCD
focal points in internal CBD meetings. In Guatemala, domestic consultation ahead
of CBD deliberations occurred only recently in the context of CBD CoP10. Goodwin
(2013) observed similar participative exercises in the UK preparation for Ramsar
CoPs.
Cross-sectoral co-ordination poses a challenge when national positions are
internally discussed. In Colombia, international negotiations on ABS issues often
confront the CBD and ITPGRFA focal points and the environment and agriculture
ministries more generally. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has previously intervened
as an arbiter to reconcile views and achieve a commonly-agreed national position
(Colombian Interviewee). The co-ordinating functions of ministries of foreign affairs
are common in other jurisdictions (see Schermers and Blokker, 2011). Problems of
co-ordination might lead to dual positions at the same meeting and/or to stalemates
that prevent coherent participation. The delegation representing one of the
countries of the sample in the negotiations of the CBD’s Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety comprised officials from the environment and industry sectors who
participated in different working groups and advanced contrasting positions.
Bodansky (2010) observed a similar situation within the Russian delegations
participating in the negotiations of the post-2012 climate change regime. In
Panama, on the eve of CMS CoP10 (Bergen, Norway, 20-25 November 2011), the
National Environment Authority (ANAM) developed a proposal for inclusion of a
native shark species in the CMS Appendices. The proposal was rejected by the
Aquatic Resources Authority on the grounds that the listing could have adverse
effects on the wellbeing of local fishermen (Panamanian Interviewee). Internal
negotiations did not lead to a national position. In other cases, however, the ANAM
has had to prepare a national position even when internal co-ordination has failed.
Participation of MEA focal points in internal co-ordination meetings held in advance
of international negotiations should ensure that a country’s position in one forum is
consistent with its positions in related venues (Schermers and Blokker, 2011), but
this may not lead to coherent, i.e., mutually reinforcing, positions. The interviews
suggest that, in preparing a national position, a country seeks consensus or mutual
agreement across relevant ministries and/or agencies, but not always congruity or
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complementarity with the positions advanced in other fora. Because national
positions emerge through bargaining and coalition politics and patterns of
participation and influence are likely to change over time (Hanf, 2000), deliberate
co-ordination of national positions becomes necessary to ensure coherent
participation in overlapping venues.
Efforts to ensure that positions presented in one forum are upheld in another were
explicitly mentioned by some interviewees. In Mexico, CONABIO ensures that
national positions at CBD and CITES meetings are coherent. Cuba has managed
to defend congruent positions across biodiversity policy venues because the
government has historically held principle-based positions. In Argentina, attempts
have been made to achieve coherence in the national positions defended at CBD
and UNFCCC venues. Similar efforts may not be occurring in other countries. A
CBD official in Peru, for instance, did not know whether national positions at CBD
meetings were reinforced at meetings of other biodiversity-related conventions.
5.2.3 The internal modalities for CoP participation
Some countries have backed inter-treaty co-operation processes as they
participate in MEA meetings. The Chilean government has supported national
positions calling for greater synergy between conventions, although the country
itself has not advanced concrete proposals for enhancing MEA integration. Cuba
has encouraged issue-based co-operation among MEAs provided funding for other
implementation activities is not compromised. Other countries have been more
proactive. Colombia has promoted MoUs/MoCs as instruments for synergising
MEA implementation processes. Colombian delegations at CBD’s meetings have
been vigilant in ensuring that issues which other conventions address are
transferred to the relevant venues or, else, are discussed within CBD arenas taking
into account the input provided by actors from the conventions involved (Colombian
Interviewee). This counteracts cross-institutional political strategies (see Alter and
Meunier, 2009) and prevents mandate creep. The Mexican government has
advocated for increased synergy between the CBD and CITES in line with national
interests (Mexican Interviewee A). Recently, on the occasion of the twentieth
meeting of the CITES Plants Committee (Dublin, Ireland, 22-30 March 2012),
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Mexico submitted a draft resolution promoting co-operation between the CBD and
CITES in the implementation of the CBD’s Global Strategy for Plant Conservation.
Proposing an item for discussion that no other state is willing to propose is one way
to exert influence on international negotiations (see Keohane, 1967).
During international negotiations, country delegations sometimes adapt national
positions to find common ground with like-minded countries. The negotiating
mandates of Jamaican delegations are flexible enough to accommodate concerns
from other Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (Jamaican Interviewee A).
National delegations of LAC countries which are members of the Group of Like-
Minded Megadiverse Countries have to be prepared to adjust their positions in
international venues where the Group acts as a negotiating bloc. However, the
SIDS and the Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries do not seem to be
active in supporting enhanced integration of biodiversity-related MEAs. A quick
glance at IISD daily reports of CBD CoP meetings (available from IISD, 2013), for
instance, reveals that neither of the two groups has tabled proposals, or otherwise
supported others’ views, on improving synergies between the CBD and other
agreements (the EU and, to a lesser extent, the African Group are the regional
blocs with more participation in this area).
5.3 Strength and (a)symmetry of vertical linkages
Vertical linkages between the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
systems in LAC countries are still not solid enough to enable complementary
evolutions. However, global attempts to influence national policy have been
stronger and more systematic than national efforts in the opposite direction,
revealing an asymmetry of vertical linkages. Top-down and bottom-up pathways of
influence differ in terms of intentionality, the instruments employed, and the impact
achieved.
The governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions have taken a stronger
interest in advancing synergies in national implementation than MEA lead agencies
in supporting further integration in the biodiversity cluster. With the exception of the
- 159 -
Governing Body of the ITPGRFA, all the governing bodies have adopted decisions
requiring their parties to improve co-ordination in the implementation of the CBD
and other biodiversity-related MEAs (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In contrast, national
delegations of LAC countries are not usually mandated to support inter-treaty co-
operation. In many cases, internal preparations for biodiversity-related meetings
are participatory exercises where the focal points of different conventions partake.
However, the central aim of these consultations is to reach intra- and inter-sectoral
agreement on a national position, rather than to create synergy between different
regime processes.
At an instrumental level, global governance has made better use of potential
avenues of influence on domestic policy as compared with national efforts to affect
international policy. Not only have norms and discourses been developed to induce
countries to create synergies in the national implementation of biodiversity-related
MEAs, but also, assistance has been offered to that purpose. Capacity-building
certainly remains under-developed: regional workshops do not usually address
national-level synergies between biodiversity-related conventions, technical
instruments such as the TEMATEA issue-based modules have not been widely
tested, and harmonised reporting has progressed slowly. In some cases, global
influence (e.g. through the GEF) has only been collateral and not the result of a
deliberate strategy to improve coherence in the implementation of the conventions
of the biodiversity cluster. Nevertheless, recent co-operative agreements show an
increased emphasis on advancing national-level synergies (Caddell, 2011).
The situation is different when bottom-up linkages are examined. With few
exceptions, LAC countries have not seized opportunities to influence national
governance, for example, by co-ordinating national positions across biodiversity-
related venues, tabling proposals for inter-treaty co-operation, and/or coalescing
with other countries in support of increased synergy between conventions.
Synergies may be implicit in national positions that are the result of internal co-
ordination among different agencies, departments and/or ministries. But they
remain obscure in the absence of an active stance to promote inter-treaty co-
operation.
Global influence on national implementation has been more significant than
national influence on international policy. Influence is difficult to measure, but can
be, at least, estimated from the empirical evidence. Global governance has shaped
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the direction of domestic synergies mostly through direct access to domestic policy-
making. Various interviewees in LAC countries acknowledged the support received,
although many of them also considered that international assistance remains
insufficient. The influence of national governance on the cohesiveness of the
biodiversity cluster is less visible. Presumably, countries which have supported
inter-treaty co-operation have achieved some impact. One of the international
experts interviewed, for instance, acknowledged that Mexico was one of the few
countries which has pursued a co-ordinated approach of CBD and CITES agendas
(Interviewee NG5). Most countries, however, have a discrete, and even negligible,
influence on the coherence of global governance, deriving mainly from national
positions agreed through participatory processes in which the focal points of
different conventions are involved (which should enable consistent, but not
necessarily coherent, national positions). It was a common opinion among the
treaty secretariat officials and international experts participating in this research
that countries (in general) have not done enough to improve synergies between
biodiversity-related conventions.
The asymmetry of vertical linkages does little to solve the gap between global and
national governance. Global efforts to support national implementation cannot
achieve substantial impact in the absence of clear guidance from national focal
points and implementing agencies. A stronger involvement of state actors in
international biodiversity governance is important for both global and national
purposes: countries may seek to re-orient inter-treaty co-operation in a way that
supports implementation of international agendas in line with countries’ interests.
Correcting vertical asymmetries is a necessary condition for improved co-evolution
of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems.
Referring back to the literature, interesting observations can be made. Starting with
the pathways of global influence on domestic policy, findings call into question the
effectiveness of international norms and discourses vis-à-vis other pathways.
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) warn against comparisons because, in practice, it is
the interaction of different governance mechanisms that creates collective
influence. However, international organisations still need to consider whether some
mechanisms employed to shape national governance are more successful than
others. This study found that international governance has affected the national co-
ordination of biodiversity-related MEAs through direct access to domestic policy-
making but not clearly through international norms and discourses (how much
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influence it has exerted is a different point). A previous study examining drivers of
environmental mainstreaming at the national level delivered similar conclusions:
donor conditions and initiatives are one of the major drivers of EPI, while
international commitments are only moderately important (see Dalal-Clayton and
Bass, 2009). Norms and discourses promoting synergy in the implementation of the
elemental regimes of a complex may not resonate in national arenas because
regime complexes are not formal institutions that countries have committed to
support.
National co-ordination is deemed essential for enhanced inter-treaty co-operation.
Schermers and Blokker (2011) suggest that synergies in international governance
improve when states conduct a consistent policy across overlapping venues.
According to them, a consistent national policy can be achieved when the same
individuals represent a state in various organisations; when ministries of foreign
affairs and/or inter-departmental committees ensure internal co-ordination ahead of
international meetings; and/or through special co-ordination offices and/or
permanent missions that maintain contact with different organisations and can
identify issues where co-ordination is needed. Internal co-ordination meetings in
preparation for biodiversity conferences are common practice in LAC countries. It is
nonetheless questionable whether these inter-liaison processes contribute to
enhancing synergy between international organisations (other than by ensuring
policy consistency). Not many LAC countries are active supporters of inter-treaty
co-operation or co-ordinate their national positions to advance common goals in
interrelated venues. Inter-departmental meetings seek to create consensus
towards a national position rather than develop inter-linkages between inter-
connected regimes. Such consensus is important to ensure that the activities of
international organisations are compatible (i.e., not conflicting) but is not enough to
make those activities complementary (i.e., mutually reinforcing).
The co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence requires open lines of
communication between governance levels to enable loose coupling. Linkages
between governance levels may be symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on
whether or not influence runs back and forth between institutions (Young, 2002).
Regime interplay studies reveal that when institutional linkages are symmetrical,
positive feedback loops emerge (e.g. Wettestad, 2009; Coffey, 2006; Skjærseth,
2006). In the biodiversity cluster, vertical influence has mainly travelled in one
direction (from the global to the national level). This should come as no surprise
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considering that inter-treaty co-operation in the biodiversity cluster is more
advanced than co-operation between national focal points at the country level.
There nonetheless remains the question of why global attempts to shape domestic
policy have not prompted national responses in the opposite direction. Some would
find an explanation in the uncompleted turn of the biodiversity cluster from an
environmental complex to a sustainable development complex, discouraging
participation from developing countries which tend to conceive of IEG within a
broader sustainable development agenda (see Najam, 2005). The empirical
evidence of this study, however, does not suggest that LAC countries fail to engage
in international biodiversity governance due to its environmental focus.
The development of feedback loops between governance levels seems to be
associated with the ability of one institution to exert, rather than merely attempt to
exert, influence upon another. Wettestad (2009) demonstrates that the UNFCCC’s
Kyoto Protocol was a major driver of the creation of the EU’s emissions trading
system (ETS), whereas the ETS has served as a model for a global carbon market
under the UNFCCC. Furthermore, as the ETS became operational, the Kyoto
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)
projects became one option and strategy for achieving ETS compliance; the ETS,
in turn, has led to a more rapid development of CDM and JI projects. Skjærseth
(2006) similarly showed that the soft law declarations adopted by the International
North Sea Conferences (INSC) facilitated decision-making and strengthened
legally binding norms under the OSPAR Commission (which administers the Oslo
and Paris Conventions for the protection of the marine environment of the North-
East Atlantic) and the EU. At the same time, the OSPAR Commission and,
particularly the EU, enabled implementation of the INSC declarations. These
feedback loops do not appear to be associated with specific types of interplay. In
some cases, mutual reinforcement is based on normative interplay (as in the North
Sea case); while in others it involves more cognitive and utilitarian forms (as the
relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and the ETS reveals).
Based on the studies above, a claim can be made that if global attempts to
influence domestic co-ordination of biodiversity-related conventions have not
prompted strong national responses, it is because global influence, which has
come mostly though cognitive and utilitarian pathways, has not been significant.
This relates to the fact that co-operation in the biodiversity cluster in the recent past
did not have a strong focus on improving synergy at the national level (Caddell,
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2011), which raises questions about its value. These assertions, however, should
be taken cautiously, as this research did not attempt to measure the degree to
which global governance has influenced domestic policy.
5.4 Concluding remarks
The previous chapter showed that horizontal linkages in regime complexes and
national implementation systems display commonalities (first objective of this
research). This chapter moved on to examine vertical linkages between them
(second research objective). Vertical linkages may or may not be symmetrical, i.e.,
influence may travel back and forth between governance levels or flow essentially
in one direction (Young, 2002). Symmetry is needed for positive feedback loops to
emerge (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2012). The co-evolution framework presented in
Chapter 2 introduced two models to examine the vertical transfer of influence: the
first, developed by Bernstein and Cashore (2012) identifies four pathways of global
influence on domestic policy (rules, norms and discourses, markets, and direct
access to domestic-policy making); the second, based on Goodwin (2013),
explores how domestic policy influences global governance as countries prepare
for and participate in international meetings (associated with foreign policy-making
and public diplomacy, respectively). The present chapter applied these models to
examine the strength and symmetry of vertical linkages between the biodiversity
cluster and national implementation systems in LAC.
Cross-level inter-connections appeared to be weak. International agencies and
treaty secretariats in the biodiversity cluster have promoted synergies in national
implementation through norms and discourses, as well as through direct access to
domestic policy-making. Influence through norms and discourses was expected to
be marginal because countries would not normally feel compelled to adapt national
implementation systems to the requirements of institutions (regime complexes) that
were not deliberately established to govern biodiversity policy arenas. Indeed,
global influence is most visible through the direct access pathway, associated with
modes of governing through enabling and by provision on which most international
organisations rely to instil domestic policy change (Kern and Alber, 2008). There
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was nonetheless broad agreement among the treaty secretariat officials, national
experts and national focal points interviewed that international assistance has been
insufficient. At the national level, foreign policy-making is typically a participatory
exercise of intra- and inter-sectoral co-ordination. Inter-agency co-ordination
ensures that national positions upheld in overlapping fora are consistent
(Schermers and Blokker, 2011). Few countries, however, have gone forwards to
co-ordinate national positions or advance proposals for improved inter-treaty co-
operation. This generally reflects (or might indeed be the cause of) the low
development of synergies on the ground.
Vertical channels of communication between the biodiversity cluster and national
implementation systems in LAC are not only weakly developed. Influence has run
essentially from the global to the national level making vertical linkages
asymmetrical. Most of the national focal points interviewed acknowledged the
assistance received (whether it has been insufficient is a different question). In
contrast, the international experts and treaty secretariat officials interviewed
coincided in the opinion that countries (in general) have not made serious efforts to
improve synergies between/among conventions. The biodiversity cluster and
national implementation systems in LAC are loosely coupled through global
pathways of influence of the direct access type. Direct access to domestic policy-
making has not triggered policy responses from state actors that feed back upon
the further development of inter-treaty co-operation processes. Low levels of
responsiveness were associated with the (presumable) lack of impact of activities
associated with direct access to domestic policy-making. This situation reveals
fundamental problems of institutional interaction because, as Gehring and Oberthür
(2006a) notice, two institutions can only interact when one of them exerts influence
upon the other.
If co-evolution in areas of regime overlap is occurring but is being defective, ways
need to be found to steer cross-level interactions as opposed to integrate
interacting institutions through top-down or bottom-up approaches. Management
interventions need to consider why policy integration processes (policy coherence
outputs) in regime complexes (national implementation) are not developing to the
point where they can successfully influence policy coherence outputs (policy
integration processes) in national implementation (regime complexes). Equally
important is to determine what affects the development of positive feedback loops
between regime complexes and national implementation systems. Determinants of
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horizontal and vertical linkages in conditions of international regime complexity are
the focus of the next chapter.
6 The biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems
in LAC: Factors affecting co-evolution
In this chapter, intervening factors in the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and
national implementation systems are explored. Previous chapters noticed an
evolution gap between global and national governance, and under-developed and
asymmetrical vertical linkages. Identifying the horizontal and vertical factors
preventing more cohesive evolutions is important to design both focalised and
system-wide responses to improve coherent governance. The assessment
presented in this chapter is conducive to the third research objective and
constitutes the final step in the analysis of the co-evolution of regime complexes
and policy coherence as per the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2.
The chapter first examines the challenges arising from the separation of global and
national governance systems. It does so by exploring and comparing problems of
horizontal integration and horizontal coherence in the biodiversity cluster and at the
level of national implementation, respectively. The chapter then explores the
barriers preventing a stronger and more symmetrical coupling of governance
systems than has hitherto been the case. Interviews with treaty secretariat officials,
international experts and national focal points provide relevant empirical evidence
for the analysis undertaken in these two sections. The chapter next summarises
the factors affecting the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national
implementation systems, and discusses possible management interventions.
Concluding remarks close this chapter.
6.1 Determinants of horizontal change
When regime complexes and policy coherence co-evolve, changes at one level
trigger adjustments at the other. This section looks into the factors that affect
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horizontal change. These are divided into three categories as per the co-evolution
framework of Chapter 2: institutional and organisational; political; and executive
and cognitive. Comparisons between intervening factors at global and national
levels are made.
6.1.1 Institutional and organisational factors
6.1.1.1 A core institution amid autonomous institutional arrangements
At an institutional level, the biodiversity cluster displays properties of co-operative
fragmentation. According to Biermann et al. (2009b), co-operative fragmentation is
characterised by loose integration under a core institution, non-conflicting norms,
and overlapping constituencies, with some major players outside the core institution
but supporting co-operation (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.1.1). As discussed next,
these three characteristics are observed in the biodiversity cluster and affect
horizontal integration in different ways.
Over the years, the biodiversity cluster has undergone a process of “CBD-ification”
or integration under the CBD as the framework convention (Caddell, 2011). This
process has evolved naturally because any action undertaken in the context of the
non-CBD conventions contributes to the objectives of the CBD (Interviewee NG4).
Minor unilateral adaptations can strengthen that synergy. As described by a treaty
secretariat official, “we can slot some of our work under different objectives and
recommended activities of the CBD. We are not necessarily doing anything
different, but what we are doing is that we are able to demonstrate that some
specific actions… are being implemented under a particular CBD programme”.
Rosendal (2001a) suggests that rules and norms in the biodiversity cluster are
compatible, but others have noticed internal tensions between “anthropocentric and
ecocentric principles, conservationist and preservationist norms, ecosystemic and
species-specific rules, as well as voting and consensus-seeking procedures” (Morin
and Orsini, 2013a, p.42). These tensions have not translated into conflict, but have
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posed problems to inter-treaty co-operation. According to one interviewee, some of
the non-CBD conventions “have not been very comfortable about liaising with the
CBD and its broad, abstract concepts and themes which are not as concrete as, for
example, designation of wetlands or selection of species requiring protection”
(Interviewee OT1). In the view of another participant, “it is not so easy to directly
relate the site-based work or the species-based work carried out by the non-CBD
conventions to the higher policy discussions taking place within the CBD”
(Interviewee TS3). A third interviewee observed, for instance, that “CMS delivers
ground-level conservation for specific targeted species and habitats; it is
sometimes tricky to link this up to the broader goals and policies of the CBD”.
Within the WHC, the CBD is seen as “a general policy convention” and therefore “it
is very difficult to relate immediately what is decided there” to the management of
World Heritage sites. One participant noticed the “cultural differences” affecting co-
operation between CITES and the CBD: CITES has strong compliance provisions,
negotiations address very practical aspects of implementation, and contentious
elements of draft decisions are put to the vote; conversely, the CBD has soft
compliance mechanisms, negotiations involve arduous policy discussions, and
rules of procedure privilege consensual decision-making.
Differences in institutional design prevent the non-CBD conventions from being
subsumed by the CBD. Referring to the linkages between the CBD and CITES, one
participant observed that “it is not so easy for the CBD to insert itself into the work
of CITES because CITES is a trade treaty based on a permit-certificate system
which is very self-standing”.
The non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions appear to find it technically easier to
co-operate with other non-CBD conventions than with the CBD. Some interviewees
noted the close co-operation between CITES and CMS, which rests on the similar
species-based structure of the conventions and the same emphasis on practical,
on-the-ground action (Interviewees TS2, NG5). Collaborative efforts have delivered
important conservation outcomes, most notably, the recovery of Saiga Antelope
populations in Eurasia. According to one interviewee, the WHC has also worked
closely with other non-CBD biodiversity-related conventions: in the framework of
the BLG, co-operation with other non-CBD conventions has advanced more
significantly than co-operation with the CBD.
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Memberships and constituencies of the elemental regimes of the biodiversity
cluster are not entirely coincident. State accession to the biodiversity-related
conventions has progressed differently over the years and, to date, “the
biodiversity-related conventions are not an equal set of overlapping member
nations” (Interviewee OT2). Advancing the CBD-ification process in the biodiversity
cluster would face opposition from states that are not parties to the CBD, most
notably, the United States, which has always been antagonistic towards that
convention (ibid.). The biodiversity-related conventions also have their own
constituencies (Interviewee IG1). Meetings of the Ramsar Convention and the three
conventions hosted by UNEP are normally attended by representatives of
environmental ministries, whereas WHC and ITPGRFA meetings have
representation from educational/cultural and agricultural ministries, respectively.
Inter-ministerial dialogue and co-operation, where it occurs, is often not reflected in
international negotiations. In addition, the conventions are supported by specific
sets of NGOs which can influence the way in which one convention links to
another. A number of conservationist NGOs participating in CITES meetings, for
instance, have opposed initiatives to insert the CBD’s sustainability principles into
CITES’ processes (Interviewee NG5). Political constituencies sometimes perceive
linkage initiatives as threatening their own existence (von Moltke, 2001a).
From an organisational perspective, horizontal integration in the biodiversity cluster
faces similar challenges to those encountered in other settings of MEA interplay
(see Oberthür, 2002; von Moltke, 2001b; Briseño, 1999): the conventions are
administered by different agencies and operate according to their own
organisational elements and functions. As some participants noted, the biodiversity-
related conventions have evolved independently of each other and, as a result,
their processes and operations cannot be easily streamlined or harmonised
(Interviewees IG2, NG11). A clustering process akin to that launched by the
chemicals and hazardous waste-related conventions seems unrealistic.
Streamlining international bureaucracies would be an uphill task. Administrative
consolidation within the chemicals cluster has been achieved through UNEP, which
hosts the secretariats of its three elemental regimes (Interviewee TS7). In the case
of the biodiversity-related conventions, only three of them are administered by
UNEP, and there are suspicions that UNEP would seek to position itself as the co-
ordinator of an institutional cluster of biodiversity-related conventions to strengthen
its power and authority in IEG (Interviewees TS2, NG10). Moreover, the
secretariats of the chemicals-related conventions are based in the same building in
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Geneva, Switzerland; whereas the secretariats of the biodiversity-related
conventions are geographically dispersed (Interviewees TS5, TS7, IG6, OT1). Re-
location to a common site would be resisted by both the host countries, which
would lose a source of income, and the secretariats themselves, which would lose
some independence (Interviewee IG4). Cohabitation is nonetheless important to
advance synergy, as experiences in the national implementation of biodiversity-
related MEAs reveal (see section 6.1.1.2 below).
6.1.1.2 Implementation arrangements organised according to a sectoral
logic
Institutional tensions also affect the management of biodiversity-related
conventions at the national level. However, while in the biodiversity cluster those
tensions emerge between the CBD and the specialist regimes, in domestic settings
they arise when attempts are made to create synergies between the CBD and
biodiversity-related agreements overseen by non-environmental ministries. In
Colombia and Panama, there have been frictions between CBD and ITPGRFA
focal points over matters concerning ABS. In Panama, for example, conflicts stem
from determining whether the use of genetic resources involves food security (the
ITPGRFA’s sphere of competence) or bio-prospecting (falling under the CBD’s
remit). Costa Rican interviewees acknowledged the need for an improved
conceptualisation of ABS issues with a view to harmonising sectoral approaches in
the environment and agriculture ministries (housing the technical focal points of the
CBD and the ITPGRFA). Such problems of cross-sectoral co-ordination usually
arise in political systems which suffer from institutional fragmentation (Jordan and
Lenschow, 2010).
The organisational structures of the conventions of the biodiversity cluster remain
independent, and so do national implementation arrangements (see Chapter 4,
Section 4.2.2). However, when conventions are administered within the
environmental sector, overlaps of, and regular interactions between, biodiversity
focal points create favourable conditions for synergy (see Masundire, 2006). If
different sectors are involved, ministries of foreign affairs can intervene to ensure
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political (although not necessarily technical) co-ordination (see Schermes and
Blokker, 2011).
It has been noticed that co-location of MEA focal points under the same roof
enables regular dialogue and communication (Van Toen, 2001). Interviews suggest
that synergies in the implementation of the CBD and the biodiversity-related
conventions which have representation in environmental agencies and ministries
(typically the Ramsar Convention, the CMS and CITES) arise naturally in day-to-
day work. Various interviewees reported that national focal points to the CBD and
other MEAs are co-located in the same agency/ministry. The Peruvian Ministry of
Environment (MINAM) hosts the technical focal points of the CBD and several other
environmental agreements. The Costa Rican SINAC is reported to have eight
MEAs under its purview. In Ecuador, Panama and Jamaica, a number of MEAs are
administered by environmental ministries and some focal points are even based in
the same department. Indeed, cases where focal points are in the same
department or administrative unit are recurrent. In Cuba, all the conventions but the
WHC are within the scope of responsibilities of one division within the Ministry of
Science, Technology and Environment (CITMA). Similar arrangements are reported
in Argentina, Bolivia and Honduras.
Interviewees acknowledged that existing arrangements enable co-ordinated work.
A Jamaican interviewee noticed that synergy between implementation processes
occurs because “national focal points are in regular contact and know what each
other is doing”. In Ecuador, spatial proximity facilitates the exchange of information
and experiences as well as the development of joint activities (Ecuadorian
Interviewee B). A Cuban CBD official considered that co-location under the same
administrative unit allows “continuity in work and coherence in implementation”.
Similarly, a Bolivian participant observed that, to the extent that MEA focal points
converge in the same department, “there could not be lack of co-ordination and
synergy in the work plans for the different conventions”. In Mexico, CONABIO’s
jurisdiction over technical aspects of the implementation of the CBD and CITES
has enabled the Mexican government to achieve high consistency in the positions it
defends in CBD and CITES fora (Mexican Interviewee A).
Improving synergy between MEA implementation activities becomes more difficult
when technical focal points pertain to ministries/agencies from different policy
fields. Most of the CBD focal points interviewed did not report close interaction with
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their WHC and ITPGRFA counterparts. As mentioned earlier, experiences in
Colombia and Panama reveal that cross-sectoral interplay between CBD and
ITPGRFA focal points can, at times, be conflictive due to broader institutional
issues.
Unlike in the biodiversity cluster, where decentralised co-ordination prevails, some
countries have made attempts to co-ordinate the implementation of MEAs through
inter-sectoral environment committees and smaller MEA co-ordination offices (see
Chapter 4, section 4.2.3). More generally, it is common practice for ministries of
foreign affairs facilitate administrative coherence. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, acting as the political focal point to a number of biodiversity-related
conventions, provides political co-ordination and guidance. In Colombia, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has mediated between the environment and agriculture
ministries to reconcile ABS approaches and present consensual positions in
international biodiversity fora. In a similar fashion, the Ecuadorian ministries of
environment and foreign affairs have established co-ordination to achieve
consistency in national positions. As has been noticed elsewhere, ministries of
foreign affairs exercise leadership in questions of general policy, but not in more
technical matters arising in implementation on the ground (Schermers and Blokker,
2011).
The previous two sections reveal a substantive difference in the institutional and
organisational challenges arising in global and national efforts to improve synergies
between biodiversity-related conventions. At the international level, organisational
barriers are more significant than institutional conflicts, whereas at the national
level the correlation is reversed. Within the biodiversity cluster, differences in
institutional design pose obstacles to co-operation, but the CBD stands firm at the
core, enabling some institutional cohesiveness. Greater fragmentation is observed
when the attention shifts towards the existing organisational arrangements. In
domestic arenas, one lead agency usually administers the MEAs of the biodiversity
cluster ascribed to the environment sector (the CBD, the Ramsar Convention,
CITES and CMS), ensuring unity of purpose. Problems of communication and co-
ordination emerge between those agencies and others with MEA-related
responsibilities in non-environment sectors due to incompatible institutional
frameworks. Synergy-related problems in domestic environments have thus deeper
institutional roots than those arising in international settings.
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6.1.2 Political factors
6.1.2.1 The CBD-ification of institutional relationships and the role of
international bureaucracies
Governance in the biodiversity cluster is strongly shaped by organisational and
individual politics. Organisational politics are approached here in light of Abbott et
al.’s (2013, 2012) framework for exploring the strategies and growth rates of
organisations in conditions of institutional proliferation (see Chapter 2, Section
2.3.3.1.2). Relationships between the conventions of the biodiversity cluster are
characterised by discord rather than harmony. Discord, however, has not
developed into conflict, but has been managed through organisational strategies of
mutual adjustment. Mutual adjustment has been asymmetrical due to power
disparities between the framework and the specialist conventions. Individual politics
acquire visibility in the personality conflicts between heads of agency, partly
counterweighted by the more professional working relationships between
programme officials.
Distrust in the biodiversity cluster has both a substantive and an organisational
component (see Abbott et al., 2013, 2012). On a substantive level, tensions derive
from the CBD’s position as the core institution of the biodiversity cluster. Clashes
occur because the CBD “addresses all of the issues that form the mandate of the
other conventions such that someone could ask ‘why do even we need these other
conventions?’” (Interviewee OT2). In the opinion of one interviewee, the CBD’s far-
reaching mandate allows the CBD’s Parties to take action in areas which fall under
the strict jurisdiction of other biodiversity-related conventions: the CBD’s Parties
may ultimately delimit the CBD’s mandate “as broadly or narrowly as they wish.
This is not always driven by a logical rationality, but is contingent upon the interests
of the Contracting Parties at any point in time” (Interviewee TS8).
In the view of one interviewee, the CBD sometimes “sees itself as the ‘big brother’
or the umbrella convention”, whereas the other conventions are keen to assert their
independence and individuality (Interviewee NG3). The CBD had originally been
envisaged as an umbrella convention (see McGraw, 2002), but that was not
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accepted by the other conventions (Interviewees IG2, IG4). Their reaction was then
hostile and protective as they perceived a threat to their autonomy (Interviewee
IG4). As a framework convention, the CBD is legally impeded from absorbing the
other conventions, but the latter sometimes perceive that the CBD takes advantage
of its leadership role to impose something on them (Interviewee OT1). As one
interviewee observed, there is “a feeling of mandate creep, i.e., that the CBD is
steamrollering through their territory and telling them what they should do”.
Discord also involves other more organisational aspects. Turf battles and
competition for resources and attention are common (Interviewees TS5, TS8,
OT2). The conventions “do not always want to share their power or money”
(Interviewee TS5) and the need to achieve individual success undermines co-
operation (Interviewee NG6). Andresen and Rosendal (2009) had previously
noticed distrust between the secretariats of the CBD and the other conventions of
the biodiversity cluster.
The CBD enjoys the largest funding in the cluster and its ever-growing work
creates a constant demand for further resources (Interviewee OT2). The other
conventions “are looking at this in a rather apprehensive way. They think: ‘If all this
effort is going into the CBD, how can we make sure that we are going to continue
to get our fair share of the cake?’” (ibid.). The non-CBD conventions “tend to feel a
bit underprivileged” and “there is some jealousy of the CBD and the attention it
gets” as the framework convention (Interviewee NG2). One treaty secretariat
official, for instance, bemoaned that the CBD has much more funding and capacity
than the other conventions despite it being more focussed on strategy than on on-
the-ground action (Interviewee TS6).
For some interviewees, existing tensions do not entail major problems in schemes
of co-operation (Interviewees IG2, IG3). One interviewee even suggested that the
relationship between the CBD and the other biodiversity-related conventions is
more amenable and harmonious than in the past (Interviewee IG4). CBD’s
leadership has not necessarily resulted in mandate creep. The CBD has on many
occasions taken the initiative to address emerging issues affecting biodiversity and,
in doing so, it “may unintentionally step into the field of competence of other
conventions” (Interviewee IG5). Nevertheless, the CBD eventually defers those
issues to the competent institutions (ibid.).
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Tensions have been managed through adverse asymmetric adjustment. This
occurs when organisations with disparate power adjust their rules and policies to
manage discord, with the weaker organisations making more extensive changes
and bearing greater adjustment costs (Abbott et al., 2013, 2012). The centrality and
authority of the CBD as the framework convention on biodiversity places it in a
position of dominance in the biodiversity cluster. Gradual alignment under the CBD
is visible (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1), but has not occurred through symmetric
adjustments.
BLG processes illustrate the tensions arising in the CBD-ification process. In its
early days, the BLG was criticised for being a forum to discuss items of the CBD’s
agenda and not issues of common interest across the conventions (Interviewees
TS2, TS7). BLG meetings would witness absence or low-profile representation
from some secretariats as “there was the assumption that the BLG was going to
address CBD-related issues and that was a waste of time” (Interviewee TS7). Input
from some interviewees suggests that some friction remains. There prevails an
impression that the BLG is the CBD’s instrument and that the BLG forum is not a
meeting of equals (Interviewees TS1, TS3). The secretariats of the non-CBD
conventions “feel that quite often they are just being asked to participate in
something which the CBD has already pre-cooked” (Interviewee TS1).
Corning (1998) notices that synergies can have eufunctional and dysfunctional
effects for the elements in interaction. A CBD Secretariat official acknowledged that
the CBD has managed to advance its goals into the agendas of other conventions
“in a way that has generated a little bit of tension” and not through “a truly
synergistic process”. Indeed, the CBD has not always been “a good listener to
other voices” (ibid.). The preparation of the new modus operandi of the BLG,
adopted at the second retreat of the group (Geneva, 4 September 2011),
exemplifies this. The CBD Secretariat circulated a two-page draft modus operandi
to other BLG members in advance of the meeting. During the discussion process,
the document expanded to almost five pages. Most of the content encompassed
comments by BLG members emphasising issues relevant to their own conventions
(ibid.). Eventually, the modus operandi agreed at the meeting was very close to the
draft that was initially circulated (ibid.). Representatives of the non-CBD
conventions “left the meeting saying: ‘ok, we have got a modus operandi but we
wish the process had been a little bit more participatory’” (ibid.).
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The non-CBD conventions are making efforts to ensure more symmetrical
adjustments in the biodiversity cluster. Recent attempts to access GEF funds (see
CBD Doc BLG 2013-2) demonstrate their interest “to position themselves alongside
the CBD as opposed to underneath it” (Interviewee NG11). In the context of the
implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, they are also
seeking to ensure that they all “have a minimum of capacity in terms of human and
financial resources so that they are able to contribute to the implementation of the
Plan” (Interviewee TS6).
Mutual adjustment remains a preferred strategy for managing discord. In contrast,
a hypothetical clustering process, modelled after experiences in the chemicals
sector, would be opposed both by the CBD and the non-CBD conventions amid
fears of losing their relative advantages. The CBD would refuse to be institutionally
integrated with conventions with less political visibility and influence. According to
one research participant, if a clustering process places the biodiversity-related
conventions at the same level, that “will either demote the CBD and make it less
able to fulfil its ambitions mandate, or over-promote the other conventions, which
have quite strict, tightly-focused mandates”. Within the group of non-CBD
conventions, fears might arise that institutional integration with the CBD could
weaken their mechanisms for implementation review and compliance, which tend to
be more detailed and effective than those of the CBD (Interviewees TS3, NG5). As
mentioned in section 6.1.1.1, some conservationist NGOs attending CITES
meetings are against the insertion of CBD’s principles into CITES’ programmes of
work. According to one interviewee, “they see the CBD as touchy-feely (‘do
whatever you want and do not do whatever you do not want’). They see it as a
weak convention that has no teeth. They are basically afraid that CITES’ provisions
could be watered down if there were more co-operation with the CBD” (Interviewee
NG5). Such opinions are shared by some CITES’ Parties, most notably the United
States (ibid.).
Individual action strongly determines the quality of inter-treaty co-operation. In the
biodiversity cluster, high-ranking and programme officials of executive agencies
play important roles in co-operative activities. Interviewees noticed that “this is a
very personality-rich environment” (Interviewee OT2), and “at the end of the day it
is individuals who determine how well the conventions and secretariats work
together” (Interviewee TS8). Until recently, there was an “enormous personality
conflict between the heads of the secretariats themselves and certainly between
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some of the heads of the secretariats and the head of UNEP” (Interviewee OT2).
Those conflicts impinged upon synergy processes. For instance, personality issues
between the two former Executive Secretaries of the CBD and the former head of
the CITES Secretariat contributed to the relatively low levels of co-operation
between the two conventions (Interviewee NG5). Conversely, recent efforts within
CITES fora to strengthen synergy with the CBD have been partially driven and
facilitated by the appointment of a new CITES Secretary-General in 2010. Coming
from a UNEP background, the new CITES Secretary-General “has a real desire to
work better with other MEAs” (Interviewee NG1) and has a particular interest in
improving co-operation with the CBD in the expectation that this would allow CITES
Parties to access GEF funding (Interviewee NG5). Leadership can make a
difference in how treaty secretariats influence regime interplay. Jinnah (2010), for
instance, observed that the charismatic leadership of Ahmed Djoghlaf, former
CBD’s Executive Secretary, played a critical role in the CBD Secretariat’s
marketing campaign to reframe the biodiversity-climate change linkage in a way
that portrays biodiversity conservation as a climate change adaptation strategy,
making it more attractive to biodiversity rich countries.
Working relationships between programme officials tend to be more harmonious
than those between heads of agency. Tensions between the former CBD’s
Executive Secretary and UNEP’s current Executive Director, for example, have not
been replicated at the staff level. One interviewee highlighted the close partnership
between the CBD Secretariat and the UNEP’s Pan-European Biological and
Landscape Diversity Strategy (PEBLDS) on the implementation of national
biodiversity strategies in the Pan-European region. Those strategies are
considered a key instrument for synergising implementation of the biodiversity-
related conventions. In the same vein, one interviewee noticed that the good
relationships between staff members of the CBD and the ITPGRFA Secretariats
have enabled high levels of collaboration between the two treaties.
State actors have so far had limited involvement in inter-treaty co-operation. One
interviewee suggested that BLG meetings should be mirrored by regular meetings
of the heads of the bureaux of the conventions to raise the political profile of co-
operation and synergy in the biodiversity cluster (Interviewee OT2). Political actors
should provide leadership and set the tone of BLG meetings (ibid.). In the same
vein, a treaty secretariat official acknowledged that “we would like the parties to be
more engaged with the BLG to move things forward. Ultimately, the process of
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improving synergies and coherence needs to be party-driven”. Scholars have
already noticed that the effectiveness of the BLG is undermined by the lack of
involvement of member states of the conventions (Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010).
6.1.2.2 Diverse political contexts and the role of national focal points in
national implementation
The organisational and individual politics involved in the co-ordination of
biodiversity-related conventions at the national level are different from those
shaping global governance in the biodiversity cluster. Synergies in national
implementation do not appear to be shaped by the politics of CBD-ification nor do
they seem to receive high-level support. Internal political contexts make synergies
contingent upon policy priorities, administrative changes, and individual
commitment.
There are not yet visible CBD-ification processes at the national level, although the
importance of the CBD as framework convention on biodiversity is recognised. In
Bolivia, the CBD takes priority over other biodiversity-related conventions
administered within the environment sector. This might be because the funds
available for CBD implementation and the CBD meetings which parties are
expected to attend are higher in comparison with other biodiversity-related
agreements (Bolivian Interviewee). The different importance attached to the
conventions is reflected in the action plans of the Bolivian ministry of environment
(ibid.). In other countries, hierarchies between the CBD and other biodiversity-
related conventions ascribed to the environment sector may be implicit in day-to-
day work, yet none of the CBD officials interviewed reported conflicts or
competition with other focal points based in environment ministries/agencies.
Frictions are more likely to arise in cross-sectoral interactions (see section 6.1.1.2),
where CBD focal points stand at the same level as (or even in a weaker position
than) the focal points for other biodiversity-related regimes.
Domestic politics affecting the management of biodiversity-related MEAs can be
considered from two different angles: 1) by examining the importance of co-
ordination within the biodiversity sector in relation to other co-ordination processes
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(within the environment sector and across sectors); and 2) by appraising the
resilience of co-ordination activities to changes of government.
Many interviewees (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Jamaica) observed
that co-ordination within the biodiversity sector is no less relevant than other intra-
and inter-institutional co-ordination processes. However, the very absence of
regulatory instruments for developing synergies in the implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions appears to suggest that the issue is either
sufficiently unimportant, or sufficiently intractable, for central administrations to
become involved (see Peters, 2013). The first assumption is plausible. Some CBD
officials perceived that creating synergies between biodiversity-related MEAs is
relatively uncomplicated (Colombian Interviewee) and/or that implementation
processes are reasonably well integrated (Mexican Interviewee B). Some also
believed that the focus should be on improving synergy with other Rio Conventions
(Brazilian Interviewee) and, more importantly, on mainstreaming biodiversity into
other sectors (Colombian, Costa Rican and Panamanian Interviewees). Improved
communication with other sectors would ultimately ensure that activities in non-
environmental policy fields are supportive of the objectives pursued by the
biodiversity-related conventions (Panamanian Interviewee).
In practice, concerns about streamlining implementation of the Rio Conventions
and/or inserting biodiversity into non-environmental institutions may override the
need to enhance synergy between biodiversity-related agreements. A CBD official
in Ecuador noticed that, while inter-linkages with other MEAs are not institutionally
hierarchized, some MEA interfaces may grow stronger in everyday implementation.
In Peru, the focal points to the Rio Conventions are in closer communication and
co-ordination than the focal points to the biodiversity-related conventions. This is
explained, at least in part, by the attention and funding which climate change
attracts within the environment sector (Peruvian Interviewee). GEF funds have
sometimes driven domestic efforts to synergise implementation of the Rio
Conventions (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3).
Changes of government have affected MEA inter-linkages in the region. Incoming
administrations often bring about staff changes in environment agencies and
ministries which affect the implementation of strategies designed to comply with
MEA commitments (Dominican Interviewee). A Peruvian CBD official observed that
the degree of collaboration between agencies involved in MEA implementation
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varies from one administration to another depending on the reforms introduced. In
Panama, changes of government usually have a negative impact on the continuity
of co-operative activities. When new environment authorities take office, they often
appoint MEA officials who are not acquainted with existing MEA liaison activities
(Panamanian Interviewee). Channels of communication between MEA focal points
become disrupted as a result. As has been noticed elsewhere (e.g. Boston, 1992),
problems of policy co-ordination are magnified during periods of rapid change.
As is the case within the biodiversity cluster, inter-personal relationships are factors
that influence the coherency of MEA implementation activities. The importance of
the individual in collaborative contexts has been highlighted in various public
management studies (see O’Leary and Vij, 2012). In Ecuador, synergies between
biodiversity-related conventions have been created at the initiative of MEA focal
points (Ecuadorian Interviewee A). Personal commitment and will make some MEA
interfaces developed further than others (ibid.). In Peru, MINAM officials who
worked at the now extinct National Environment Council have provided the
necessary experience and expertise to advance synergies among biodiversity-
related agreements.
In the view of a Peruvian interviewee, inter-personal relationships determine, to a
great extent, the quality of synergies among MEAs. Lack of communication
between MEA officials has thwarted synergy processes in the past (ibid.). An
Ecuadorian interviewee observed that friendly relations among MEA focal points
have facilitated the management of MEA inter-linkages. In Mexico, good levels of
collaboration between CBD officials at CONABIO and Ramsar officials at CONANP
have been possible because some CONANP officials previously worked at
CONABIO (Mexican Interviewee A).
Some interviewees acknowledged that closer communication between national
focal points can enhance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions. A
CBD official in Costa Rica noticed the need for improving personal dialogue in
order to achieve a better division of labour and greater complementarity of work. In
a similar way, a Colombian interviewee considered that increased co-operation and
mutual assistance among individuals and technical teams responsible for
overseeing implementation of different MEAs can improve MEA interfaces.
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Unlike global-level synergies, national co-ordination activities are pursued by
technical focal points with no direct involvement of high-ranking officials, making
the creation of synergies a relatively less politicised exercise. Nevertheless, the
absence of high-level support means that national co-ordination of MEAs often
lacks political commitment, which is considered an important factor in the
realisation of synergies between policies (Jordan and Lenschow, 2010).
There is a close relationship between institutional, organisational and political
factors affecting the management of biodiversity-related conventions, but this
relationship acquires distinct patterns at global and national levels. The politics of
CBD-ification in the biodiversity cluster emanate from evolving institutional
processes converging around the CBD. Conversely, national political contexts
strongly shape the way in which biodiversity-related MEAs are implemented. In the
first case, politics are the consequence of more coherent institutional processes,
whereas in the second case, politics determine the coherency of implementation
arrangements. As a result, domestic arenas offer a less stable environment to
advance synergies between biodiversity-related conventions than international
settings.
6.1.3 Cognitive and executive factors
6.1.3.1 Limited ownership of global targets and the international governance
dilemma
Global targets have become popular instruments for mobilising international and
national action (see White and Black, 2004; Jolly, 2003). They can thus be an
enabling factor in the alignment of horizontal and vertical agendas. The CBD
embraced this soft-law approach with the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target
(Harrop and Pritchard, 2011). The Target highlighted the urgency of addressing
global biodiversity loss, but it was, at the same time, a political call to advance the
CBD’s implementation. As this section shows, the 2010 Target was formally
supported by the conventions of the biodiversity cluster without bringing greater
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alignment under the CBD. Organisations in the biodiversity cluster have not been
immune to the international governance dilemma in which they face an increasing
number of tasks amid limited capacity (Eberlein and Newman, 2008; Keohane,
2001). Approached in the light of Ohiorhenuan and Wunker’s (1995) capacity
building framework (a framework originally developed in connection with national
capacity needs, as described in Chapter 2), capacity barriers to co-operation in the
biodiversity cluster involve human, organisational and physical aspects.
In the opinion of some research participants, the 2010 Biodiversity Target fostered
increased collaboration within the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions. One
interviewee remarked that “the 2010 Target made a very big impact on co-
operation” as it provided a common goal to work towards (Interviewee IG4).
Another interviewee similarly suggested that the 2010 Target “was a unifying
theme. It spurred much collaboration over the past 10 years. Without the 2010
Target there would still be Memoranda of Co-operation and Understanding, but I do
not think we would see the levels of co-operation that we have now” (Interviewee
IG2).
The 2010 Target made inroads into the strategic plans/programmes and policy
decisions of the non-CBD conventions (see Table 5.3). Some interviewees
considered, however, that the 2010 Target was supported on paper and through
public utterances, but real work to ensure that the Target would be achieved did not
occur. CITES’ Parties did not perceive the need to revise the operation of the
Convention in the light of the 2010 Target. The CBD’s framework of goals and sub-
targets to assess progress towards the Target (adopted at CBD CoP7 through
Decision VII/30) included one sub-target on wildlife trade “which was compatible
with CITES’ core work since 1973” (Interviewee NG5). “The convention could
therefore carry on pursuing its mandate as usual while contributing to the 2010
Target” (ibid.).
In the case of the WHC, a secretariat official suggested that the 2010 Target
allowed the convention to communicate and market its work as contributing to the
achievement of global biodiversity goals, enriching the panoply of arguments
offered to donors when seeking funding. The 2010 Target, however, did not affect
the way in which the convention was implemented. On-going work to protect
natural heritage was seen as contributing to the Target. Similarly, one interviewee
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suggested that, within the Ramsar Convention, endorsement of the 2010 Target did
not lead to decisions requiring changes in the operation of the convention.
The 2010 Target provided a common focus for all the biodiversity-related
conventions, but did not motivate changes in the modus operandi of the non-CBD
conventions that could lead to greater integration under the CBD. When the
governing bodies of the non-CBD conventions referred to the 2010 Target, they
were generally cautious not to frame it as the CBD’s target (see Table 5.3). That
framing carried an implicit commitment to support implementation of the CBD’s
Strategic Plan 2002-2010 and improve alignment with the CBD’s agenda.
Capacity constraints have limited the extent of co-operation. Human resources are
sometimes lacking, with the smaller secretariats finding it particularly challenging to
get involved. The World Heritage Centre is a case in point. An interviewee noticed
that there are “three to four people dealing with natural heritage” who have to
monitor over 200 sites. To the extent that most of the work of the World Heritage
Committee focusses on the inscription of sites on the World Heritage List and the
review of the conservation status of listed sites, monitoring activities become a
priority for the World Heritage Centre’s natural heritage section. As the same
participant mentioned, the Centre has limited capacity to participate in co-ordination
activities in the biodiversity cluster, and the issue of co-operation with other
biodiversity-related conventions cannot be tabled at every meeting of the World
Heritage Committee due to the latter’s overloaded agenda.
Indeed, co-operation has been increasingly affected by the enlargement of
institutional processes within the conventions and the consequent problems of
organisational management. Convention bodies and state parties are overwhelmed
with implementing the multiple decisions adopted by the governing bodies at their
regular meetings. Inter-institutional collaboration, mostly a responsibility of treaty
secretariats, has been undermined as a result. As one secretariat official described,
“all secretariats have already so much work to do within their own conventions that
the time that they can assign to additional co-ordination with other conventions is
relatively limited” (Interviewee TS3).
Time constraints have forced the secretariats to prioritise internal governance
processes over inter-institutional co-ordination initiatives (Interviewee IG3). Co-
operative activities represent a small fraction of the work carried out by treaty
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secretariats and their relevance might sometimes be overestimated. When co-
operation reports are prepared, secretariats try to “make the best possible picture
of something that has been relatively small” (Interviewee TS1). Opportunities for
collaboration were greater in the past “because we had not created so much
institutional machinery, and relationships and joint operations could happen almost
spontaneously without having to be fully negotiated, fully agreed, fully funded, etc.”
(ibid.).
Insufficient physical resources, notably funding, have also undermined synergy
processes. A treaty secretariat official said, for instance, that achieving greater
complementarity with the CBD demands financial resources which are not always
available.
6.1.3.2 Knowledge and capacity barriers to implementation
Cognitive and executive factors impinging upon the national management of
biodiversity-related conventions are similar, to some degree, to those shaping
global governance in the biodiversity cluster. Cross-cutting biodiversity policy goals
providing common ground across MEA programmes and activities cannot be easily
identified at the national level. Furthermore, the global 2010 Biodiversity Target had
little impact on national implementation (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). Problems of
capacity are possibly more acute than in the biodiversity cluster. Ohiorhenuan and
Wunker’s (1995) capacity building framework provides, again, a basis for
approaching the different dimensions of national capacity needs.
On a cognitive level, co-ordination in national implementation is affected not only by
the lack of inter-subjective frameworks of meaning supporting co-ordinated
approaches to implementation (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2), but also by a poor
understanding of the nature and operations of the conventions. An Ecuadorian
CBD official, for instance, noticed that an enhanced understanding of the
objectives, goals, programmes of work and funding mechanisms of biodiversity-
related MEAs is a pre-condition for advancing synergies between them.
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Human capacities to synergise implementation are sometimes missing. In Chile, a
number of MEAs are administered by the same institution and the same group of
officials. As these individuals are also burdened with other institutional tasks, they
cannot devote enough time and resources to MEA liaison activities (Chilean
Interviewee A). Similar difficulties are reported in Panama. According to one
interviewee, national focal points are very busy with their own work and fail to
notice how implementation activities under different MEAs can be made more
complementary.
Organisational barriers have also been noticed. A CBD official in Peru noticed that
the functions and tasks of MEA officials are not always well defined. Sometimes
there are no formal channels to address MEA interfaces (Dominican Interviewee).
Costa Rican interviewees highlighted the need for better platforms and networks for
improved communication and dialogue between MEA focal points. CBD officials
from Colombia and Honduras similarly stressed the importance of strengthening
co-ordination capacities. Honduras has identified a number of areas where
capacities have to be further developed, including in relation to management and
exchange of information; the use of instruments for planning, management,
assessment and monitoring of MEAs implementation; the design and operation of
joint projects; the preparation of national reports; and the replication of successful
synergy experiences (Honduran Interviewee).
Lack of financial resources is another impediment to enhancing synergies between
biodiversity-related conventions. A Costa Rican CBD official noticed that budgets in
the environment sector are low and synergies need to be worked upon in the
context of existing budget allocations. In Jamaica, both the government and
environmental NGOs face financial constraints to support an integrated
implementation of biodiversity-related MEAs (Jamaican Interviewee B). Limited
funding leads to a deficit in human and technical capacities (Jamaican Interviewee
A). Financial issues affecting synergies between MEAs were also reported by
Chilean, Cuban and Ecuadorian interviewees.
Synergies at global and national levels are affected by common cognitive and
executive problems. Frameworks of meaning enabling policy convergence have
gradually emerged at the international level, first through the 2010 Biodiversity
Target and, more recently, through the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020.
The 2010 Target, however, had limited impact as a management instrument,
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especially at the national level. Cognitive frameworks emanating from national
arenas have developed poorly. NBSAPs, in most cases, do not offer a clear
framework for the coherent implementation of biodiversity-related agreements (see
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2). The new Strategic Plan for Biodiversity, which should be
implemented through updated NBSAPs, promises greater alignment, but capacity
barriers create operational problems to improve synergies at both levels of
governance.
6.2 Determinants of vertical coupling
The governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions have called on parties
to improve co-ordination in their implementation (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Following
the adoption of the 2010 Biodiversity Target in 2002, synergies became a central
issue in the international biodiversity policy agenda. The 2010 Target was the
subject of ample discussion and collaboration within the BLG, but state actors did
not provide the same degree of support (see Chapters 5, Section 5.1.2). This can
be explained through the lens of Underdal’s (2000a, 2000b) Models II (domestic
politics) and III (social learning and policy diffusion) of his framework for studying
the formation of national positions and the implementation of international
agreements (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.3.2).
Problems of diffusion limited the impact of the 2010 Target in national arenas. CBD
officials in Ecuador, Panama and Peru reported inadequate communication of the
Target as a factor preventing strong national involvement. In Panama, the
institutions addressing activities relevant to the CBD’s implementation were
unaware of the Target. While they knew that some of their actions had collateral
benefits for biodiversity, they ignored that those actions contributed to the
achievement of an international goal (Panamanian Interviewee). CBD officials in
Mexico commented that the 2010 Target had low visibility even within the
environment sector, exerting limited influence on national agendas. In Peru,
domestic politics were at play: changes in public administration disrupted on-going
work in support of the 2010 Target (revealing problems of institutional memory).
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Under Underdal’s (2000a, 2000b) explanatory Model I (unitary rational actor), the
low development of synergies in policy-making and policy implementation activities
would be explained by the high costs involved relative to the potential benefits.
International assistance can help redress the balance between costs and benefits,
but, in the present case, it does not seem to have affected domestic policy-making
in significant ways (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Model II in Underdal’s framework
offers possible reasons for this.
Institutional capacity and political will, elements associated with domestic politics,
have both undermined global influence on domestic policy. Basic infrastructure is
sometimes lacking. A Honduran interviewee highlighted that there is no baseline for
assessing existing capacities to implement biodiversity-related MEAs and
measuring impact of capacity-building activities. Political barriers emanate from
issues of national sovereignty. A Bolivian CBD official recognised, for instance, that
treaty secretariats cannot have a more active intervention in domestic synergy
activities in the absence of express requests from state parties. Some countries
might -be wary of international assistance on the grounds that many capacity-
building efforts “have the goal of shaping Southern policies in the image of their
Northern precursors” (Sagar and VanDeveer, 2005, p.19). Indeed, some
interviewees’ views reveal a national ownership of MEA inter-linkage tasks. It was
noticed that countries have primary responsibility for ensuring a synergistic
implementation of biodiversity-related agreements (Costa Rican Interviewee A).
Lack of coherence prevents countries from meeting their commitments under
different conventions (Chilean Interviewee A). As an Argentinian interviewee
noticed, national co-ordination should be pursued regardless of specific requests
from governing bodies and access to international support. Path dependency limits
social learning. Sometimes, for example, the technical tools designed by global
experts appear incompatible with domestic working cultures (Mexican Interviewee
A). The rigidity of policy frames and professional commitments within an
organisation make it less receptive to alternative problem-solving approaches
advanced by epistemic communities (Peters, 2013).
Part of the blame for the limited impact of international assistance on national-level
synergies can also be apportioned to the suppliers. Donors supporting efforts to
build capacity in national implementation do not attach major importance to the
issue of synergies (Cuban Interviewee). Furthermore, implementing agencies
sometimes administer donor funds without providing clear direction (Guatemalan
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Interviewee). This relates to the Samaritan’s dilemma of helping under-resourced
countries regardless of how much effort they make to receive help (see Gibson et
al., 2005). Factors like these fall beyond the scope of Underdal’s models, which
tend to conceive of international governance as a form of governing by regulation
(whether through soft- or hard law), overlooking complementary forms of governing
through enabling or governing by provision (see Kern and Alber, 2008).
The available evidence is not extensive enough to make conclusive statements on
the factors affecting vertical channels of communication between the biodiversity
cluster and national implementation in LAC. Nevertheless, a claim can be made
that structural factors related to institutional capacity are constraining, but not
inhibiting, vertical coupling. Structure has a similar impact on horizontal integration
and coherence as section 6.1.1 shows. These observations suggest that if co-
evolution is strategically steered, coherent governance can be achieved without
radical changes in institutional architectures.
6.3 Factors affecting the co-evolution of global and national
governance: A synthesis
When regime complexes and policy coherence co-evolve, changes at one level
stimulate adaptations at the other through processes of social interaction. In other
words, as horizontal linkages at global (national) level become stronger, they
influence developments at national (global) level via vertical interplay. Co-evolution
is thus contingent upon the creation and development of horizontal and vertical
linkages. Factors affecting those linkages in the ambit of biodiversity governance
were examined in this chapter employing the framework developed in Chapter 2.
Table 6.1 summarises the main findings.
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Table 6.1 Intervening factors in the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and
national implementation systems in LAC
Determinants of policy integration in regime complexes had not been previously
explored. Recent studies have improved knowledge of the way in which regime
complexes evolve from a stage of competition to a stage of specialisation.
Disruptive interactions in regime complexes in a stage of competition, e.g. those
emerging in the areas of food security (Margulis, 2013) and maritime piracy (Struett
et al., 2013), are strongly determined by conflictive norms across the elemental
regimes. As regime complexes evolve from competition to specialisation, interest
maximisation, shared norms, and processes of learning contain institutional conflict
(Oberthür and Stokke, 2011). These dynamics are perceived, for instance, in the
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regime complex of trade and the environment (Gehring, 2011), and in Arctic
environmental governance (Stokke, 2011). In the present case, the transition from
specialisation towards policy integration has involved three main challenges: 1)
increased centralisation amid independent organisational arrangements; 2)
strategies of mutual adjustment where costs are not equally distributed; and 3)
gradual recognition of common frames of meaning but limited capacity to advance
concerted actions.
Some studies have addressed problems of coherence in the implementation of
inter-connected MEAs, with most of them highlighting lack of co-ordination as one
of the main challenges (e.g. Chasek et al., 2011; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et al.,
2006; Van Toen, 2001). This study, in contrast, did not find co-ordination to be a
major dilemma. Co-ordination is occurring in most LAC countries of the sample, but
its extent and depth is contingent upon three main factors: 1) the sectoral
management of MEAs in political systems where ministries do not always share the
same norms; 2) governmental and individual politics; and 3) practical challenges
arising from learning and capacity barriers. Co-ordination tends to be invisible
because it does not aim to streamline implementation arrangements (either in an
administrative or substantive way), it often pursues national policy goals rather than
an enhanced implementation of international commitments, and it is more ad hoc
than structured, usually arising in day-to-day implementation. As a result, national
clusters of biodiversity-related agreements, where they have emerged, have
different boundaries and a different structure than the global biodiversity cluster.
Intervening variables in the coupling of regime complexes and national
implementation systems were explored using three models developed by Underdal
(2000a, 2000b) to predict and explain the formation of national positions (whereby
domestic influence travels from the national to the global level) and the
implementation of international agreements (where the influence of global
governance on domestic policy can be assessed). These models were originally
applied to examine the formation and implementation of issue-specific regimes, but
were found useful to approach how countries create synergies when they formulate
national positions and implement international commitments. Loose coupling
problems in biodiversity governance, as emerging from the available evidence,
were largely explained by Underdal’s Model II (domestic politics associated with
governmental supply of environmental policy), with Models I (unitary rational actor)
and III (social learning and policy diffusion) providing complementary insights.
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However, none of the three models (which implicitly visualise international
governance as a form of governing by regulation) fully captured the more specific
collective-action problems arising in donor-recipient relationships (associated with
forms of governing through enabling and by provision). These problems have been
extensively examined by Gibson et al. (2005) and require consideration when
vertical inter-connections between regime complexes and national implementation
systems are examined. Chapter 5 showed that vertical influence in biodiversity
governance has flowed essentially from the global to the national level, and
hypothesised that its impact has not been significant, inhibiting the development of
positive feedback loops. This chapter suggested that barriers to loose coupling
essentially arise in the ambit of domestic politics, but part of the blame may also be
apportioned to donors and implementing agencies.
The apparent absence of positive feedback loops between the biodiversity cluster
and national implementation systems brings to the fore the blocking coalitions
which, according to Young (2006), are the driving force of cross-level interactions
producing system change, i.e., those characterised by co-evolution (see Chapter 2,
Section 2.2). Blocking coalitions emerge when two or more participants in cross-
level interactions are able to veto the preferences of others but cannot muster
enough support for their own goals (Young, 2006). In international biodiversity
governance, two major blocking coalitions have traditionally been recognised: one
comprising (mostly) Western countries supporting the preservation of, and
international oversight over, biological diversity; and another one formed by
(essentially) developing countries promoting sustainable uses of, and national
sovereignty over, natural resources (see Neumann, 2005; Raustiala and Victor,
2004; Stoett, 2002; Martin, 2000). These blocking coalitions, which sustain patterns
of differentiation (global/national) in biodiversity governance, pose natural obstacles
to vertical coupling. In many LAC countries, synergies in the implementation of
biodiversity-related conventions are not considered an international obligation, but
a national responsibility. This constrains the ability of global governance to
influence domestic policy and, therefore, the emergence of positive feedback loops
between governance levels.
Young (2006) observes that “the persistence of blocking coalitions… is apt to lead
to institutional breakdown resulting either in the dominance of a new hegemonic
system or in the evolution of a new synthesis transcending prior management
options” (no pagination). In the present case, institutional breakdown would be
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associated with the transformation of the biodiversity cluster into a comprehensive
biodiversity regime as per Morin and Orsini’s (2013a, 2013b) model of the life cycle
of regime complexes (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). Nevertheless, the same
blocking coalitions that have established a separation between global and national
governance would impede the formation of a comprehensive biodiversity regime.
Current governance arrangements seem to accommodate the interests of most
countries. While existing structures pose obstacles to coherent governance, policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs in
national implementation are co-evolving. Indeed, institutional and organisational
conditions in the biodiversity cluster constrain, but do not preclude, the co-evolution
of global and national governance systems. A re-engineering of governance
architectures runs the risk of severing the loose connections between international
and national policies. Instead of focussing on structure, reform should seek to
strengthen existing linkages.
Current developments in the biodiversity cluster point in that direction: the focus of
inter-treaty co-operation is moving away from further policy development towards
improving synergies at the national level. This should enhance global influence on
domestic policy (not least because treaty secretariats and international
organisations now have a clearer mandate to support synergies in national
implementation), which appears to be a necessary condition for the development of
positive feedback loops between global and national institutions (see Chapter 5,
Section 5.3).
6.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter 4 showed that regime complexes and national implementation systems co-
evolve (first research objective) notwithstanding of which vertical disintegration of
policy is possible. Chapter 5 examined how influence travels from regime
complexes to national implementation systems and vice versa (second research
objective), assessing the strength and symmetry of vertical inter-connections. This
chapter explored determinants of the co-evolution of regime complexes and
national implementation systems (third research objective). More specifically, it
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analysed 1) the factors affecting policy integration processes (policy coherence
outputs) in regime complexes (national implementation) and, by extension, the
ability of global (national) governance to exert influence on policy coherence
outputs (policy integration processes) in national implementation (regime
complexes); and 2) the factors impinging upon the development of positive
feedback loops between regime complexes and national implementation systems.
Using the co-evolution framework developed in Chapter 2, determinants of policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs in
national implementation were grouped in three general categories (institutional and
organisational; political; and cognitive and executive) adapted from EPI studies
(building upon the assumption that EPI processes and downstream coherence
outputs can be examined under the same analytical lens); whereas loose coupling
challenges were approached based on Underdal’s (2000a, 2000b) study of the
formation of national preferences and the implementation of international
(environmental) agreements (which identifies various factors that shape how
influence travels from one level of governance to another).
Policy integration processes in the biodiversity cluster were found to be affected by:
1) the CBD’s centrality in a cluster of legally independent regimes (institutional
factors) operating under separate organisational arrangements (organisational
factors); 2) the CBD-ification process, which has resulted in adverse asymmetric
adjustments and the politicisation of institutional relationships (political factors); and
3) the incipient acceptance of common frameworks of meaning (cognitive factors)
amid limited capacity to advance co-operation (executive factors). Conversely,
policy coherence challenges at the level of national implementation appeared to be
related to: 1) the sectoral administration of MEAs (organisational factors) in political
systems characterised by institutional fragmentation (institutional factors); 2)
implementation practices, policy priorities, and administrative changes in political
contexts where synergy processes lack close support from high-ranking officials
(political factors); and 3) the absence of cognitive frameworks and appropriate
capacity to streamline implementation activities within and across sectors (cognitive
and executive factors). Substantive differences can be noticed in the factors
affecting horizontal linkages at global and national levels: whilst policy integration
challenges relate to finding an appropriate balance between the objectives pursued
by the different conventions in the context of established co-operative mechanisms;
policy coherence outputs depend, to a significant degree, on the ability of MEA
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focal points and agencies to make use of the instruments and opportunities
provided by the political system to synergise convention processes.
Cross-level interactions between regime complexes and national implementation
systems in LAC are strongly shaped by domestic politics, notably, by the political
will and institutional capacity of national governments. Past studies noticed that
national implementation debates in IEG have shifted away from a focus on political
will towards attention to capacity (Sagar and VanDeveer, 2005; VanDeveer and
Dabelko, 2001). Recent research reveals that capacity remains a central factor in
the implementation of international environmental commitments (see Akhtar-
Schuster et al., 2011; Chasek et al., 2011). Empirical observations in this study
suggest, however, that political will, associated with the ideological profile of
national governments (Underdal, 2000a), is no less important. Developing countries
tend to conceive of biodiversity as a national resource rather than a global
commons (see Neumann, 2005; Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Stoett, 2002; Martin,
2000) and these perceptions seem to affect the coupling of the biodiversity cluster
and national implementation systems. In many LAC countries, the management of
biodiversity-related conventions is considered a national responsibility. Countries
recognise the need for external assistance. However, as Sagar and VanDeveer
(2005) observe, capacity-building efforts are sometimes disguised attempts to
advance Western agendas in developing countries. To be effective, capacity-
building approaches must recognise the “shared needs of Northern and Southern
actors” (Sagar and VanDeveer, 2005, p.20, emphasis in original) as well as
contextual specificities (Behague et al., 2009). Achieving influence on national
implementation is critical to the emergence of positive feedback loops between
governance levels (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3).
This chapter showed that institutional and organisational conditions in biodiversity
governance complicate the creation and development of synergies within and
across jurisdictional levels. Existing structures, however, are not inhibiting the co-
evolution of global and national governance. When regime complexes and national
implementation systems co-evolve but co-evolution is weak, steering co-evolution
through targeted interventions is a most cost-effective way of improving coherent
governance than a hypothetical integration of institutions under a top-down (or
otherwise bottom-up) design. To solve the vertical disintegration of policy in areas
of international (environmental) governance (Hanf and Underdal, 1998), inter-treaty
co-operation needs to be increasingly directed at supporting national
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implementation in line with countries’ interests. This should create a positive impact
on national-level synergies that feed back upon the further development of inter-
treaty co-operation. Positive feedback loops would then emerge that would
strengthen policy integration processes and policy coherence outputs at global and
national levels, respectively. The next chapter elaborates on the policy implications
of this research.
7 Regime complexes and policy coherence: Discussion of key
contributions and findings
This chapter discusses key contributions and findings of this research. The first
section refers back to the core research problem, the co-evolution of regime
complexes and policy coherence in areas of environmental governance, and
restates the approach developed in this study to examine how policy integration
processes in regime complexes are dynamically inter-linked with policy coherence
outputs at the level of national implementation. In a second section, the chapter
assesses the validity of this approach with reference to empirical observations in
the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and national implementation
experiences in LAC. The third section highlights the academic contributions of the
research and discusses its policy implications. A final section summarises the main
messages of this study.
7.1 A public policy approach to co-evolution
Coherence is a core concern in IEG debates. At the twenty-fifth session of the
Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (GC/GMEF) of UNEP
(Nairobi, 16-20 February 2009, Nairobi), governments and other members of the
international community perceived that “the current system of international
environmental governance is fragmented and requires coherence” (UNEP, 2009,
no pagination). Recent estimations suggest that the MEA system encompasses
more than 700 agreements (see Kim, 2013). Najam et al. (2007) observe that this
leads to treaty congestion, institutional and policy fragmentation, national difficulties
to meet MEA demands, duplication and conflicting agendas, and separate scientific
processes that undermine integrated solutions. They nonetheless acknowledge
some positive aspects of institutional proliferation such as increased visibility and
awareness of environmental threats, some degree of redundancy which makes the
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system more robust, constructive competition that encourages innovation,
opportunities for treaty secretariats to develop pockets of expertise, political spill-
over between environmental and non-environmental regimes, and numerous entry
points for civil society. In an overall assessment, however, Najam et al. claim that
institutional proliferation and fragmentation need to be addressed because the IEG
system has expanded without due regard for previous knowledge and existing
instruments; resources are diverted away from environmental action at the national
level; and environmental co-operation is not guided by cross-sectoral knowledge,
undermining the credibility of IEG.
Coherence has remained a central issue as IEG becomes embedded in broader
IFSD debates focussed on integrating the environmental, economic and social
pillars of sustainable development. Bernstein and Brunnée (2011) list a number of
gaps or inadequacies in the current IFSD, including weak and fragmented
institutions for sustainable development; incoherent policies; insufficient integration
of the three pillars of sustainable development within and across levels of
governance; lack of enforcement capabilities; problems of monitoring, data
collection and assessment; insufficient consideration of sustainability concerns in
decision-making; an environmental pillar weak in authority, priority and profile
relative to the economic pillar; a weak science-policy interface; low progress in
areas considered a priority in sustainable development governance; emerging
challenges which existing institutions are unprepared to address; and lack of
complementarity between inter-governmental processes and other forms of
governance. Bernstein and Brunnée note that existing organisations (e.g. UNEP
and the UN Commission for Sustainable Development) and UN initiatives and
processes (e.g. the Millennium Development Goals, the UN “Delivering as One”
strategy, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) can claim some
strengths and successes in their operation. There is, however, general consensus
that the IFSD needs reform (ibid.).
To the extent that coherence problems in IEG and the IFSD have been associated
with the fragmentation of global governance architectures, calls for institutional
and/or organisational integration have been recurrent in policy debates (see
Bernstein and Brunnée, 2011; Biermann et al., 2009a; Ivanova, 2007). Policy
discussions have nonetheless overlooked (or otherwise downplayed the relevance
of) existing regime complexes or loosely coupled systems of institutions that
emerge spontaneously in areas of regime overlap (Gehring and Faude, 2013) and
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have advantages over comprehensive regimes such as improved flexibility and
adaptability (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Regime complexes occur in several areas
of environmental and sustainable development governance such as climate change
(Keohane and Victor, 2011), forests (Reischl, 2012), plant genetic resources
(Raustiala and Victor, 2004), food security (Margulis, 2013), and areas falling in the
intersection of trade and environment regimes (Gehring, 2011).
Keohane and Victor (2011) recognise that regime complexes need to fulfil minimum
standards of coherence to be considered a serious alternative to comprehensive
regimes. In their view, coherence is achieved when the elemental regimes of a
complex are compatible and mutually reinforcing. Coherence, however, requires a
broader perspective than is implied in this definition. Regime complexity not only
poses an international governance challenge, but creates a problem of policy
coherence at the national level (Morin and Orsini, 2013a). Gehring and Faude
(2013, p.122) note, for instance, that “actors determine their implementing behavior
in areas of overlap not in light of the commitments entered into under a single
regime, but out of obligations originating from all relevant elemental institutions of
the complex”.
Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b) claim that the life cycle of regime complexes is
dynamically inter-linked with the coherency of governmental policy-making such
that global governance transformations encourage domestic policy change and
vice versa. Morin and Orsini, however, fail to consider whether co-evolution extends
beyond governmental policy-making (foreign policy) to the ambit of national
implementation (public policy). That connection seems to exist within the IEG
system. The 25th session of the UNEP’s GC/GMEF observed that “the lack of
coherence in current international environmental governance is felt strongly at the
national level and affects the coherence of countries’ own national governance”
(UNEP, 2009, no pagination). If international governance and national
implementation systems co-evolve, coherence problems in environmental and
sustainable development governance could be solved through targeted
interventions aimed at facilitating co-evolution rather than through drastic changes
in global governance architectures.
The present study proposed a public policy approach to examine the co-evolution
of regime complexes and policy coherence. Nilsson et al.’s (2012) distinction
between policy integration processes, policy coherence outputs and policy
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outcomes and impacts provided an initial point of departure. A claim was made that
in conditions of international regime complexity, policy integration processes among
international institutions are inter-connected with policy coherence outputs in
national implementation. The former are determined by inter-treaty co-ordination
and the latter by state-level co-ordination of implementation activities. When
processes and outputs are mutually reinforcing, governance as a whole achieves
coherence (an outcome that this study denominates coherent governance) (see
Chapter 2, Section 2.2).
The approach taken suggests that policy integration processes in regime
complexes and policy coherence outputs at the level of national implementation
influence each other in dynamic ways, meaning that influence runs back and forth
between governance levels. The interaction between policy integration processes
and policy coherence outputs determines the coherency of governance as a whole.
When that interaction is mutually reinforcing, coherent governance is achieved. Co-
evolution, according to this approach, proceeds through patterns of differentiation
and loose coupling (see Benz and Eberlein, 1999), and should bring about
(eufunctional) system change (see Young, 2006). In other words, global and
national governance systems act, in principle, independently of each other, but
become loosely coupled through information exchange and mutual learning. Cross-
level interactions should result in partially isomorphic governance systems which
move forward in complementary ways.
In line with the above conceptualisation, a framework for examining co-evolution
was proposed which addresses 1) horizontal linkages in global and national
governance (resulting from patterns of differentiation); 2) vertical linkages between
governance levels (loose coupling); and 3) factors affecting the co-evolution of
governance systems and, by extension, the achievement of coherent governance
(factors affecting system change). This framework was used to examine whether,
to what extent, and under what conditions, the biodiversity cluster and national
implementation systems in LAC countries have co-evolved. Empirical findings and
their relevance to our understanding of the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence are discussed in the next section.
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7.2 Lessons from the biodiversity case
Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b) have observed that regime complexes co-evolve
with governmental policy-making (foreign policy). This study found evidence that
regime complexes and national implementation systems (public policy) have a
similar inter-connection. Policy goals and institutional arrangements in the
biodiversity cluster are partly coincident with corresponding policy objectives and
implementation arrangements in LAC countries (see Chapter 4). Governance
systems are moving in similar directions, although not yet in a complementary
manner (see Chapter 5). Coherence is nonetheless emerging naturally. Some
would claim that the pace of change is not fast enough to resolve the global
biodiversity crisis. But if co-evolution is occurring amid substantive and procedural
barriers to synergies (see Chapter 6), reform within existing governance structures
rather than overarching change seems the most pragmatic way to achieve
coherent governance. Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b) believe that regime
complexes should ideally evolve into comprehensive regimes, but from a public
policy perspective, this appears unnecessary.
This research claimed that the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy
coherence is based on differentiation of jurisdictions and loose coupling through
enabling modes of management. These strategies have been purposely used
within the EU to advance the Europeanization of sub-national policies (see Benz
and Eberlein, 1999). In situations of regime complexity, however, differentiation and
loose coupling lack deliberate design (regime complexes, unlike the EU, are not
negotiated institutions with specific decision-making structures). Patterns of
differentiation in biodiversity governance emanate from independent decisions of
the governing bodies of the biodiversity-related conventions. As Tables 4.1 and 4.2
showed, 179 decisions were adopted between 2002 and 2010 promoting synergy
between the CBD and the other conventions of the cluster. Three out of four
decisions required inter-treaty co-operation. Co-ordination in national
implementation has remained a national prerogative. Governance levels have thus
been effectively decoupled. Loose coupling, as explained in Chapter 5, is most
visible in the cognitive and utilitarian means used by treaty secretariats and
international organisations to influence national implementation systems.
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Co-evolution is defective when interacting systems fail to complement each other.
Lack of complementarity creates gaps between higher and lower levels of
governance (e.g. Schliep and Stoll-Kleemann, 2010; Baker, 2003). Despite
perceived similarities between horizontal integration processes in the biodiversity
cluster and horizontal coherence outputs at the national level, an implementation
gap is evident. Mirroring the broader gap between policy development and policy
implementation in the IEG system (see Kim, 2013; Esty and Invanova, 2002),
global synergies in the biodiversity cluster have advanced more rapidly than
national co-ordination of implementation activities. As a result, vertical inter-
connections have largely flowed in one direction (from global to national levels),
with no positive feedback loops between governance levels that allow more
cohesive evolutions.
Implementation gaps reflect problems of horizontal and vertical co-ordination
(Nilsson et al., 2009b; Peters, 1998; Scharpf, 1993). For instance, exploring high-
level policy intentions and local-level decision-making in the Swedish waste sector,
Nilsson et al. (2009b) noticed discrepancies between national goals of material
recycling and local investments in waste incineration. The gap was found to be the
result of “an overall coordination failure” (p.15): local planning had no influence on
local management decisions; national policies were considered ambiguous by local
stakeholders; deficient knowledge systems at the local level prevented a critical
evaluation of the causal relations and long-term implications of the decisions
adopted; and legal and policy frameworks in national arenas were not always in
harmony.
Problems of horizontal and vertical co-ordination were observed in the present
case. Horizontal integration processes and horizontal coherence outputs are
similarly affected by the lack and/or low appropriation of common frameworks of
reference as well as capacity barriers (human, organisational, physical and
communicative). Oberthür (2009) has stressed the role of inter-institutional learning
in enhancing synergistic interaction. Capacity is nonetheless equally important.
Even when actors develop mutual understandings, they may lack the necessary
resources to put those understandings into practice (Spillane et al., 2002). Capacity
limitations prevent international organisations from fulfilling the tasks ascribed by
their principals (Keohane, 2001) and constrain the ability of countries to deliver on
international commitments (Young, 2002).
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On a more substantive level, horizontal integration processes and horizontal
coherence outputs in biodiversity governance have been shaped by distinct sets of
factors. Co-ordination challenges in the biodiversity cluster emanate from the
gradual alignment of the specialist regimes around the framework convention. It
has been noticed that centralisation pushes complexes towards increased density
(Morin and Orsini, 2013a; Orsini et al., 2013). However, the synergistic effects of
centralisation may be eufunctional for the core institution but not necessarily for the
peripheral regimes (see Corning, 1998). The evolving CBD-ification process in the
biodiversity cluster has been founded on adverse asymmetric adjustments (Abbott
et al., 2013, 2012): whilst the specialist regimes of the complex have been
supportive of the CBD’s goals, the CBD has not shown a similar commitment to
accommodate the goals of the other conventions. National co-ordination faces
different challenges. The cluster’s convergence around the CBD as core institution,
which ultimately emerges from the material linkages between the issue-areas
governed by the conventions, has not been mirrored at the national level. Linkages
between MEA agencies and focal points are strongly dependent on the political
context. Synergies at the national level emerge in relatively unstable environments
as a result of, inter alia, administrative changes, governmental priorities and
personal commitment. Masundire (2006), examining implementation of biodiversity-
related agreements in Africa, considered it puzzling that, despite the same
agencies being responsible for more than one convention, no synergistic
implementation had been achieved. LAC experiences suggest that changing
political contexts, coupled with learning and capacity barriers, can neutralise the
positive effects of enabling organisational environments.
Loose coupling of governance systems involves a two-way dynamic where global
policies and norms encourage domestic policy change and national perspectives
inform the direction of global governance (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2012). This was
not observed in the present case. Loose coupling between the biodiversity cluster
and national implementation systems in LAC is based on asymmetrical linkages
(Young, 2002): global efforts to assist national co-ordination have not prompted a
response in the opposite direction. This might be because global governance has
not achieved impact in the first place. Scholarly studies have observed that positive
feedback loops arise when one of the interacting institutions activates a case of
interaction with synergistic effects for the target institution, triggering similar action
by the latter in the opposite direction (see Wettestad, 2009; Coffey, 2006;
Skjærseth, 2006). This research found that treaty secretariats and international
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agencies have influenced national co-ordination of biodiversity-related MEAs
though direct access to domestic-policy making (and not yet through normative
pathways), but it fell short of assessing how much influence they have exerted.
That most LAC countries are not deeply involved in promoting inter-treaty co-
operation suggests, however, that global influence on domestic policy has not been
significant.
The transfer of influence from the global to the national level has been undermined,
in essence, by two factors associated with domestic politics: institutional capacity
and political will or the ideology of national governments (see Underdal 2000a,
2000b). Capacity-building remains a pressing need to advance national-level
synergies, but in many cases the development of synergies is considered a
national governance problem. This denotes the endurance of the blocking
coalitions that drive co-evolution dynamics in biodiversity governance: while
Western countries tend to perceive biodiversity as a global commons that needs
protection through international oversight, developing countries are keen to assert
national sovereignty over the management of the natural resources within their
respective borders (see Neumann, 2005; Raustiala and Victor, 2004; Stoett, 2002;
Martin, 2000).
Young (2006) claims that the persistence of blocking coalitions can lead to
institutional breakdown such that a new hegemonic system will prevail or new
synthetic arrangements will be created. In the present case, the clustering of
biodiversity-related conventions would signal that breakdown. Clustering in an IEG
context involves the “combination, grouping, consolidation, integration or merger of
MEAs or parts thereof” (Oberthür, 2002). Clustering is occurring in the chemicals
and hazardous waste sector and is considered a potential reform option for the
biodiversity cluster (see Wehrli, 2012). Nevertheless, (Western) coalitions favouring
the clustering of biodiversity-related conventions may not be strong enough to
override the preferences of developing countries which, being the main repositories
of biological diversity, have bargaining power to oppose top-down approaches to
governance. Blocking coalitions neutralise each other, maintaining the patterns of
differentiation and loose coupling that sustain the co-evolution of the biodiversity
cluster and national implementation systems. Moreover, if co-evolution is a result of
compromise between the North and the South, it cannot be associated with a
Western project of deep integration of national economies (Raustiala and Victor,
1998; Lawrence et al., 1996; see Chapter 2, Section 2.2). If this were the case, the
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possibilities of institutional breakdown would be stronger. These observations
should nonetheless be taken with caution insofar as blocking coalitions were not
examined in this research.
The co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems in
LAC has been defective because it has not been deliberately managed. To the
extent that co-evolution is based on iterative interplay rather than on overarching
design, it requires limited management (differentiation and loose coupling, as
mentioned earlier, are more spontaneous than deliberate strategies). The present
case shows, however, that limited management can result in weak co-evolution,
which, in turn, creates problems of coherent governance. Deliberate management
of co-evolution dynamics demands recognition of the existence of regime
complexes as naturally occurring governance formations. Regime complexes,
however, have not been the subject of political discussion in debates on the reform
of IEG and the IFSD, focussed, as they are, on possible changes in institutional
architectures (Ivanova, 2012).
7.3 Academic contributions and policy implications
This study advances understanding of the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence. The co-evolution approach proposed in this study departs from
Morin and Orsini’s co-evolution work in significant respects. Morin and Orsini take a
normative stance when they claim that the evolution of a regime complex
culminates when its elemental regimes become closely integrated to form one
single regime. Exemplifying its case with the global trade regime based in the
WTO, Morin and Orsini suggest, indeed, that regime complexes should evolve into
comprehensive regimes. They associate this final stage of integration with
systematic policy-making at the national level, which is, in turn, the last stage in the
evolution of policy coherence in their framework. They thus implicitly associate
institutional integration with policy coherence. However, under a public policy
perspective, there is no intrinsic connection between institutional integration and
policy coherence. Instead, policy coherence is closely intertwined with upstream
policy integration processes (Nilsson et al., 2012). The present study claimed that
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when policy integration processes in regime complexes and policy coherence
outputs at the national level co-evolve in complementary ways, coherent
governance is achieved. In other words, coherence in conditions of international
regime complexity does not require the integration of institutional arrangements, at
least inasmuch as co-evolution of policy integration processes and policy
coherence outputs at global and national levels, respectively, can be established.
With this premise in mind, this research advanced an explanation of co-evolution
which goes beyond Morin and Orsini’s descriptive account and which identifies its
three fundamental pillars, namely, differentiation, loose coupling and system
change.
If coherence in areas of regime overlap emerges through the co-evolution of
regime complexes and national implementation systems, IEG and IFSD debates
arise anew. Mainstream analyses suggest that coherence problems in IEG and the
IFSD stem from the fragmentation of governance. On the contrary, this study posits
that those problems emanate from the deficient (unmanaged) co-evolution of global
and national governance systems. These distinct perceptions carry different policy
implications. If fragmentation is at the core of coherence dilemmas, institutional
integration emerges as a natural reform option. Conversely, if flawed co-evolution
dynamics explain perceived incoherencies in IEG and the IFSD, more targeted
interventions that improve loose coupling between global and national governance
systems may offer better solutions. Unmanaged co-evolutions may still bring about
change, but at a pace that is incompatible with the urgency of action that the global
environmental crisis demands. Co-evolutions need to be steered.
Managing co-evolution means ensuring that policy integration processes in regime
complexes and policy coherence outputs at the level of national implementation are
mutually reinforcing. Implementation gaps such as those observed in biodiversity
governance and IEG more generally reveal defective co-evolutions. If experiences
in biodiversity governance can be transferred to other IEG areas, implementation
gaps may be the result of vertical linkages flowing unidirectionally from the global to
the national level with little response from domestic actors. These vertical
asymmetries, which impede the development of positive feedback loops between
governance levels, find an explanation in the limited impact of global policy on
domestic arenas (i.e., cross-level interactions have not produced synergistic effects
at the national level). Correcting those asymmetries requires an enhanced focus on
national implementation barriers rather than the streamlining of existing institutions
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and organisations (top-down solutions that run the risk of reinforcing asymmetrical
linkages). Important in this regard is that capacity development is a core aspect of
the UNEP’s upgrading process (see UN General Assembly Res. 67/213; UN
General Assembly Res. 66/288).
Within biodiversity governance, there are particular reasons that justify a focus on
national-level management. First, national sovereignty and jurisdiction over natural
resources is an overriding principle of the CBD (Mooney, 2010). Many countries,
particularly in the developing world, would strongly oppose any attempt at
centralising biodiversity governance amid fears of losing control over their biological
resources. Indeed, this could be one of the motives why the CBD was developed
as a framework and not an umbrella convention (see McGraw, 2002). Clustering
does not necessarily entail a centralised co-ordination of MEAs (Oberthür, 2002),
but it can still raise eyebrows among developing countries which have been wary of
similar initiatives intended to streamline international biodiversity governance, e.g.,
the EU’s proposal to establish a global partnership on biodiversity (see IISD,
2006a, 2006b, 2006c).
Second, addressing national co-ordination problems makes sense from a
pragmatic point of view: institutional integration in the biodiversity cluster would be
a daunting task. The conditions that enabled clustering in the chemicals and
hazardous waste sector are not present in the biodiversity cluster. Institutional
arrangements within the chemicals sector are not based on a core institution or
framework convention around which other nodes in the complex tend to gravitate
(Selin, 2010). Institutional relationships are thus less hierarchized than those in the
biodiversity cluster, leading to less politicised interactions. Also, the three
secretariats of the chemicals cluster are all administered by the same organisation
(the secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention is jointly managed by UNEP and
FAO) and co-located within the same building. Cognitive linkages within the cluster
have grown stronger through the SAICM, an overarching framework for chemicals
treaties (Selin, 2010). Only recently has a similar framework emerged in the
biodiversity cluster (the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020).
Third, a focus on national implementation may solve horizontal asymmetries
between the CBD and the other biodiversity-related conventions. The programmes
of work of the non-CBD conventions reflect some degree of alignment with the
CBD (as Jardin (2010) notices, the first generation conventions have increasingly
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embraced the notion of sustainable use), but the CBD has shown less commitment
to accommodate the goals of other conventions (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1; and
Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2.1). As the emphasis of inter-treaty co-operation moves
away from policy development to policy implementation, opportunities arise to
correct the misbalance. The CBD, lacking concrete instruments to instil
compliance, relies on other biodiversity-related conventions to achieve its mandate.
While positioned as the international agenda-setter for biodiversity, the CBD is not
the most successful biodiversity regime as measured by its impact on the ground (a
study by Baakman (2011) found that, among the five founding conventions of the
BLG, the WHC is the most effective). The balance of power between the CBD and
the other conventions of the biodiversity cluster is more even at the national level.
Certainly, to the extent that the CBD has a broader mandate, the CBD’s plans and
programmes provide a natural basis for co-operation. Nevertheless, co-operation
under the CBD’s framework would need to be founded on more democratic and
inclusive liaison processes than those unfolding at the global level. The balancing
of different environmental objectives ensures strong EPI (Oberthür, 2009) with
eufunctional effects for the regimes in interaction (see Corning, 1998).
Synergies at the national level need to be enhanced to bridge the gap between
global and national governance. There is nonetheless a risk that, as national co-
ordination improves, co-evolution dynamics are driven by national governance
interests, leading to the prioritisation of short-term national priorities at the expense
of global management needs over long-time horizons (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2012;
Cash et al., 2006). Complementarity between governance levels needs to be based
on a two-way dynamic of integration where global perspectives inform lower-level
governance and vice versa (ibid.). On the road to the UN Rio+20 Conference,
policy discussions on the IFSD recognised the need to balance top-down and
bottom-up approaches to governance (see Pisano et al., 2012).
As emerging in current practice, efforts to advance synergies in the national
implementation of biodiversity-related conventions do not ignore the need for
vertical interaction in both directions. The new Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-
2020 provides a flexible framework for horizontal and vertical alignment of
biodiversity agendas. Countries are expected to implement the Plan through
updated NBSAPs which, addressing national concerns, should also enable the
attainment of global biodiversity targets. The six biodiversity-related conventions
have endorsed the Plan and supported its implementation through, for example,
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promoting participation of their focal points in the NBSAP regional workshops run
by the CBD Secretariat. The Strategic Plan falls shorts of providing some degree of
constitutionalisation for a multi-level governance system for biodiversity, which
some would see as a necessary step towards coherent governance (see Gupta
and Sanchez, 2012), but is possibly the only framework for cross-sectoral and
multi-level co-ordination that could have been developed in a highly politicised
environment. The effects of the Strategic Plan are still to be seen, however, and
problems have already been reported. Horizontal asymmetries between the CBD
and the other biodiversity-related conventions have proved a contentious issue as
treaty secretariats co-operate towards implementation of the Plan: non-CBD actors,
for instance, have faced capacity constraints to get involved in the CBD’s NBSAP
workshops. If such asymmetries are not effectively addressed, opportunities for
streamlining implementation of biodiversity-related agreements in the framework of
the Strategic Plan can be missed.
7.4 Concluding remarks
This final section discusses three general messages arising from this research as
supported by empirical observations in the area of focus. In a nutshell, these
messages are as follows: 1) coherence can emerge in areas of regime overlap
through the co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation
systems; 2) coherence challenges do not emanate from what most observers
perceive as fragmented institutions, but from the defective co-evolution of global
and national governance systems; and 3) managing the co-evolution of regime
complexes and national implementation systems, as opposed to making changes in
institutional design, may be the most cost-effective solution to improve coherence
in areas of regime overlap. These messages are unpacked below.
Regime complexes have been portrayed as a practical alternative to
comprehensive regimes due to their flexibility and adaptability (Young, 2012;
Keohane and Victor, 2011), but they have to meet certain normative standards, one
of which is coherence (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Coherence is a key theme in
the reform of environmental and sustainable development governance (see
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Bernstein and Brunnée, 2011). Most observers perceive a lack of coherence within
and across levels of governance, but this is only partially the case. Findings of the
present study revealed that the biodiversity-related conventions and national
implementation systems in LAC countries are co-evolving, enabling some
isomorphism of global and national governance structures. However, the evolution
gap between inter-treaty co-operation and synergies in national implementation
makes existing similarities between governance systems go unnoticed (the broader
gap between global policy and national implementation in IEG (UNEP, 2012a,
2012b) might obscure similar co-evolution dynamics in other areas of
environmental governance). Coherence can arise naturally, albeit weakly and
imperfectly, in conditions of international regime complexity. This has major
implications for our understanding of, and responses to, international governance
challenges writ large.
Problems of coherence in international (environmental) governance are commonly
associated with institutional fragmentation. Indeed, fragmentation is sometimes
raised as the underlying cause of governance dilemmas in the biodiversity cluster
(e.g. Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010). Fragmentation is nonetheless relative. There is a
widespread occurrence of regime complexes or loosely coupled systems of
institutions in areas of environmental governance and beyond (see Raustiala,
2013). Moreover, some of these complexes are inter-linked with each other within
networked governance architectures (see Kim, 2013; Lesage and Van de Graaf,
2013). On a vertical dimension, recent research has observed that regime
complexes are inter-linked with governmental policy-making (Morin and Orsini,
2013a, 2013b). This study revealed that such co-evolution extends to the ambit of
national implementation. Co-evolution, however, tends to be weak in the absence
of deliberate management, preventing global and national governance systems
from advancing in complementary ways. Thus, coherence problems in international
governance do not necessarily result from institutional and/or organisational
fragmentation, but from the unmanaged co-evolution of global policies and national
implementation systems.
Finally, if incoherencies in areas of regime overlap are caused by the weak co-
evolution of regime complexes and national implementation systems, governance
solutions should seek to strengthen co-evolution rather than replace existing
governance architectures. This proposition challenges mainstream IEG and IFSD
debates. Dominant frames place the blame of coherence problems on the
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fragmentation of governance. Unsurprisingly, IEG reform discussions have
focussed on institutional form (Ivanova, 2012) and various options have been
tabled that aim to streamline existing institutions and organisations (see Bernstein
and Brunnée, 2011; Biermann et al., 2009a; Ivanova, 2007). Within biodiversity
governance, clustering proposals have gained momentum in view of the positive
experiences reported in the cluster of chemicals and hazardous waste conventions
(see Perry, 2012; Wehrli, 2012). Grand solutions to complex problems have been
previously criticised (e.g. Oberthür and Gehring, 2004) and this study provides
further arguments to reject such approaches. Coherence arises spontaneously
through the co-evolution of global and national governance systems, but because
co-evolution goes unmanaged, levels of coherence tend to be below expected
standards. To improve coherence, co-evolution needs to be steered. Because co-
evolution requires inter-linked, rather than integrated, systems, enabling, rather
than regulatory, forms of management should form the basis of governance
interventions. Recent developments in biodiversity governance suggest that the
biodiversity-related conventions are embracing this approach. Both the Strategic
Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the updated NBSAPs are flexible instruments
for improved coupling of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
systems, potentially leading to more coherent governance in the biodiversity sector.
The above messages should be of special value to MEA focal points and agencies,
treaty secretariats and international organisations involved in international
biodiversity governance and IEG more generally. The need for improved coherence
within and across levels of governance is widely recognised in environmental and
sustainable development policy circles. As explained, conventional discourses
associate problems of coherence with institutional fragmentation, but these
assumptions need to be challenged. This study demonstrates that problems of
coherence in international (environmental) governance do not emanate from
horizontal and vertical fragmentation, but from the weak co-evolution of global and
national governance systems hindering complementary and mutually reinforcing
interactions. Strong co-evolution requires strategic interplay management (targeted
efforts to improve inter-institutional relations) rather than a reshuffle of global
governance architectures (Oberthür (2009) expands on the differences between
interplay management and broader notions of IEG reform). Regime complexes and
interplay management remain academic concepts which have not penetrated the
policy realm. By making the policy relevance of these concepts more visible than
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has hitherto been the case, this research expects that they contribute to solve real
world problems.
8 Conclusions
Humanity has transgressed or is soon approaching the boundaries of six (out of
nine) Earth system processes which sustain all life (Rockström et al., 2009). The
rate of biodiversity loss is one of the planetary boundaries which have been
overstepped (ibid.). The biodiversity crisis gained political visibility at the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development, where world leaders committed to
halting the decline of biodiversity by the year 2010, a target set by the CBD’s
parties earlier that year. The 2010 Biodiversity Target failed due to the insufficient
integration of biodiversity concerns into relevant sectors and lack of effective action
to address the underlying causes of biodiversity loss (CBD Secretariat, 2010).
Institutional integration has long been considered an option for strengthening IEG
in general, and international biodiversity governance more specifically: proposals
for an all-encompassing world environment organisation date back to the very
creation of UNEP in 1972 (Bauer and Biermann, 2005), whereas the prospects of
clustering biodiversity-related agreements under an umbrella convention have been
considered since the late 1980s when the CBD was being negotiated (McGraw,
2002). Evolution towards institutional integration has nonetheless been slow: UNEP
has only recently been upgraded (although not transformed into a world
environment organisation) and the on-going clustering process in the chemicals
and hazardous waste sector has revived calls (but not yet concrete proposals) for
similar integration in the biodiversity cluster.
Institutional reform debates have obviated the existence of regime complexes or
loosely coupled systems of institutions relating to a common subject matter (Orsini
et al., 2013; Keohane and Victor, 2011). Regime complexes are spontaneous
institutions that emerge from repeated institutional interaction rather than through
deliberate negotiation (Gehring and Faude, 2013). They are considered more
flexible and adaptable institutions than comprehensive regimes (Keohane and
Victor, 2011). These advantages, however, do not arise automatically, and regime
complexes still need to meet certain normative standards, including coherence
(ibid.), which is considered one of the main challenges in environmental and
sustainable development governance (Bernstein and Brunnée, 2011). Coherence is
conventionally portrayed as a problem of global governance, but regime complexes
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also pose a problem of policy coherence at the national level (Gehring and Faude,
2013; Morin and Orsini, 2013).
Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b) suggest that the density of regime complexes and
the coherency of governmental policy-making are inter-linked phenomena in the
sense that changes at one level stimulate adjustments at the other. However, they
conceive of policy coherence as a problem of foreign, rather than public, policy,
and therefore fail to examine whether the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence extends to the ambit of national implementation. Adopting this
approach is important because it would explain whether coherent governance
emerges naturally in the absence of overall design.
8.1 Revisiting the research’s aim and novelty
This research aimed to understand the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence from a public policy perspective, with an empirical focus on the
biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems in LAC countries. It was a
novel study in at least four ways. First, it was not interested in exploring how the
degree of integration in a regime complex and the coherency of governmental
policy-making are inter-linked, as Morin and Orsini (2013a, 2013b), pioneers of the
co-evolution thesis, do. Instead, it examined the interdependence of regime
complexes and policy coherence through a policy-analytical framework where
policy integration processes at the global level are dynamically inter-linked with
policy coherence outputs at the national level. By taking this approach, this thesis
was concerned with examining whether coherent governance can be achieved in
conditions of international regime complexity rather than with assessing possibilities
of institutional integration as patterns of interests become more convergent (which
would be the focus under Morin and Orsini’s approach). The policy-analytical
approach of this thesis advanced a sophisticated understanding of the problem of
coherence in situations of regime complexity, moving beyond perceptions of
coherence as an issue of horizontal co-ordination at the global level (e.g. Keohane
and Victor, 2011).
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Second, this study examined how regime complexity is managed at the national
level, an under-researched area in regime interplay studies (Ochieng et al., 2012).
It is well known that regime complexity triggers implementation politics and cross-
institutional political strategies through which state actors support specific regimes
to the detriment of others (Alter and Meunier, 2009; Raustiala and Victor, 2004).
Nevertheless, little research has been done to examine how state actors manage
regime complexity to ensure that overlapping regimes are implemented coherently.
These dynamics have been addressed in the (grey) literature on MEA
implementation (e.g. Chasek, 2010, 2006; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et al., 2006;
Boyer et al., 2002; Van Toen, 2001), but there are virtually no links between regime
complexity and MEA implementation research (perhaps because no studies have
approached MEA clusters under the lens of regime complexity). Those links were
raised here to highlight how regime complexity is managed in national
implementation arenas and not merely exploited for competitive purposes.
Third, and related to the previous point, this research followed the approach of
studies which have drawn parallels between regime interplay and public
management studies to explore phenomena that are common at global and
national levels of governance (e.g. Nilsson et al., 2012; Nilsson et al., 2009a;
Oberthür, 2009). It even went further by bringing together concepts and
approaches from different literatures to develop a framework for examining the
problem of focus. The framework is a pragmatic instrument that falls short of
integrating those literatures under a general theory, but helps visualise the
connections between them. Due to its pragmatic nature, the framework can assist
policy efforts to address coherence challenges arising from regime complexity.
Fourth, this study can claim empirical novelty. On the one hand, biodiversity is an
area of environmental governance to which regime interplay studies have paid little
attention (Oberthür and Gehring, 2011). Various studies have recently examined
synergies in the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions (e.g. UNEP-WCMC,
2012; Baakman, 2011; Caddell, 2011; Jóhannsdóttir et al., 2010; Jardin, 2010;
Andresen and Rosendal, 2009; Urho, 2009), but only Simon (2011) made an initial
attempt to set the problem within regime interplay studies. Approaching the
biodiversity cluster as a regime complex, this study paved the way for comparisons
with other complexes. On the other hand, several studies have looked at synergies
between biodiversity-related conventions and other MEAs at the level of national
implementation (see above on studies on MEA implementation), but none of them
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has focussed on the specific inter-connections arising in the implementation of the
conventions of the biodiversity cluster. Moreover, synergies in the national
implementation of MEAs have been explored in countries of Africa (e.g. Masundire,
2006) and the Asia-Pacific region (e.g. Chasek, 2010; Boyer et al., 2002; Van
Toen, 2001), but not in LAC, which is one of the most biologically diverse regions in
the world (see Bovarnick and Alpizar, 2010). This research was unique in that it
examined whether national clusters of biodiversity-related conventions exist in
countries with high levels of biological diversity.
8.2 Answering the research questions
The present study sought to address three research questions as follows:
1. Do regime complexes and national implementation systems display similar
evolution patterns?
2. How do regime complexes and national implementation systems influence
each other?
3. What factors affect the co-evolution of regime complexes and national
implementation systems?
The first research question requires a nuanced response. If regime complexes and
policy coherence co-evolve, some similarities can be expected. Nevertheless, the
politics of international regime complexity (Alter and Meunier, 2009) anticipate that
the degree of similarity will vary depending on the national implementation context:
co-evolution will tend to be stronger in developed countries because they are active
advocates of deep integration of domestic policies through flexible forms of co-
operation (Raustiala and Victor, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1996). Morin and Orsini
(2013b), proponents of the co-evolution thesis, suggest that evolutions are not
uniform and that some countries improve their levels of coherence before others.
Co-evolution will tend to be stronger in developed countries supportive of deep
integration of domestic structures through flexible forms of co-operation (Raustiala
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and Victor, 1998; Lawrence et al., 1996). Examining experiences in developing
countries, this study found similarities between policy integration processes in the
biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs in national implementation, which
substantiates the co-evolution argument. There is nonetheless an evolution gap:
policy integration processes appear more advanced than policy coherence outputs.
This gap is a distinct expression of a broader gap between policy development and
policy implementation in IEG (UNEP, 2012a, 2012b).
Gaps between higher and lower levels of governance are well known to scholars
examining MLG dynamics (e.g. Schliep and Stoll-Kleemann, 2010; Nilsson et al.,
2009b; Baker, 2003). In some cases, implementation gaps reflect different, and
partly incompatible, modes of governance (e.g. Nilsson et al., 2009b). In the
biodiversity case, governance modes differ but are not incompatible. The evolution
gap is explained instead by governance systems which are not mutually reinforcing.
LAC countries are not attempting to boycott integration processes in the
biodiversity cluster by pursuing policies that run at cross purposes with global co-
ordination objectives, but are failing to adapt swiftly to changes in global
governance.
The second research question can be answered as follows. If co-evolution means
that changes in one of the interacting systems prompt adjustments in the other,
vertical influence will travel from the more advanced system to the less developed
one. If this triggers a response in the opposite direction (from the less developed
system to the more advanced one), vertical linkages become symmetrical (Gehring
and Oberthür, 2006b; Young, 2002). Symmetry ensures effective and legitimate
governance (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2012). When influence runs back and forth
between institutions, positive feedback loops emerge (e.g. Wettestad, 2009;
Coffey, 2006; Skjærseth, 2006). Findings of this thesis suggest that policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs at the
level of national implementation are not inter-linked through such feedback loops.
Global governance has promoted synergies in national implementation through
norms, discourses and capacity-building; conversely, few countries have
deliberately attempted to influence inter-treaty co-operation as they prepare for and
participate in biodiversity-related meetings.
In those cases where feedback loops were observed (see studies cited above),
mutual reinforcement was preceded by a case of interaction where one of the
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institutions exerted (and not merely attempted to exert) influence on the other, thus
prompting a response from the latter. If these studies provide lessons for the
biodiversity case, the absence of positive feedback loops between policy
integration processes in the biodiversity cluster and policy coherence outputs at the
level of national implementation can be related to the low influence of global
governance on domestic policy. Limited influence removes the need for a policy
response (which seems critical for improved cross-level communication and
complementarity). Influence, however, was not measured in this research and the
previous claim should thus be taken with reserve.
To answer the third research question, this study assumed that co-evolution is
determined, first, by the independent evolutions of regime complexes and national
implementation systems (because changes at one level stimulate adjustments at
the other), and, second, by the cross-level interplay of global and national
institutions (that allows the vertical transfer of influence). In other words, horizontal
and vertical linkages determine the quality of co-evolution. The study first
considered determinants of horizontal change in the biodiversity cluster. Regime
complexity studies have examined the factors that enable a transition from
competition to specialisation (e.g. Oberthür and Stokke, 2011), but not the factors
involved in policy integration processes. This study identified three main challenges
affecting horizontal integration in the biodiversity cluster: 1) increased centralisation
within a networked governance structure of legally independent regimes; 2) mutual
adjustment but uneven distribution of costs; and 3) growing acceptance of common
cognitive frames amid capacity constraints to advance co-operation. Several
studies on MEA implementation have pointed at the lack of co-ordination among
national focal points as one of the main obstacles to national-level synergies
between MEAs (e.g. Chasek et al., 2011; Masundire, 2006; Mouat et al., 2006; Van
Toen, 2001). In contrast, this research found co-ordination to be commonplace in
national implementation. Its extent and depth are nonetheless hindered by a
combination of factors, notably, 1) the sectoral organisation of implementation
arrangements in political systems where ministries embrace different normative
frameworks; 2) governmental and individual politics; and 3) practical difficulties
stemming from learning and capacity barriers.
The co-evolution of regime complexes and national implementation requires that
vertical influence runs from the global to the national level and vice versa. Most
studies on national implementation seek to explain how international commitments
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are made operational on the ground (e.g. Williams et al., 2012; Gray, 2003), but
some have also examined how national preferences are formed and championed in
international venues (e.g. Underdal and Hanf, 2000; Underdal, 1998). Underdal
(2000a, 2000b) introduced three explanatory models of negotiating positions
(through which influence travels from the national to the global level) and
implementation records (which reflect the extent to which global influence has been
exerted on domestic policy): the unitary rational actor model, the domestic politics
model, and the social learning and policy diffusion model. The second model was
of particular relevance to explain barriers to loose coupling in biodiversity
governance. The available evidence pointed at problems of governmental supply
(in terms of political will and institutional capacity) as a key obstacle to the
development of cross-level feedback loops. Other variables anticipated by the other
models (e.g. cost-benefit calculations and policy diffusion) as well as factors not
fully captured by Underdal’s framework (narrow sectional interests of donors and
implementing agencies) were also at play.
In a nutshell, this research provided evidence of the co-evolution of regime
complexes and national implementation systems, and observed, as a corollary, that
international governance structures constrain, but do not inhibit, co-evolution.
These conclusions are of cardinal importance to IEG reform debates. Institutional
form remains a central concern in these discussions while the raison d'être of the
current system is often overlooked: while “the natural environment forms an
interlocking entity”, in a policy context, “the ‘environment’ is in fact a series of
relatively independent issues that exhibit widely differing problem structure” (von
Moltke, 2001b, p.12). Problem structure is determined both by the type of global
environmental change involved (Turner II et al., 1990) and by “economic and social
factors that arise from the range of affected interests” (von Moltke, 2001b, p.11).
Therefore, even within compact clusters of MEAs such as the biodiversity cluster,
single regimes exhibit “dramatically different problem structure” (ibid. p.12). Further,
as Jupille and Snidal (2006) explain, the institutional status quo matters. Changing
existing institutions or creating new arrangements are costly and risky strategies,
and movements away from the status quo “represent, if not puzzles, then at least
phenomena of particular interest” (Jupille and Snidal, 2006, pp.36-37). Thus, rather
than aiming to transform institutional landscapes, policy responses to international
regime complexity should consider how established arrangements can be used to
advance collective goals. This demands an increased focus on agency and a
management approach based on learning and capacity-building. Regime
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complexes can be, indeed, promising options to address international co-operation
problems if actors are aware of and act upon existing horizontal and vertical
institutional interactions.
8.3 Policy implications
The policy implications of empirical findings should be considered in relation to the
IEG and IFSD reform debates inspiring this research (see Chapter 7, Section 7.3
for a more extensive discussion). International environmental negotiations have not
yet considered the possibility of using existing regime complexes to address global
environmental change.. Regime complexes can be superior to comprehensive
regimes if they meet, among other normative criteria, minimum standards of
coherence (Keohane and Victor, 2011). Regime complexity poses problems of
coherence at both global and national levels. The dynamic interaction between
policy integration processes in global arenas and policy coherence outputs at the
level of national implementation determines the coherency of governance as a
whole. When the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy coherence is weak,
coherent governance is compromised.
Cohesive evolutions demand deliberate management. Iterative interplay between
regime complexes and national implementation systems may bring about coherent
governance, but not at the pace that the global environmental crisis demands. The
question arises how co-evolution can be managed and whether the management of
co-evolution is a better alternative to any hierarchical or negotiated structures that
could be created for purposes of coherent governance. This study observed that
co-evolution requires differentiation of decision-making arenas and loose coupling
through information exchange, communication and persuasion (Benz and Eberlein,
1999). Loose coupling has a strong association with enabling modes of
management based on learning and capacity-building (Oberthür, 2009). Enhancing
loose coupling can be especially challenging in cases where co-evolution has been
weak, but managing the linkages between governance systems which are already
co-evolving is less problematic than establishing formal structures of governance
based on an explicit allocation of functions and responsibilities.
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Empirical findings have obvious relevance for governance reform in the cluster of
biodiversity-related conventions. The weak co-evolution of policy integration
processes in the cluster and national implementation systems in LAC undermines
the coherency of governance in one of the regions with the highest levels of
biological diversity in the world. The strong separation of global and national
governance systems has reinforced scale dependencies and posed obstacles to
loose coupling. Until recently, synergies among biodiversity-related conventions
have developed in the absence of strategic frameworks for co-ordination. As a
result, potential complementarities in areas of substantive overlap have been
overlooked and/or appear under-exploited. Recent events nonetheless indicate an
awareness of these problems and a commitment to action. The Strategic Plan for
Biodiversity 2011-2020 is intended to reinforce integration in the biodiversity
cluster. Implementation of the Plan at the national level is expected to occur
through revised NBSAPs which should take into consideration synergies among
biodiversity-related agreements. Both the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020
and the NBSAPs provide flexible frameworks for horizontal and vertical co-
ordination in areas where substantive coherence is particularly needed. This study
can support these efforts by drawing attention to the factors that have influenced
the extent and depth of horizontal and vertical linkages in areas of regime overlap.
8.4 Limitations
General limitations of this study should be acknowledged (more specific limitations
associated with research methods were discussed in Chapter 2). While the
approach adopted to examine the co-evolution of regime complexes and policy
coherence may guide future analyses in the same direction, the broader application
of the co-evolution framework developed in Chapter 2 should be considered more
carefully. The framework is a pragmatic instrument that relies on concepts and
approaches from different studies to examine the co-evolution of regime complexes
and (public) policy coherence from an IEG perspective. It provides a flexible
structure that supports the application of various analytical tools in a
complementary manner. Because the framework was designed in connection with
the specific research questions addressed in this thesis, it does not advance
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general theoretical propositions. This reduces its value as an instrument for
examining co-evolution in other empirical settings.
The policy relevance of the framework could also be further exploited. The
framework can inform efforts to improve horizontal management of overlapping
regimes and vertical linkages between levels of governance. But it does not offer or
propose specific avenues to improve the co-evolution of regime complexes and
policy coherence with a view to more coherent governance. As an analytical tool, it
is primarily intended to map out the horizontal and vertical dimensions of co-
evolution. The application of the framework can deliver important policy insights as
Chapter 7 discussed in relation to the area of governance under analysis.
Nevertheless, the policy relevance of the co-evolution framework should not be
overstated.
8.5 Future research
Areas of further research can be highlighted. One of them relates to the analysis of
the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems in
other domestic contexts. This study examined national implementation in countries
which fall into the categories of emerging and developing economies. National
implementation experiences in advanced economies can bring about further
insights into the co-evolution of the biodiversity cluster and national implementation
systems. Raustiala and Victor (1998) suggest that the deep integration of Western
economies has resulted in a zone of collective management where international
and domestic policies co-evolve. Some would thus expect the co-evolution of the
biodiversity cluster and national implementation systems to be stronger when the
empirical focus is on experiences in developed countries, even if only because
those countries possess greater material capabilities than other states. This
research showed, however, that various factors other than capacity may be at play
as countries make efforts to synergise MEA implementation activities. Factors that
have undermined national co-ordination in LAC countries (for example,
functionalistic styles of implementation and domestic politics) may also be present
in more advanced economies.
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Co-evolution needs to be examined in other areas of governance for purposes of
theory-building and policy prescription. As a novel topic in regime complexity
studies, the co-evolution of regime complexes and (public) policy coherence
requires further empirical research. Coherence could be explored in areas
governed by regime complexes which display higher or lower levels of integration
than the biodiversity cluster. For instance, new research could establish whether
the division of labour achieved in areas falling within the regime complex for trade
and environment (Gehring, 2011) is replicated in national arenas; or whether the
clustering process launched by the chemicals and hazardous waste conventions
(Selin, 2010) has been supported by integrated approaches to chemicals
management at the country level.
Two other areas where research is needed to advance understanding of co-
evolution can be highlighted. One concerns the interaction between regime
complexes and the way in which this interaction shapes and is shaped by national
implementation systems. Inter-treaty co-operation between the biodiversity-related
MEAs and the Rio Conventions, for example, might reinforce national perceptions
of the UNFCCC and the UNCCD as elemental regimes of the biodiversity cluster
(see Chapter 4, section 4.2.3). At the same time, those perceptions may be driving
inter-treaty co-operation between the BLG and the Joint Liaison Group of the Rio
Conventions. Mutual adaptations may cause a redraw of the boundaries of the
biodiversity cluster at global and national levels, introducing further complexities to
integration and coherence within the biodiversity sector. A second issue requiring
attention relates to the management problems posed by regime complexity at
regional and sub-national levels of governance. Some regimes of the biodiversity
cluster have strong presence at these levels: the CMS operates regionally through
the co-operation agreements concluded under its framework, whereas CITES
manages a system of global trade regulation which impacts upon the livelihoods of
local communities living alongside wildlife (Abensperg-Traun, 2009). Problems of
coherence emanating from international regime complexity become more intricate
when other levels of governance are brought to the analysis.
- 223 -
8.6 Concluding statement
Regime complexes are here to stay and debates on the reform of international
governance architectures must not ignore this fact. While past research has
showed that regime complexes can have detrimental effects on national
implementation, empirical findings of this study showed that regime complexes and
national implementation systems can co-evolve in harmony, although not
necessarily in complementary ways. If co-evolution is steered, however, the need
for more elaborate and integrated governance architectures may become
redundant.
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Appendix A An overview of the biodiversity-related
conventions
This note provides a general description of the six conventions of the biodiversity
cluster. Descriptions are based on the texts of the foundational treaties and on data
available at the conventions’ websites.
A.1 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat
The earliest convention in the biodiversity cluster, the Convention on Wetlands was
adopted on 2 February 1971 in the city of Ramsar, Iran, and entered into force on
21 December 1975. It has been amended twice (1982 and 1987) and it has 168
state parties at present (November 2013). The convention mandates each
contracting party to “designate suitable wetlands within its territory for inclusion in a
List of Wetlands of International Importance” (Article 2, paragraph 1) and to
“consider its international responsibilities for the conservation, management and
wise use of migratory stocks of waterfowl” when designating entries for the List and
when changing entries in respect of wetlands within its territory (Article 2,
paragraph 6). At the time of writing, 2168 sites had been included in the List of
Wetlands of International Importance.
Parties to the Ramsar Convention commit to promoting the conservation and wise
use of local wetlands included in the List (Article 3). Specific obligations include
establishing nature reserves on wetlands, encouraging research and exchange of
information regarding wetlands, and increasing waterfowl populations on wetlands
(Article 4).
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The CoP is the main governing body of the Convention. It meets every three years
and oversees the implementation of the treaty (Article 6). Other bodies include 1)
the Secretariat, which is housed by the IUCN at its headquarters in Gland,
Switzerland, and is in charge of the day-to-day operation of the convention; 2) the
Standing Committee, which reviews implementation between meetings of the CoP;
and 3) the Scientific and Technical Review Panel, which is tasked with providing
scientific advice to the CoP and the other convention bodies.
A.2 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage
The WHC was adopted on 16 November 1972 at the 17th session of UNESCO’s
General Conference (Paris, France). It entered into force on 17 December 1975
and comprises 190 state parties. The treaty aims to protect the cultural and natural
heritage of its contracting parties. Cultural heritage includes monuments, groups of
buildings and other sites of outstanding universal value (Article 1); whereas natural
heritage encompasses natural features, geological and physiographical formations,
and other natural sites deemed to be of universal significance (Article 2).
As stipulated in the treaty, state parties shall endeavour to formulate a general
policy on cultural and natural heritage and incorporate the protection of that
heritage into relevant planning programmes; establish specific services for the
conservation of cultural and natural heritage; promote research and devise
operating methods to counteract the threats to cultural and natural heritage sites;
adopt appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures
necessary for the conservation of cultural and natural heritage; and create training
centres for the protection of such heritage (Article 5). Parties are also expected to
develop educational and information programmes to raise public awareness (Article
27).
Each contracting party acknowledges that “the duty of ensuring the identification,
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the
cultural and natural heritage referred to in Articles 1 and 2 and situated on its
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territory, belongs primarily to that State” (Article 4). Contracting parties nonetheless
assert that “such heritage constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the
duty of the international community as a whole to co-operate” (Article 6). In
accordance, the treaty establishes a system of international co-operation and
assistance designed to support the efforts of state parties in conserving the world
heritage (Article 7).
The convention provides for the creation of a World Heritage Committee which is
responsible for establishing, updating and publishing a World Heritage List, i.e., an
inventory of the properties that have outstanding value according to the criteria
determined by the Committee (Article 11, paragraph 2). At present, there are 981
sites on the list, located in 160 countries. The Committee is also required to
produce a List of World Heritage in Danger, a catalogue of the properties for which
major interventions are necessary to ensure their conservation (Article 11,
paragraph 4). The Committee can receive and study requests for international
assistance formulated by contracting parties with respect to properties situated in
their territories which may qualify for inclusion in the World Heritage List (Article 13,
paragraph 1). It keeps a list of property for which international assistance has been
granted (Article 13, paragraph 5).
Other bodies that form part of the organisational structure of the WHC include the
General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention, which oversees the
implementation of the treaty; and the World Heritage Centre, which is housed at
the headquarters of UNESCO in Paris, France, and ensures the day-do-day
management of the convention. Three advisory bodies assist the World Heritage
Committee in its deliberations, namely, IUCN, the International Council on
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Centre for the Study of the
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM).
- 261 -
A.3 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
CITES was signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973, and entered into force
on 1 July 1975. It has been amended once (1979) and has 179 states parties.
CITES’ mission is to protect wild species against over-exploitation from
international trade. The convention defines a species as “any species, subspecies,
or geographically separate population thereof” (Article I). A specimen means: 1)
“any animal or plant, whether alive or dead”; and 2) “any readily recognizable part
or derivative thereof” (Article I).
Species are listed in three Appendices according to the degree of protection they
need. Appendix I includes “all species threatened with extinction which are or may
be affected by trade” (Article II, paragraph 1). Trade in specimens of these species
must only be authorised in exceptional circumstances. Appendix II covers a) all
species which although not threatened with extinction may become so if trade is not
strictly regulated; and b) all species which must be subject to regulation in order
that trade in specimens of species listed under a) can be effectively controlled
(Article II, paragraph 2). Species referred to in b) are often called look-alike
species. Finally, Appendix III contains all species which any Party identifies as
being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction and as requiring the co-operation of
other states so that their trade can be monitored (Article II, paragraph 3). Nearly 5
600 species of animals and 30 000 species of plants are listed in the CITES’
Appendices.
The convention establishes a system of permits and certificates for the regulation
of trade in specimens of species listed in its Appendices. Permits and certificates
must be issued by competent authorities at the national level in accordance with
the specific conditions stipulated in the treaty for each Appendix. Exceptions to
CITES’ permit requirements include specimens in transit; specimens acquired
before CITES provisions applied; specimens that are personal or household
effects; specimens of Appendix-I species bred in captivity (in the case of animals)
or artificially propagated (in the case of plants); non-commercial loan, donation or
exchange between scientists or scientific institutions; and specimens which form
part of a travelling exhibition (Article VII).
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States assume a number of obligations as members of CITES. They pledge to
enforce the provisions of the treaty and prohibit trade in wildlife in violation of
CITES’ norms; designate ports of exit and entry for export and import of
specimens; maintain records of trade in specimens of species listed in the CITES’
Appendices; and designate Management and Scientific Authorities competent to
grant permits and certificates (Articles VIII and IX). Parties are expected to submit
an annual report on their trade in CITES species and a biannual report on the
legislative, regulatory and administrative measures taken to implement the
convention (Article VIII, paragraph 7).
The treaty states that its provisions should not prevent Parties from adopting
stricter domestic measures to regulate wildlife trade (Article XIV, paragraph 1); or
affect their obligations “deriving from any treaty, convention, or international
agreement relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession or transport of
specimens which is in force or subsequently may enter into force for any Party”
(Article XIV, paragraph 2).
In terms of organisational structure, the CoP is the governing body of the
convention. It meets every two years to review the implementation of the treaty.
The CITES Secretariat, which is administered by UNEP and located at Geneva,
Switzerland, is tasked with arranging CoP meetings, studying the reports of the
Parties and requesting additional information, publishing updated editions of
CITES’ Appendices, preparing annual reports on its own work, and making
recommendations for better implementation of the convention (Article XIV). The
Standing Committee provides policy guidance to the Secretariat in relation to the
implementation of the treaty, and monitors the management of the Secretariat’s
budget. The Animals and Plants Committees offer technical support to decision-
makers with respect to wild species protected by CITES.
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A.4 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals
The last convention ascribed to the first generation of biodiversity-related
agreements, the CMS was adopted on 23 June 1979 at Bonn, Germany, and
entered into force on 1 November 1983. At present, 119 states are parties to the
convention. On joining the treaty, states agree to take action, either individually or
in co-operation, to conserve migratory species and their habitats (Article II). A
migratory species means “the entire population or any geographically separate part
of the population of any species or lower taxon of wild animals, a significant
proportion of whose members cyclically and predictably cross one or more national
jurisdictional boundaries” (Article I, paragraph 1).
Animal species are listed in two Appendices based on how threatened they are.
Appendix I includes migratory species which are endangered (Article III, paragraph
1), whereas Appendix II covers migratory species which have an unfavourable
conservation status and those which have a conservation status which would
substantially benefit from international co-operation (Article IV, paragraph 1). A
species may be listed in both Appendices (Article IV, paragraph 2).
States assume three general obligations as contracting parties to the CMS: 1)
promote, co-operate in, and support research on migratory species; 2) provide
immediate protection for migratory species listed in Appendix I; and 3) conclude
Agreements for the conservation and management of species included in Appendix
II (Article II, paragraph 3). Parties that are range states of species protected by the
convention – a range state in relation to a particular migratory species means “any
State… that exercises jurisdiction over any part of the range of that migratory
species, or a State, flag vessels of which are engaged outside national
jurisdictional limits in taking that migratory species (Article I, paragraph 1) – are
required to report on the measures that have adopted to implement the provisions
of the treaty for those species (Article VI, paragraph 3).
Parties that are range states of Appendix-I species shall endeavour to conserve
and, where possible, restore habitats of the species concerned; mitigate the effects
of activities which hinder species migration; prevent or reduce the factors that are
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endangering or may further endanger the species; and prohibit the taking of
animals belonging to those species (Articles III, paragraphs 4 and 5).
The treaty envisages two types of Agreements for the conservation of migratory
species. On the one hand, range states of Appendix-II species shall endeavour to
conclude AGREEMENTS – capital letters are intentionally used in the text of the
treaty – “where these should benefit the species and should give priority to those
species in an unfavourable conservation status” (Article IV, paragraph 3). On the
other hand, all parties are encouraged to adopt agreements – lower-case letters
are here used – “for any population or any geographically separate part of the
population of any species or lower taxon of wild animals, members of which
periodically cross one or more national jurisdiction boundaries” (Article IV,
paragraph 4). Whereas AGREEMENTS are primarily targeted at Appendix-II
species with an unfavourable conservation status, agreements may grant
protection to any migratory species, whether or not it is listed in the CMS’
Appendices. To date, 7 AGREEMENTS and 19 agreements – in the form of
Memoranda of Understanding – have been concluded by range states of migratory
species.
The convention states, in a similar fashion to CITES, that its provisions shall not
affect the right of parties to adopt stricter domestic measures for the conservation
of migratory species, regardless of whether they are listed in the Appendices of the
treaty (Article XII, paragraph 3). Also, the provisions of the convention shall not
“affect the rights or obligations of any Party deriving from any existing treaty,
convention or Agreement” (Article XII, paragraph 2).
Convention bodies include the CoP, which meets at intervals of three years to
review the implementation of the treaty; the Standing Committee, which offers
policy guidance between meetings of the CoP; the Scientific Council, responsible
for providing scientific advice and identifying research and conservation priorities in
relation to migratory species; and the Secretariat, the functions of which are:
arranging meetings of the CoP, promoting co-operation, collecting information,
preparing reports on its work, maintaining an updated list of CMS’ Appendices,
encouraging the conclusion of AGREEMENTS, amongst others (see Article IX,
paragraph 4). The Secretariat is administered by UNEP and is based in Bonn,
Germany.
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A.5 Convention on Biological Diversity
The CBD is part of the second generation of biodiversity-related instruments (those
adopting an ecosystem-based approach as opposed to a more specific focus on
certain species and habitats). It was adopted on 22 May 1992 at the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. It
entered into force on 29 December 1993 and comprises 193 states. The three
general objectives of the convention are “the conservation of biological diversity,
the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (Article 1). The treaty
defines biological diversity as “the variability among living organisms from all
sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and
the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within
species, between species and of ecosystems” (Article 2).
As parties to the CBD, states are required to develop national strategies for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity – or adapt for this purpose
existing strategies; as well as integrate the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity into sectoral and cross-sectoral programmes (Article 6).
A number of areas are identified in the treaty as requiring action from state parties,
including identification and monitoring (Article 7), in-situ and ex-situ conservation
(Article 8 and 9), sustainable use of components of biological diversity (Article 10),
incentive measures (Article 11), impact assessment and arrangements for
minimising adverse impacts on biological diversity (Article 14), access to genetic
resources (Article 15), handling of biotechnology and distribution of its benefits
(Article 19), access to and transfer of technology (Article 16), research and training
(Article 12), public education and awareness (Article 13), exchange of information
(Article 17), and technical and scientific co-operation (Article 18). Parties must
report on measures adopted to implement the provisions of the convention (Article
26).
Some of the duties mandated by the treaty are as follows: establish protected
areas; promote the protection of ecosystems and natural habitats; rehabilitate
degraded ecosystems; regulate the use and release of living modified organisms;
prevent the introduction of species into ecosystems where they do not naturally
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occur; preserve the knowledge and practises of local communities relevant to the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; and enact legislation for
the protection of threatened species (Article 8). To further the goal of sustainable
use – defined by Article 2 as “the use of components of biological diversity in a way
and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity,
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and
future generations” –, the CBD’s parties commit to incorporating the conservation
and sustainable use of biological resources into national decision-making
processes, and protecting and encouraging customary uses of biological resources
that are sustainable (Article 10). The convention also requires parties to facilitate
access to genetic resources and share the benefits arising from the commercial
and other utilisation of such resources (Article 15).
The CBD was envisaged to be further elaborated through the adoption of specific
protocols (Article 28). Two such protocols have been concluded to date, namely, 1)
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which was adopted on 29 January 2000 and
entered into force on 11 September 2003; and 2) the Nagoya Protocol on Access
to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization, adopted on 29 October 2010 and not yet in force.
On becoming a member of the CBD, a state acknowledges that the provisions of
the treaty shall not affect its rights and obligations under other treaties concluded
before the CBD, “except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity” (Article 22).
The three main bodies of the Convention are: 1) the CoP, which reviews the
implementation of the convention; 2) the Secretariat, which is based in Montreal,
Canada and is in charge of arranging CoP meetings; preparing reports on the work
assigned to it by the CoP; establishing co-operation arrangements with relevant
international bodies, among other functions; and 3) the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, tasked with providing scientific,
technical and technological input to decision-making.
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A.6 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture
The ITPGRFA was adopted on 3 November 2001 at the 31st session of the
Conference of FAO (Rome, Italy). It entered into force on 29 June 2004 and its
membership comprises 131 states. In line with the CBD, the objectives of the
ITPGRFA are “the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for
food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of
their use” (Article 1.1). Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA)
are defined as “any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for
food and agriculture” (Article 2). The treaty explicitly states that its objectives will be
attained by establishing a close relationship with FAO and the CBD (Article 1.2).
The treaty mandates parties to promote an integrated approach to the exploration,
conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA, taking actions such as surveying and
inventorying PGRFA; supporting the efforts of farmers and local communities
relative to the conservation and management of PGRFA; promoting in situ
conservation, i.e., in the wild or on farmers’ fields, of wild crop relatives and wild
plants for food production; and co-operating in the design of an efficient system of
ex situ conservation (Article 5.1). Also, Parties are required to minimise or eliminate
threats to PGRFA (Article 5.2), adopt appropriate policy and legal measures for the
sustainable use of PGRFA (Article 6.1), and integrate the conservation and
sustainable use of PGRFA into their agricultural and rural programmes and
strategies (Article 7.1).
Farmers’ rights in relation to PGRFA are protected by Article 9 of the convention.
Contracting parties pledge therein to safeguard traditional knowledge related to
PGRFA, ensure the right of farmers to equitably participate in the distribution of
benefits arising from the utilisation of PGRFA, and involve farmers in local decision-
making processes concerning PGRFA (Article 9.2).
Article 10 establishes a multilateral system to facilitate access to a selected pool of
PGRFA and share the benefits arising from the utilisation of these resources. The
system covers 64 crops which are deemed essential for food security and
interdependence (Article 11.1). Article 12.4 stipulates that access is to be provided
pursuant to a standard material transfer agreement (MTA) to be developed by the
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Governing Body of the ITPGRFA. The MTA was adopted on 16 June 2006 through
Resolution 1/2006 and is the legal instrument by which PGRFA under the
multilateral system may be accessed. The MTA also “makes provision for the fair
and equitable sharing of the commercial benefits resulting from the use of such
resources” (ITPGRFA Doc IT/GB-1/06/Report). The treaty envisages a number of
benefit-sharing mechanisms, including “exchange of information, access to and
transfer of technology, capacity-building, and the sharing of the benefits arising
from commercialization” (Article 13.2)
Article 14 encourages states to implement the Global Plan of Action for the
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (GPA), which was adopted on 23 June 1996 at the FAO International
Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, held in Leipzig, Germany. The
GPA is a framework for action at community, national, regional and international
levels, which “seeks to create an efficient system for the conservation and
sustainable use of plant genetic resources, through better cooperation,
coordination and planning and through the strengthening of capacities” (FAO,
2013). Parties are also expected to co-operate to develop a Global Information
System on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture in order to facilitate
the exchange of information (Article 17). To accomplish this goal, parties are
required to seek co-operation with the Clearing House Mechanism of the CBD
(Article 17.1).
The Governing Body is the main organ of the treaty and its basic function is to
promote the implementation of the convention. The Secretariat is tasked with
organising sessions of the Governing Body, carrying out activities mandated by the
CoP, and reporting on its work (Article 20.2). It is housed at the FAO headquarters
in Rome, Italy. Unlike the other biodiversity-related conventions, the ITPGRFA
lacks a dedicated scientific advisory body to assist decision-making.
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Appendix B Research Concept Note
To approach potential interviewees, the research used two different concept notes.
The first note, circulated among treaty secretariat officials and international experts
(first document attached), invited prospective participants to share their views on
the synergies developed in the biodiversity cluster and their effects at the national
level. The second one, disseminated among CBD national focal points and
available in English and Spanish (second and third documents attached), placed
emphasis on national-level synergies among biodiversity-related conventions and
the national positions of countries with regard to inter-treaty co-ordination. The
latest versions of the concept notes are provided here. These are revised and
refined versions from earlier editions used at the outset of data collection. There
were no substantive differences across versions.
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B.1 Concept note for international officials and experts
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B.2 Concept note for national focal points (English version)
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B.3 Concept note for national focal points (Spanish version)
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Appendix C Participant Consent Form
The participant consent form that participants were required to complete, sign, and
return is attached to this appendix in its English and Spanish versions. Note that
these are the standard versions. Slight adjustments were made in some cases to
accommodate participants’ concerns (a simplified consent form, for instance, was
used when participants opted for a questionnaire instead of an interview).
- 278 -
C.1 Standard English version
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C.2 Standard Spanish version
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Appendix D Interview Protocol/Questionnaire
This appendix presents the list of questions that participants were given in advance
of the interview and/or were required to answer via e-mail. Different questions were
posed to international officials/experts (see first document attached) and national
focal points (see second (English version) and third (Spanish version) documents
attached). The standard versions of the interview protocol/questionnaire are
provided. These are the latest versions used and do not differ substantively from
earlier editions. Note that the interviews followed a semi-standardised format such
that the questions of the interview protocol were modified or omitted as interviews
progressed. In the case of participants who chose to answer a questionnaire, the
questions stayed unaltered.
- 281 -
D.1 Standard English version (for international officials and experts)
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D.2 Standard English version (for national focal points)
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D.3 Standard Spanish version (for national focal points)
